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Abstract 
 
Due to the lack of an established philosophical tradition in Australia, Heideggerian 
scholarship has relied heavily on readings coming from abroad, especially from 
North America. However, the same lack has granted a certain intellectual freedom, 
and some novel and exciting ideas have been able to emerge, a relatively large 
portion of which has been more or less directly influenced by Heidegger’s thought. 
This makes it all the more urgent for an independent interpretation of Being and 
Time to emerge within the Australian context. Needless to say, such a new and 
independent interpretation of Being and Time requires a careful engagement with 
those readings currently dominating Heideggerian scholarship. And since no 
influence has been stronger in Australia than that of commentators working in the 
United States, the primary aim of this dissertation will be to define and assess the 
major currents in the contemporary North American interpretation of Being and Time. 
 
Accordingly, I shall firstly identify four main readings of Being and Time which will be 
exemplified by the four scholars who I believe embody these readings most 
comprehensively. These are, the Pragmatic reading of Hubert Dreyfus, the 
Epistemological reading of Cristina Lafont, the Hermeneutical reading of Stephen 
Crowell and the Ethical reading of François Raffoul. Of these four interpretative 
trends, at least the first two, and to a lesser degree also the third, tend to pay 
excessive attention to Heidegger’s notion of understanding. Such readings run the 
risk of reducing Heidegger’s work to a search for that ground which allows for the 
discoveredness of entities in their ‘truth’. Once this reduction is carried out, the focus 
of Being and Time comes implicitly yet inevitably to shift from ontology to 
epistemology. As a result, the notion of Being developed in the Pragmatic and the 
Hermeneutic interpretation, as well as, partially, in the Phenomenological reading, is 
an incomplete one. For Dreyfus, Being is nothing more than the unspoken social 
background, a sort of preconscious knowing-how, which determines the ‘what’ of 
things. For Lafont, it is merely the function of a Language which determines the 
being of entities by conditioning the means through which entities are interpretatively 
understood by Dasein. In both cases, Being is reduced to the quasi-transcendental 
condition of the correctness of human understanding and Heidegger’s greatest 
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achievement would be that of having definitively and inextricably bound human 
subjectivity to such a condition, lest it not be at all. Similarly, also Crowell runs the 
risk of reducing Being to a mere grounding space, i.e. the ‘space of meaning’, a 
transcendental-phenomenological clearing where entities can be discovered as what 
they ‘are’. It must be said, however, that the Phenomenological interpretation of 
Being and Time, far from Dreyfus’ and Lafont’s unsophisticated approaches, has the 
great merit of having released the study of Heidegger’s philosophy to the necessary 
confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology, without which a satisfactory 
interpretation of Being and Time cannot be achieved. On the other hand, Raffoul’s 
Ethical reading, by paying close attention to the analysis of authentic Disclosedness, 
especially in relation to the call-response dynamic which characterises Dasein 
fundamental openness to its Being, shows Dasein’s existential subjectivity not as a 
static essence that Dasein ‘has’ and that can be ‘known’, but as the existential 
relation to that alterity which is Dasein’s own Being.  
 
Building upon some of Raffoul’s insights, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that, 
firstly, much of the interpretative tradition which has influenced the current Australian 
understanding of Being and Time has mistakenly taken the analysis of 
discoveredness as the principal aim of Heidegger’s book rather than his starting 
point, and overlooked the strategic role of the concept of Disclosedness in the 
economy of the book’s ontological project. Secondly, by conducting a critical study of 
the notion of Disclosedness and its constituents, paying special attention to 
Heidegger’s analysis of authentic Disclosedness, this essay attempts to bring to the 
fore what I believe is Heidegger’s fundamental concern, namely, that of constructing 
a phenomenology of the transcendent ground of phenomenology itself. As such, 
Disclosedness constitutes the bridging notion between the phenomenological ‘space 
of meaning’ and the ethical ‘call-response of alterity’, the unifying space of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological and mystical voice. Yet this unification can be 
achieved only if the notion of Disclosedness is interpreted not as the openness which 
results from having merely understood something, but as the existential relation with 
that otherness which characterises Dasein in its transcendence and, as such, 
manifests Dasein in its Being. This otherness is Dasein’s Being. 
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In order to explore this relation more thoroughly, I shall introduce the notion of 
Otherness in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This may seem an arbitrary move, but, 
as I shall demonstrate, the comparison between Levinas’ analysis of Alterity and 
Heidegger’s treatment of authentic Disclosedness proves extremely useful in 
justifying the grounding nature of the disclosing relation between Dasein and its 
Being, in respect to discoveredness of intraworldly entities, the Disclosedness of the 
World and, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being itself. With the help of Levinas’ 
philosophy, this dissertation will show that while Heidegger begins his analysis with a 
study of the human understanding, initially described as grounded in a pre-emptive 
understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis], in Being and Time his final goal is the 
overcoming of a notion of the human existence centred exclusively on understanding 
in favour of a ‘relational’ interpretation of Dasein. Therefore, Dasein’s existential 
openness to its Being is no longer characterised as an understanding of Being but in 
terms of the relation of Disclosedness between Dasein itself and its Being 
[Seinserschlossenheit]. This is not merely a terminological shift, but constitutes an 
attempt to pay closer attention to what I believe is Heidegger’s original avenue for 
overcoming transcendental philosophy and paves the way to a true philosophy of the 
transcendent. Being and Time tries to achieve this quasi-mystical goal by radicalising 
the phenomenological notion of intentional space in terms of the disclosive relation 
between Dasein and its Being. As such, in this dissertation I shall, finally, propose a 
reading of Being and Time centred on the notion of Disclosedness, able therefore 
not only to acknowledge the presence of Heidegger’s two voices, but also to bring to 
the fore Heidegger’s effort to reconcile them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Do not read Being and Time!” proclaimed Jeff Malpas from the heights of his key-note 
address at a meeting of the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) in 2009. 
I am still not exactly sure what he meant. Perhaps, that the Heidegger ‘after’ Being and Time 
is the more dependable Heidegger. Certainly, the later Heidegger is currently the most 
fashionable, especially among English-speaking philosophers. Perhaps Malpas’ statement 
was intended to prevent researchers, whether Heideggerian or not, from wasting time on what 
he believed to be a philosophical dead end. Indeed many contemporary commentators of 
Being and Time have disguised the poverty of their interpretations behind the unfinished 
nature of this book. 
 
In the last three decades there has been a progressive rise in Heideggerian scholarship within 
the Australian context, as shown, for example, by the large number of papers on Heidegger at 
the most recent ASCP Conference in 2013. Although most of the attention seems to  have 
been devoted to Heidegger’s later essays - such as the Letter on Humanism, The Question 
Concerning Technology, The Origin of the Work of Art, and the like - Being and Time has 
also attracted its share of attention. Certainly, it remains one of the major contributions to 
philosophy in the twentieth century, and a fundamental reading for anyone who is seriously 
interested in engaging with Heidegger’s thought. 
 
There are, of course, different views as to why this is the case. To cite a few, Jean-Paul Sartre 
believed that Being and Time constituted a penetrating phenomenological analysis of the 
Cartesian subject; Hans Georg Gadamer considered it as the stepping stone for modern 
hermeneutics; Derrida regarded Heidegger’s masterwork to be an inspiring attempt towards 
the ultimate deconstruction of Western metaphysics; and Gianni Vattimo finds in the 
analytics of Dasein the roots of that ‘Week Thought’ [Pensiero Debole] which constitutes the 
core of his own philosophy. In addition, the influence of Being and Time has been felt beyond 
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the domain of pure philosophy, from art to psychology, from architecture to pedagogy, from 
literary theory to psychology, and from neuroscience to theology. 
 
Despite the importance of Being and Time within contemporary philosophical debate, very 
few writers have seriously engaged in an in-depth study of the text, and little work has been 
done to compile a consistent interpretation of it. This has left Heideggerian scholarship in a 
state of confusion, particularly among relatively recent academic communities where the lack 
of an established philosophical tradition has further prevented engagement with demanding 
philosophical texts such as the one in question. This has been especially true in Australia 
where Heideggerian scholarship has relied heavily on major interpretations coming from 
North America. Much of our research and teaching has been influenced by what and how the 
‘Americans’ are reading. In addition, although the magnitude of Heidegger’s masterwork and 
its large influence continue to draw the attention of many, most of the explorations conducted 
on Being and Time have been subsidiary to other, more contemporary and often tangential 
research interests. As a result, the task of carefully interpreting Being and Time has been 
neglected. Because of this, much Australian Heideggerian scholarship suffers from an over 
reliance on second hand accounts, employed as convenient shortcuts. What this ultimately 
means is that, aside from some noteworthy exceptions including Bruin Christensen, Richard 
Colledge, Ingo Farin and, more recently, Paolo Diego Bubbio, we have largely failed to do 
the important work of engaging with the most challenging ideas and passages from Being and 
Time. 
 
While there are difficulties with how we currently read Heidegger, there are some positives 
as well. The lack of an established philosophical tradition in Australia has granted a certain 
intellectual freedom, and some novel and exciting ideas have been able to emerge. A great 
deal of radical philosophical work is produced in our country each year in the field of 
Continental Philosophy, and a relatively large portion of this is more or less directly 
influenced by Heidegger’s thought. Therefore, I believe that anyone who is genuinely 
committed to supporting the rise of an original scholarly tradition in Australia, especially 
within the field of Continental philosophy, can no longer elude a serious confrontation with 
Heidegger’s more challenging works, particularly Being and Time. This makes it all the more 
urgent for an independent interpretation of Being and Time to emerge within the Australian 
context. 
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Needless to say, a new and independent interpretation of Being and Time requires a careful 
engagement with those readings currently dominating Heideggerian scholarship. And since 
no influence has been stronger in Australia than that of commentators working in the United 
States, the primary aim of my work in this dissertation will be to define and assess the major 
currents in the contemporary North American interpretation of Being and Time. 
 
The picture I intend to sketch is deliberately an abridged one, in the attempt to focus the 
reader’s attention on the major trends in the field. This will be achieved by identifying each 
of these trends with the work of the most representative proponents of each. Indeed, since a 
comprehensive assessment of the Anglo-American interpretation of Being and Time is still 
largely uncharted territory, such an approach should help presenting all major interpretations 
in the clearest, most accessible way, while avoiding the risk of wandering too far into the 
details of each particular interpretation. Accordingly, I shall identify four main readings of 
Being and Time which will be exemplified by the four scholars who I believe embody these 
readings most comprehensively. 
 
The first of the readings I shall engage with will be that of Hubert Dreyfus in his book Being-
in-the-World.
1
 In spite of what is arguably a lack of sophistication, Dreyfus’ so called 
pragmatic reading of Being and Time has certainly been one of the most influential within the 
English-speaking philosophical world. In Being-in-the World Dreyfus focuses almost 
exclusively on Division One of Being and Time where, according to him, Heidegger moves 
from a description of Dasein’s everyday relation with intraworldly entities to the exploration 
of the general constitution of the intelligibility of entities in general. The core of the 
Pragmatic Interpretation consists in the analysis of this potentiality for intelligibly in terms of 
the shared and unspoken cultural background which makes of an entity a human Dasein. 
Being a Dasein means to be always, already socialised according to that ‘normal knowing-
how’ which constitutes Dasein’s world, and according to which entities are understood in 
terms of what ‘one does’ with them. In other words, entities are what they are, i.e. have 
Being, according to the average cultural preconceptions from which Dasein approaches them, 
and can be approached only within the limits defined by this unconscious, unspoken 
understanding. In this way the Pragmatic Interpretation equates Being to the World, that is, 
the shared horizon within which entities are understood as the entities they are. As such, the 
                                                 
1
Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I  (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1991). 
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term ‘Being-in-the-world’ would supposedly indicate the givenness of that background from 
which Dasein’s understanding depends. This notion, which Dreyfus takes as the most original 
contribution of the book, is then exploited in order to construct Being and Time as an attempt 
to validate pragmatic truth in terms of the human understanding of intraworldly entities. 
The second interpretative trend which I shall examine is that discussed by Cristina Lafont in 
her book Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure.
2
 Like Dreyfus, Lafont focuses 
primarily on Division One of Being and Time and on Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s 
understanding of intraworldly entities, in an attempt to explore the notion of truth that this 
analysis yields. Unlike Dreyfus’, Lafont’s interpretation concentrates on the phenomenon of 
‘Discourse’,3 construed as both the fundamental structure of intelligibility and the limiting 
horizon which actively determines the possible ways in which a given entity can be 
understood by Dasein. As such, Lafont names her reading ‘hermeneutic’, supporting the view 
that discovering an entity in its Being always requires a prior understanding of Being – a pre-
interpretational ground upon which the entity itself can emerge as what it is for Dasein. 
Hence, understanding does not mean finding out ‘what’ that entity is but uncovering the way 
in which the Being of that entity is understood by Dasein. This 'way' in which an entity enters 
into the intelligibility of Dasein is the meaning of that entity.
4
 From this Lafont infers that the 
way the Being of an entity is understood, that is to say, the interpretation of that entity 
according to its meaning, determines what the entity itself ‘is’, i.e. the reference of that 
meaning. And, moving from Heidegger’s assertion that “[d]iscourse is the Articulation of 
intelligibility”,5 Lafont concludes that what determines our understanding of an entity as such 
is the possibility of Articulation provided by Discourse. And what actually gets articulated 
through Discourse in Language [Sprache] is the entity itself as meaning. In other words, 
Lafont takes Heidegger’s hermeneutic intuition concerning the way in which Dasein 
discoveringly understands entities to mean that Dasein’s understanding is ultimately 
determined by the Language through which that act of understanding is Articulated. The all-
encompassing notion of Discourse which results from this interpretation is more or less 
explicitly equated by Lafont to that understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis] which at the 
                                                 
2
Cristina Lafont, Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
3While Lafont’s usage of the terms Discourse and Language is at best confusing, her main argument concerns 
what I will refer throughout this dissertation as ‘Discourse’, i.e. the ontological ground of Language and 
languages. 
4
Cfr: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.193, H.152. 
5
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
pp.203-204, H.161. 
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outset of Being and Time is described as the foundation of the hermeneutic understanding 
typical of Dasein. This hermeneutic foundation of knowledge is then likened by Lafont to the 
Kantian transcendental schema, that is, the grounding structure of the truth concerning any 
object of knowledge.
6
 Yet, whereas Kant’s schemas can rely on the necessary nature of the 
unity of apperception which grounds it in order to yield objective truth, Heideggerian 
Language is only capable of yielding a historically-relative truth, due to the factical nature of 
Dasein. Finally, insofar as Discourse is both normatively constitutive for the Being of entities 
and generally all-encompassing, Lafont interprets Being and Time as a desperate attempt to 
ground true knowledge upon a relative foundation which cannot be internally revised; this is 
achieved by appealing to a concept of truth which is not the result of an internal learning 
process driven by Dasein but the event of an independent breakthrough of the system itself. 
This is what Lafont calls Heidegger’s ‘reification’ of Discourse.7 In other words, according to 
Lafont, the overall consistency of Being and Time’s philosophy requires Discourse to be not 
only an analytic constituent of Disclosedness but the active drive of all events of 
Disclosedness according to a ‘fate’ for which Dasein is not responsible, albeit being 
ultimately thrown into it. 
 
The third interpretation of Being and Time that I shall consider is, I contend, definitely more 
comprehensive and sophisticated, despite the fact that it is less well-known and commented 
upon. This reading has been developed by Steven Crowell in his book Heidegger, Husserl 
and the Space of Meaning,
8
 and in a few of Crowell’s published articles.9 While Dreyfus and 
Lafont, as well as many others, take Being and Time to be at bottom a reaction against 
phenomenology, Crowell believes that Heidegger's philosophy is fundamentally in keeping 
with the spirit of Husserl's phenomenological research. The reading of Being and Time that 
Crowell develops, which for obvious reasons I will refer to as the Phenomenological 
Reading, interprets Heidegger's philosophy as a transcendental-phenomenological attempt to 
describe the conditions of possibility of the discoveredness of entities, as well as the 
Disclosedness of Being, to Dasein. Since Heidegger defines the latter as an entity whose 
                                                 
6
Cfr: Cristina Lafont, Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp.22-23. 
7Lafont however refers to it as ‘the reification of Language’. Cfr: Cristina Lafont, Heidegger, Language and 
World-Disclosure, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.1, 105, 246. 
8
Steven Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning, (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 2001). 
9Cfr: Steven Crowell, “Meaning and the Ontological Difference”, Tulane Studies in Philosophy 32 (1984), 
pp.37-44. 
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Being consists in an intrinsic openness to the manifestness of both Being and, as a 
consequence, entities, Crowell believes Dasein to be, strictly speaking, a form of 
intentionality, albeit a radicalised version. In this sense, Dasein would be capable not only of 
directing itself towards the ‘wherein’ within which entities are discovered but also, and most 
importantly, of disclosing the space which allows the manifestation of the ground of 
intentionality itself, i.e. Being. This ground is always, already manifested to Dasein, a fact 
which constitutes that existential character of Dasein’s intentionality to which Heidegger 
refers, depending on the context, as ‘understanding-of-Being’, ‘Being-in-the-world’, or 
‘Care’. 
 
Crowell believes this to be nothing more than a radicalisation of Husserl’s transcendental 
reduction, which consists in a reduction of ‘in-themselves’ to the way in which consciousness 
is intentionally directed towards them as ‘phenomena’. What would set Heidegger apart from 
Husserl is the method used to achieve the reduction: while Husserl’s starting point is still the 
Cartesian schema comprising of res cogitans and res extensa, thus requiring an epoché in 
order to clear out the field of intentionality, Heidegger begins by assuming that in fact the 
phenomenological field is more fundamental than Descartes’ and as such does not actually 
require to be justified through the epoché. This basic assumption is discussed by Heidegger in 
terms of the ‘always, already’ of Dasein, in relation to its Being-in-the-World and its 
understanding of Being. From this it would follow that the ground itself, i.e. Being, and the 
way in which the latter is understood by Dasein, namely, its meaning, can be fundamentally 
equated. As such, Crowell proposes to understand Being in terms of both its meaning as well 
as the space of all meaning, thus reducing Being solely to its Disclosedness within the 
intentional space, as the ground of that space itself. 
 
The fourth and final reading of Heidegger’s masterwork which I shall examine has been 
developed by François Raffoul during the course of his career, and has recently gained some 
visibility thanks to Raffoul’s book The Origin of Responsibility.10 In spite of sharing some of 
Crowell’s views on the relation between Heidegger and Phenomenology, Raffoul’s approach 
to Being and Time is radically different from the other three interpretations mentioned thus 
far. By reading the text through the lens of the longstanding French Heideggerian tradition, 
spanning from Sartre, Ricoeur and Levinas to Derrida, Badiou and Dastur, Raffoul creates 
                                                 
10
François Raffoul, The Origin of Responsibility, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
7 
 
something of a counterpoint to other Anglo-American interpretations in their tendency to 
concentrate excessively on the analysis of Dasein’s discoveredness of intraworldly entities 
and of the background which allows it. Raffoul shifts the interpretational focus to Division 
Two of Being and Time, where Heidegger pays closer attention to Dasein in terms of its 
authentic transcendence as the meaning of Dasein’s Being, i.e. its temporality. On this 
ground, Raffoul attempts a reinterpretation of the concept of Dasein as a transcendental-
phenomenological subjectivity, capable of an essential openness towards ‘otherness’. This is 
at the basis of Raffoul’s claim that Heidegger’s ontology is at bottom not a question 
concerning Dasein’s understanding of Being but, most importantly, a question concerning 
responsibility; that is to say, Dasein’s responsiveness to the call of another. To be called, 
according to Raffoul, is to be ‘thrown’. In other words, Dasein is existentially factical insofar 
as its Being is both essentially finite and existentially responsible for the null ground of that 
finitude. The null ground that Dasein is called to take up is the fundamental alterity to which 
Dasein is to respond; and this ‘Other’ that in the call calls Dasein to itself is nothing other 
than Dasein’s Being. As such, Raffoul radically redefines Being and Time’s philosophy in 
terms of the call and response between Dasein and its Being, dubbing it Originary Ethics. For 
this I will name this fourth and final interpretation as the Ethical Reading of Being and Time. 
 
Certainly, there are many and very noteworthy commentators working in the United States 
who have been left out of this picture, including Charles de Guignon, Mark Wrathall, 
William Blattner, Theodore Kisiel, Daniel Dahlstorm, Leslie MacAvoy, Robert Bernasconi, 
Taylor Carman, Simon Critchley, Thomas Sheehan, Mark Okrent, Frederick Olafson only to 
name a few. These and others have not been cited as their interpretations seem to fit under 
one or more of the interpretative trends I have mentioned, without representing a clear cut 
example of any of them. Nonetheless, a special mention should be made for Theodore Kisiel, 
whose painstaking work on the thought of the early Heidegger and, especially, on the 
chronological evolution of Being and Time has constituted an enormous advancement for the 
understanding of Heidegger’s masterwork. The more historical nature of Kisiel’s work 
implies that his research does not intend to support any general interpretative line on Being 
and Time, so that Kisiel does not figure prominently in this dissertation. This is in no way 
diminishing of the relevance of Kisiel’s research, whose findings constitute a constant point 
of reference for much of the original interpretation developed in the present dissertation. 
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Now, if I have been able to convince the reader that one should indeed read Being and Time, 
it is also important to mention that there are ways in which one should not read it.  I have 
already said that of the four interpretative trends discussed above at least the first two, and 
possibly also the third, tend to pay excessive attention to Heidegger’s notion of 
understanding. Such readings run the risk of reducing Heidegger’s work to a mere search for 
the ground which allows for the discoveredness of entities in their ‘truth’. Once this reduction 
is carried out, the focus of Being and Time shifts implicitly yet inevitably from ontology to 
epistemology. As a result, the notion of Being developed in the Pragmatic and the 
Hermeneutic interpretation, as well as, partially, in the Phenomenological reading, is an 
incomplete one. For Dreyfus, Being is nothing more than an unspoken social background, a 
sort of preconscious knowing-how, which determines the ‘what’ of things. For Lafont, it is 
merely the function of a Language which determines the being of entities by conditioning the 
means through which entities are interpretatively understood by Dasein. In both cases, Being 
is reduced to the quasi-transcendental condition of the correctness of human understanding 
and Heidegger’s greatest achievement would be that of having definitively and inextricably 
bound human subjectivity to such a condition, lest it not be at all. Similarly, also Crowell 
runs the risk of reducing Being to a mere grounding space, i.e. the ‘space of meaning’, a 
transcendental-phenomenological clearing where entities can be discovered as what they 
‘are’. It must be said, however, that the Phenomenological interpretation of Being and Time is 
far from Dreyfus’ and Lafont’s unsophisticated approaches, as Crowell genuinely attempts to 
engage with the notion of Being not only in relation to the discoveredness of intraworldly 
entities but also in terms of the Disclosedness of Being itself to Dasein. In addition, the 
phenomenological approach has the great merit of having released the study of Heidegger’s 
philosophy to the necessary confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology, without which a 
satisfactory interpretation of Being and Time cannot be achieved. Nonetheless, Crowell’s 
interpretation of Being in terms of the ground of understanding, prevents him from 
developing a full discussion of Being in its relation of Disclosedness to Dasein.  
 
Indeed, any reading of Being and Time which construes the book’s ontological philosophy in 
epistemological terms is bound to lose sight of Heidegger’s most important effort, namely, 
using phenomenological means to go beyond transcendental idealism and tap into the 
transcendent itself. As such, Heidegger’s method results in a certain ambiguity concerning 
the way some of the fundamental issues are approached in Being and Time. Crowell readily 
recognises this duality, something that he names ‘Heidegger’s two voices’, i.e. the 
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phenomenological and the mystical one.
11
 Yet, Crowell chooses to actively pursue only one 
of these. Worse still, in my opinion, Lafont and Dreyfus dismiss the mystical voice in 
Heidegger as misleading, and proceed to construe an expurgated version of Being and Time 
which engages with the only half of the book that makes sense in epistemological terms, i.e. 
Division One. 
 
In this interpretative milieu, Raffoul’s Ethical Reading comes as a wakeup call. His insistence 
on the subjective nature of Dasein has the effect of arousing interest around the ethical 
characters of Heidegger’s philosophy, most eminently shown in the analysis of the existential 
relation between Dasein and its Being carried out in Division Two. Certainly, as I shall 
attempt to show throughout my work, Raffoul’s Ethical Interpretation runs the risk of 
reducing the fundamental otherness of Being to an internal movement of Dasein’s 
subjectivity. However, it has the great merit of paying close attention to the analysis of 
authentic Disclosedness, especially in relation to the call/response dynamic which 
characterises Dasein’s fundamental openness to its Being. From this, Raffoul begins to 
construct Dasein’s existential subjectivity in terms of a constant movement of transcendence 
which constitutes what Dasein is, as disclosed to itself in its Being. Hence, the latter is not a 
static essence that Dasein ‘has’ and that can be ‘known’, but an existential relation to that 
alterity which is Dasein’s own Being.  
 
Building upon some of Raffoul’s insights, this dissertation begins from a thorough study of 
the notion of Disclosedness, both in its existential and existentiell forms. This will constitute 
the backbone for the examination of the four chosen readings of Being and Time. This 
dissertation aims to demonstrate that, firstly, much of the interpretative tradition which has 
influenced the current Australian understanding of Being and Time has mistakenly taken the 
analysis of discoveredness as the principal aim of Heidegger’s book rather than his starting 
point, and overlooked the strategic role of the concept of Disclosedness in the economy of 
Being and Time’s ontological project. Secondly, by conducting a critical study of the notion 
of Disclosedness and its constituents, paying special attention to Heidegger’s analysis of 
authentic Disclosedness, this dissertation attempts to brings to the fore what I believe is 
Heidegger’s fundamental concern, namely, that of constructing a phenomenology of the 
transcendent ground of phenomenology itself. As such, Disclosedness constitutes the 
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bridging notion between the phenomenological ‘space of meaning’ and the ethical 
‘call/response of alterity’, the unifying space of Heidegger’s phenomenological and mystical 
voice. Yet this unification can be achieved only if the notion of Disclosedness is interpreted 
not as the openness which results from having merely understood something, but as the 
existential relation with that otherness which characterises Dasein in its transcendence and, 
therefore, manifests Dasein in its Being. This otherness is Dasein’s Being. 
 
In order to explore this relation more thoroughly, I shall introduce the notion of otherness in 
the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This may seem an arbitrary move, but, as I shall 
demonstrate, the comparison between Levinas’ analysis of alterity and Heidegger’s treatment 
of authentic Disclosedness proves extremely useful in justifying the grounding nature of the 
disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being, in respect to discoveredness of intraworldly 
entities, the Disclosedness of the World and, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being itself. 
The comparison between Heidegger’s and Levinas’ philosophies on the subject of otherness 
does not intend to be an in-depth confrontation of these two writers, even though such a 
confrontation is possible, and indeed would be greatly desirable. Rather, I intend to employ 
Levinas’ philosophy as an instrument for exploring Being and Time from a new perspective. 
In this sense, Levinas will be used strategically, as a ‘tool at hand’, in order to throw some 
light on the difficult relation between Dasein and its Being within the field of that relation 
itself. Accordingly, I make no claims for this being the only or even the best possible tool, but 
rather the most useful currently available to me. Karl Jasper, Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Derrida 
or indeed some authors from the analytic tradition could certainly be other possible means to 
the same end, namely, analysing the phenomenon of Disclosedness in order to expose its role 
in relation to the Being of Dasein.  
 
Nevertheless, as it shall become clear in the course of this dissertation, my choice to engage 
with Levinas’ philosophy is far from arbitrary but is rather a necessary move which will 
advance us in the new interpretational path inaugurated by Raffoul. By reframing the concept 
of Dasein’s Being in term of alterity, I will show that, while Heidegger’s analysis begins with 
a study of the human understanding in terms of its groundedness in a pre-emptive 
understanding-of-Being, Being and Time’s final goal is that of overcoming a notion of the 
human existence centred exclusively on understanding in favour of a ‘relational’ 
interpretation of Dasein. Therefore, Dasein’s existential openness to its Being is no longer 
characterised as an understanding of Being but in terms of the relation of Disclosedness 
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between Dasein itself and its Being [Seinserschlossenheit]. This is not a merely 
terminological shift, but constitutes an attempt to pay closer attention to what I believe is 
Heidegger’s original avenue for overcoming transcendental philosophy and pave the way to a 
true philosophy of the transcendent. Being and Time tries to achieve this quasi-mystical goal 
by radicalising the phenomenological notion of intentional space in terms of the disclosive 
relation between Dasein and its Being. As such, in this dissertation I shall, finally, propose a 
reading of Being and Time centred on the notion of Disclosedness, able therefore not only to 
acknowledge the presence of Heidegger’s two voices, but also to bring to the fore 
Heidegger’s effort to reconcile them. The fundamental argument I shall present throughout 
this work is that any interpretation of Being and Time attempting a radical separation of 
Heidegger’s two voices or, worse, the silencing of one in favour of the other, ends up 
overlooking the true depths of Being and Time’s philosophy, reducing Heidegger’s thought to 
a straw-man, useful only for scaring away analytic philosophy’s bigoted crows or continental 
philosophy’s weak-minded sparrows. Regrettably, the ‘sorrowful figure’ of this reading of 
Heidegger’s work has wandered about Anglo-American circles for too many years, so that it 
is not too strong a statement if I say, half provocatively and half seriously, that reading Being 
and Time in the shadow of this gloomy ‘Sir Knight’ is the prime example of how it should 
not be read. 
 
Perhaps this is what Malpas was trying to say: that it is better not to read Being and Time if 
one can read it only according to the interpretations that for so long have been plaguing our 
universities. Or perhaps Malpas thinks that there is in fact no other way of reading Being and 
Time, except as the impossible analysis of the foundation of human understanding. 
Fortunately, I believe there is another way to read Being and Time and this dissertation is an 
attempt to mark the contours of this path.  
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1. THE CONSTITUTION OF DISCLOSEDNESS 
 
 
It is rather unusual for a dissertation concerning Being and Time to begin by discussing the 
notion of Disclosedness. Commentators tend to focus primarily on concepts such as Being-in-
the-World, Care and Temporality, which on the surface seem more central to the analytic of 
Dasein. A more careful study of the text, however, shows that on the one hand all these 
notions constitute progressive attempts to explain the very same fundamental phenomenon, 
namely, the Being of the human Dasein; and that, on the other hand, the concept of 
Disclosedness fulfils this task most comprehensively. For as this dissertation attempts to 
demonstrate, Heidegger’s attempt to overcome traditional epistemology by means of a 
radicalised version of Husserlian phenomenology leverages on the articulated structure of 
Disclosedness to describe the complex relation between Dasein, its Being and the ‘relational 
space’ between the two without either falling into realism or idealism, as well as attempting 
to overcome the limit of transcendental philosophy. Heidegger achieves this by both insisting 
on the unitary nature of Disclosedness as well as maintaining the composite nature of its 
structure. This double movement is consistently upheld by means of the concept of 
equiprimordiality, which describes the inalienable interrelatedness of the constituents of 
Disclosedness. These constituents are Disposition [Befindlichkeit], Understanding 
[Verstehen], Discourse [Rede] and Falling [Verfallen]. The equiprimordial nature which 
underlies the constitution of Disclosedness ensures that there is no one particular way of the 
manifestation of Being which can be taken as paradigmatic or more fundamental than the 
others. Overlooking this simple fact has the effect of breaking an already precarious balance 
and turning the philosophy of Being and Time into a parody of itself. Hence, before I begin 
studying the different possible reading of Heidegger’s book, which I have outlined in the 
introduction, it is necessary to take a step back and outline a preparatory study of the notion 
of Disclosedness and its equiprimordial constituents. 
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i. Dasein, Disclosedness and its Equiprimordial Constitution 
 
In §16 of Being and Time, Heidegger clarifies that “‘Disclose’ and ‘Disclosedness’ will be 
used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify 'to lay open' and 'the 
character of having been laid open'” and that “‘to disclose’ never means anything like ‘to 
obtain indirectly by inference’.”12 Then, in §28, he establishes a connection between the 
‘There’ [Da] of Da-sein and Disclosedness: 
 
In the expression ‘there’ we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of 
this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 
‘there’ for itself. … By its very nature, Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it. If it 
lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is 
not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness. … But in so far as the essence of this 
entity is existence, the existential proposition, ‘Dasein is its disclosedness’, means at 
the same time that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be 
its ‘there’.13 
 
But what does it mean for Disclosedness to be the ‘Da’ of Dasein? And, prior to that, in what 
sense is Dasein its ‘Da’ and, therefore, its own Disclosedness? 
In order to answer these questions, it is important to note that the discussion on Disclosedness 
falls within the scope of Heidegger’s inquiry concerning Being-in [In-Sein] as such. The 
analysis of this phenomenon is especially important within the more general inquiry on the 
fundamental character of Dasein, i.e. Being-in-the-World. 
 
After having clarified the notion of World in §§13-24 and the role of Dasein as the entity 
‘Who’ is-in-the-World in §§25-27, Heidegger introduces the notion of Being-in to clarify the 
way in which Dasein is in-the-World. This ‘in’ has no spatial significance, insofar as the 
phenomenon of Being-in-the-World cannot be taken to characterize “the present-at-hand 
insideness of something present-at-hand ‘in’ something else that is present-at-hand”;14 that is, 
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Dasein cannot be taken to be in-the-World in the same way that water is in the glass.
15
 Yet, if 
not spatially, how is Dasein in-the-World then? 
 
In §18 Heidegger interestingly defines World as “...that in terms of which the ready-to-hand 
is ready-to-hand”;16 thus, whenever Dasein discovers something ready-to-hand, Dasein also 
discloses the world in terms of which that ready-to-hand entity is ready-to-hand. In this sense 
the term ‘world’ can be taken to mean something like the horizon of significance 
[Bedeutsamkeit] which defines the Totality-of-Involvement [Bewandtnisganzheit] that is 
determined by the meaning of Dasein’s Being. This should not be taken to mean that a world 
is disclosed whenever an entity is discovered, but rather the opposite, which is to say that the 
World is always, already disclosed, though non-thematically, whenever Dasein sets forth to 
discover an entity. The character of this ‘always, already’ in regards to the phenomenon of 
the World is especially important, since it constitutes the way of Dasein’s being-in-the-World 
as utterly immersed in what Heidegger initially calls understanding of Being. This character 
is fundamentally ingrained in the make-up of Dasein, which is “…that [entity] which, in its 
very Being, its Being is an issue for it.”17 As such, Dasein is, by definition, constantly in 
relation with Being, and this relationship is constitutive for the Being of Dasein itself. The 
inalienable nature of this relationship is ultimately the meaning of the term Being-in-the-
World. I shall return to this point. 
 
However, the very character of this relationship proves to be somewhat elusive, as Heidegger 
employs different strategies in attempting to define it. As I shall outline in the course of this 
dissertation, Heidegger begins in §4 by discussing this relation in terms of Dasein’s pre-
ontological understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis]. “Understanding of Being” Heidegger 
says “is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being”;18 Heidegger calls this characteristic 
‘being ontological’ and it is so intrinsic to Dasein’s Being that Heidegger defines it as an 
existentiale of Dasein. Then, in the course of Division Two, Heidegger fades the notion of 
pre-ontological understanding of Being in favour of the more comprehensive analysis of 
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Disclosedness, of which understanding is only one of the equiprimordial constituents. A 
thorough account of this transition will be attempted later in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
 
Interestingly enough, in expressing the foundational character of the world, its ‘always, 
already’, Heidegger says: “In anything ready-to-hand the world is always ‘there’.”19 What is 
remarkable in this sentence is the use of the ‘there’ [da], which refers to the ‘early character’ 
of the World in relation to the discoveredness of entities. According to Heidegger “…the 
‘there’ points to a ‘here’ and a ‘yonder’. The ‘here’ of an ‘I-here’ is always understood in 
relation to a ‘yonder’ ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this ‘yonder’…”20 This 
represents the way in which Dasein reaches out to ready-to-hand entities for-the-sake-of its 
own Being. Nonetheless, this ‘reaching out’ is possible only because the space ‘between’ the 
‘here’ and the ‘yonder’ is always, already a ‘common space’. As Heidegger puts it: “ ‘Here’ 
and ‘yonder’ are possible only in a ‘there’…”21 Is this ‘there’ therefore the World? Whenever 
something ready-to-hand is discovered, the world is already ‘there’. But strictly speaking 
what is ‘there’ is not the world but Dasein, and this is the case because Dasein is, in its Being 
by being in-the-world. This fact provides also a provisional answer concerning the question 
of the way in which Dasein is in-the-world; that is, Dasein is in-the-world in a way as to be 
its ‘there’, i.e. being the openness through which a World is disclosed, which in turn allows 
the possibility of a relation between Dasein itself and ready-to-hand entities.  
 
The way in which Dasein is its ‘there’ is what Heidegger calls Disclosedness. This refers, 
most generally, to the essential character of openness of Dasein to its own Being, that is, the 
fact that Dasein is ontological. The ontological character of Dasein results in an openness 
towards ready-to-hand entities. Nevertheless the latter should not be confused with 
Disclosedness itself; rather, the latter is a particular kind of Disclosedness which Heidegger 
calls the Disclosedness of the World, defined as the ‘wherein’ in which entities are 
discovered. With this I have achieved an answer, albeit a partial one, of the question 
concerning the nature of Dasein’s Being-in, i.e. the ‘how’ of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World. 
That is, Dasein is in-the-world as to allow the possibility of discoveredness of entities and the 
Disclosedness of the World. In this way Dasein is ‘there’. Indeed, Dasein is its ‘there’, 
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because its own Being is constantly and fundamentally disclosed to it. As such, Dasein is ‘its 
own there’, by playing a fundamental part in allowing the Disclosedness of its own Being, 
which in turns grounds the Disclosedness of the World and the discoveredness of entities. In 
this sense, Disclosedness is what Being-in ultimately amounts to. 
 
Once Heidegger has established that the question of Being-in is fundamentally a question of 
Disclosedness, he then proceeds to analyse Disclosedness itself in terms of its ‘existential 
constitution’. This analysis consists, firstly, in the study of its equiprimordial constituents 
conducted in §§29-38. In these sections, traditionally reckoned to be at the core of 
Heidegger’s analysis of Disclosedness, the latter is initially broken up into three 
equiprimordial constituents, i.e. Disposition, Understanding and Discourse, which are 
examined, firstly, in general, and, secondly, in their fallen [verfallen]
22
 everydayness. As 
such, Falling also comes to feature in the constitution of Disclosedness in §38, although this 
is not clearly acknowledged as a constituent until §54 of Division Two. 
 
Before I proceed to the analysis of this set of constituents, the question we need to ask is: in 
what sense is Disclosedness constituted? This cannot certainly mean that a number of 
phenomena are the ‘cause’ of Disclosedness. For if Disclosedness, as I hope to demonstrate, 
is that primordial relation between Dasein and its Being, which Heidegger defines as 
Dasein’s ontological character, exemplified in the always, already of Dasein’s Being-in of its 
Being-in-the-World, then Disclosedness, just like Dasein’s most primordial being ontological, 
cannot be derived from any other phenomena. Heidegger is clear on this point: 
 
If we inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot indeed consent to nullify the 
primordial character of this phenomenon by deriving it from others-that is to say, by 
an inappropriate analysis, in the sense of a dissolving or breaking up.
23
 
 
Yet, if Disclosedness cannot be derived from its constituents, how am I to understand this 
constitutive relation between Disclosedness itself and the phenomena of Disposition, 
Understanding, Discourse and Falling? “But the fact that something primordial is underivable 
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does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be 
constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial.”24 
Hence, even though Disclosedness cannot be grounded in any of its constituents,
25
 it may still 
be analysed further; such an analysis would not find anything ‘more primordial’ than 
Disclosedness but will show Disclosedness itself in its articulated structure. The elements of 
this articulation are what Heidegger calls the ‘equiprimordial constituents’ of Disclosedness. 
Heidegger’s neologism ‘equiprimordial’ suggests that the elements of this articulated 
structure are both mutually sustaining and holistically united. As such the equiprimordial 
constituent of a primordial phenomenon are never ‘more primordial’ than the primordial 
phenomenon itself. Thus, although it is impossible to account for a primordial phenomenon 
only through its equiprimordial constituents, an analysis of the latter can provide the reader 
with a more profound insight in the nature of the given primordial phenomenon. In other 
words, analytically breaking up Disclosedness into its constituents will not result in the 
discovery of a more primordial ‘ground’, so to speak; yet, this study should provide a deeper 
insight into the nature of Disclosedness itself. And if, as I have anticipated, Disclosedness is 
the primordial character of Dasein, an inquiry into its structure could be the stepping stone for 
working out the structural totality of Dasein’s Being. Having clarified the notion of 
‘constitution’, I may now turn to the actual analysis of Disclosedness, as it is conducted in 
§§29-38. 
 
ii. Disposition and the Thrownness of Dasein 
 
The first constituent of Disclosedness which Heidegger analyses is Disposition. The term is 
the nominal form of the verb befinden, which, as Macquarrie and Robinson tell the readers of 
the 1962 English translation of Being and Time in a footnote, is most commonly used in the 
phrase ‘Wie befinden Sie sich?’, to ask ‘how are you?’ or, ‘how are you feeling?’.26 Hence, 
traditionally, English renderings of the term Befindlichkeit range from ‘findedness’ and 
‘being-at-ness’ to ‘state-of-mind’. More recently, thanks to Kisiel’s thorough study of the 
transcripts from Heidegger’s early lectures, the term ‘Befindlichkeit’ has been closely 
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associated with Aristotle’s metaphysics, since it is the word that Heidegger adopts to translate 
Aristotle’s diathésis. The latter is defined in Metaphysics 5.19.1022b as:

…the arrangement [diathésis] of that which has parts, either in space or in potentiality 
or in form. For it must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the word, 
‘disposition.’27 
 
This is clearly nothing more than a generic definition of the notion of diathésis, which 
encompasses both physical and moral disposition, which is not surprising given that book 
Delta of the Metaphysics is supposed to be a lexicon of ground concepts. Nonetheless, a more 
careful analysis of Aristotle’s quote in relation to Heidegger’s notion of Disposition within 
the context of Being and Time, shows a lot more than a superficial consonance between the 
two. Hence, I have chosen to render the term 'Befindlichkeit' with the English 'Disposition', 
rather than the more standard ‘state-of-mind’ used by Macquarrie and Robinson. 
 
Concerning Disposition, Heidegger states that, ontically, this term refers to the familiar 
phenomenon of Dasein’s having a mood [Stimmung] or, which is the same, Being-attuned 
[Gestimmtsein].
28
 But what, in fact, does Heidegger mean by ‘mood’ [Stimmung]? In what 
way is Dasein attuned? and to what? Heidegger explicitly rejects any reductions of moods to 
the mere psychological phenomena of 'affects' or 'feelings', which do no more than 
accompany the primary acts of cognition. Instead, moods constitute a genuinely fundamental 
way of Dasein’s Disclosedness. Yet, it is still unclear just how Dasein’s ‘having a mood’ 
would actually contribute to its Disclosedness. Here is where Aristotle’s definition of 
diathésisbecomes helpful. I have explained that diathésis is defined as a kind of ‘position’ 
[thésis]. In relation to ‘that which has parts’ a thésis is that of a something in relation to its 
parts, and of the parts among themselves. In relation to the phenomenon of the Disclosedness 
of Dasein’s Being, the thésis becomes that of Dasein in relation, initially, to entities, both 
intraworldly entities and other Daseins; secondly, to the World; and, ultimately, to its own 
Being. As such, having a mood means finding oneself in a given ‘position’ relatively to other 
entities, to the world, and to Being. It does not amount to being affected by an entity but 
implies that, whenever an entity is discovered by Dasein, that entity stands always, already in 
a relation with Dasein itself. This relation is not a one-sided Kantian Sensibility 
                                                 
27Aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.19.1022b. 
28
It should be noted that, according to Heidegger, it is because Dasein had a mood that entities, the world and 
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[Sinnlichkeit], which proceeds from ‘outside’ to ‘inside’; for Disposition does not name the 
way in which Dasein is affected by ‘something else’. In other words, Disposition does not 
name the relation in between Dasein and its 'object', something which necessarily implies the 
void of a separation, but the givenness of Dasein's existential situation as being always, 
already in-the-World. Hence, to be precise, Dasein's being-attuned is not essentially directed 
towards intraworldly entities. For while their discovery provides a first important clue about 
Disposition, the latter refers more generally to the facticity of the Disclosedness of Being to 
Dasein. Hence, what are commonly called moods, such as fear, boredom, joy etc., constitute 
the ontical manifestation of Dasein’s Being-in, in the sense of its being always, already in 
that space which is conducive to the disclosure of Being. 
 
Then, it should not be difficult to see why Heidegger believes that Disposition brings “Dasein 
before itself… [yet] not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the 
sense of finding itself in the mood that it has”.29 In other words, by revealing to Dasein its 
own being attuned with its there-in, moods contribute to Dasein’s Disclosedness of its Being 
as Being-in-the-World. In this sense, Heidegger says, “the Being of the ‘there’…”, which is 
to say, the ground of Dasein’s Disclosedness, “…is disclosed moodwise in its ‘that-it-
is’”.30This 'that-it-is' ['das Dass'] is nothing but the thrownness of Dasein into its 'There'.31 
‘Thrownness’ is an existentiale of Dasein and indicates the impossibility of Dasein to be 
otherwise than 'what' it is, i.e. an ontological Being-in-the-World. This is true in spite of the 
ever-potential character of Dasein’s existence. Indeed, as I shall argue in the following 
section, Dasein is thrown into nothing else but its being-possible. Ontically, this means that 
moods have the function of manifesting the inevitability of the affective relation between 
Dasein and everything which is significant to Dasein within its hermeneutical situation, i.e. 
its world. 32 As such, moods prove to Dasein the fact of its relatedness with everything which 
shows up in its world. Ontologically, Disposition consists in the disclosure of Dasein’s 
existential thrownness into the inevitability of its Being as being-ontologically-in-the-world. 
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.174, H.135. 
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.173, H.135, 
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Cfr: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.174, H.135. 
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Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, (London: The Scarecrow Press, 2000), 
p.244. 
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What this ultimately discloses is Dasein’s inalienable relation with its ‘that it is and it has to 
be’, namely, its Being. 
 
 
iii. Heidegger’s conception of Understanding 
 
The second constituent of Disclosedness that Heidegger considers is Understanding 
[Verstehen]. In §31 the reader is immediately told by Heidegger that “[a] state of mind 
always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has 
its mood”.33 This does not mean, trivially, that whenever one understands something, one’s 
understanding, “in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing”,34 is always intermingled with 
one’s, so to speak, ‘gut feelings’, and vice versa. This is not to say that this facile 
interpretation is altogether false either. However, the point Heidegger is trying to make is that 
the superficial combination of moods and understanding, which is so familiar in our everyday 
experience, is grounded in a deeper link between Understanding and Disposition. Since the 
concept of Disposition has already been analysed, I shall now turn to that of Understanding 
and then, in turn, will attempt to shed some light on the ‘deeper link’ between these two 
constituents. 
 
Very early in §31, Heidegger clarifies that the notion of Understanding he is interested to 
elucidate is what he calls “primordial Understanding” [ursprüngliche Verstehen].35 In an 
attempt to explain what this primordial understanding actually is, Heidegger states: 
 
To say that in existing, Dasein is its ‘there’, is equivalent to saying that the world is 
‘there’; its Being-there is Being-in, and the latter is likewise ‘there’, as for the sake of 
which Dasein is. In the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is 
disclosed as such, and this Disclosedness we have called ‘understanding’.36  
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The term ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ refers to Dasein insofar as it functions as the ultimate 
‘reason’ according to which entities, or Being, are understood by Dasein. This ‘reason’ is 
what Heidegger calls ‘Bewandtnis’, a notion which will be fully discussed in the following 
chapter. Leaving Heidegger’s complex terminology aside, what the aforementioned quote 
highlights is that understanding is at bottom not about the mere discoveredness of this or that 
object, but the Disclosedness of Dasein’s Being as the ultimate Bewandtnis according to 
which all discoveredness and Disclosedness happen. Hence, what Heidegger calls 
Understanding in its most primordial sense is not about intraworldly entities but about the 
Being of Dasein. 
 
This is not to say that once the ‘essence’ of Dasein is ‘disclosed’ intraworldly entities will be 
finally completely ‘understood’. This is because the phenomenon of Understanding is not 
directed at a static object to behold, but towards the Being of that entity whose Being is 
constantly an issue for it. Loosely speaking, Dasein’s Being is nothing static, but rather the 
pre-emptive totality of Dasein’s existence.37 In this sense, the phenomenon of Understanding 
consists fundamentally in Dasein’s openness to its own potentiality-for-Being. This is 
expressed by Heidegger in the following quote: 
 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression ‘understanding 
something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a 
match for it’, ‘being competent to do something’. In understanding, as an existentiale, 
that which we have such competence over is not a ‘what’, but Being as existing. The 
kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in 
understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its 
competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible.
38
 
 
Understanding, therefore, does not depend on intraworldly entities and it is not primarily 
about them, i.e. it is not about finally grasping ‘some-thing’. Indeed, the fact that Dasein has 
and understanding of intraworldly entities consists in the merely ontic manifestation of a 
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of Dasein’s own Being, on the ground of Dasein’s Being itself, then it is possible for Dasein to hold a clear 
Understanding. 
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deeper ontological structure. The latter consists in Dasein’s ‘having competence over Being 
as existing’ or, which is the same, taking up its own Being in its possibilities. As such what 
Dasein primarily understands is nothing but its own Being,
39
 which in turn determines the 
way in which entities are understood. Heidegger exemplifies this point by saying that the fact 
that I use a hammer to hammer a nail, makes clear that I understand the hammer in terms of 
its possible use, i.e. to hammer nails; this understanding does not exhaust all the possible uses 
of the hammer, but shows the way in which the hammer is manifested to a particular Dasein, 
who is engaged in a particular task, i.e. building something. In the context of building 
something, therefore, the hammer is shown in its ‘hammering’, i.e. its Bewandtnis. This 
particular Bewandtnis would be proper to a Dasein whose primary task is that of building, but 
it would not be so to a Dasein whose task at hand is that of studying archaeological artefacts; 
to the latter, the hammer, given the case it was an ancient tool, may be understood as a means 
to date a certain layer of soil, or to demonstrate the stage of technological development in a 
certain area. Hence, the hammer is ultimately understood in terms of Dasein and what it itself 
is. But what is Dasein? Certainly I cannot answer this question by reducing Dasein’s Being to 
what Dasein actually ‘devotes its life’, as Jean-Paul Sartre does in Being and Nothingness.40 
Heidegger is not trying to argue that the Being of a given entity depends on whether I ‘am’ a 
builder, an archaeologist, a postman etc.
41
 Rather the point is more general and consists, to 
put it bluntly, in that Dasein’s understanding depends on Dasein’s Being. Later in this 
dissertation I shall comment on the meaning of this word ‘depends’. 
 
I have mentioned already that according to Heidegger the Being of Dasein is not something 
‘static’, which may be known in its objective totality once and for all.42 This is due to the fact 
that Dasein is essentially existing, so that, insofar as it ‘daseins’, it cannot be, so to speak, 
‘complete’ or, as Heidegger says, it cannot yet ‘be-a-whole’ [Ganzsein]; so that, it is always 
possible for Dasein to ‘be something else’.  This essential characteristic of the existing 
Dasein is what Heidegger calls potentiality-for-Being [Seinskönnen]. “Understanding” 
Heidegger says, “is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so 
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Yet not as one understands something, but as one relates to another. Understanding Being means essentially to 
exist, where existence is maintaining Being as an issue, that is, relating understandingly to one’s Being. 
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Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology, trans. H. Barnes, (London: 
Methuen, 1957), pp.462-463. 
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This is true to an extent, but only trivially and in the second-degree. 
42This is not entirely correct, insofar as Dasein’s Being does eventually become a whole, but only with Dasein’s 
death. Yet, since understanding is proper only to Dasein, its Being cannot be ‘grasped’ in its totality as an 
object. It may be at most ‘taken up’ in Dasein’s Being-towards-death. 
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in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its being is capable of”.43 The reader 
should remember at this point that Understanding is one of the constituents of Disclosedness. 
In other words, Understanding is one of the ways in which Dasein is-in. What is therefore the 
‘understanding-way’ of Being-in? What does Understanding actually disclose? The answer is 
that Understanding discloses Dasein’s Being in terms of its potentiality-for-Being. The latter 
consists in nothing but Dasein’s transcendental-ontological character which is at the basis of 
Heidegger’s famous claim that Dasein’s essence is its existence. The correctness and 
importance of the connection between Understanding and Dasein’s transcendental-
ontological character will be clearer when I come to discuss the temporal [zeitlich] character 
of Disclosedness as shown primarily in its authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. What is important to 
highlight for now is that Heidegger’s notion of Understanding consists in a clear break with 
traditional epistemology, which focuses exclusively on the relation between, in Heideggerian 
terms, Dasein and intraworldly entities. Conversely, the phenomenon of Understanding 
which Heidegger describes is concerned primarily with the disclosive relation between 
Dasein and its Being, specifically as a potentiality-for-Being. In fact, Dasein’s phenomenon 
Understanding is the clearest example of its ontological nature, its continuous disclosive 
directedness towards its Being.
44
  The disclosure of Dasein’s Being in terms of its 
potentiality-for-Being is what constitutes the horizon for the discoveredness of intraworldly 
entities. As a mode of Disclosedness, Understanding fulfils this function because it “has itself 
the existential-ontological structure which we call ‘projection’ [Entwurf]”.45 This is intended 
as an act of projection upon [auf] a meaning [Sinn];
46
 that is to say: Dasein’s understanding 
of its own Being results from Dasein projecting it upon its meaning, where meaning is taken 
to be the horizon of any understanding projection. In its Being, Dasein discloses itself in 
terms of a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception, which are connected to the 
tripartite structure of temporality.
47
 I will come back to this point in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. As such, what Dasein actually ‘understands’ is primarily its ontological Being, 
that is, its existential potentiality-for-Being. On this ground the World, as the hermeneutical 
horizon of entities, is disclosed. Finally, the horizontal space opened by the disclosure of the 
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World allows intraworldly entities to be discovered by Dasein and, as such, understood in 
their possibilities, that is, in relation to the understanding projection of Dasein’s Being. 
 
Does this mean that Understanding belongs to Dasein and to Dasein only? Yet ‘possibilities’ 
seem to be proper to all entities, even those without the character of Dasein. Heidegger 
confirms this point in §32: 
 
In the projecting of the understanding, entities are disclosed in their possibilities. The 
character of the possibility corresponds, on each occasion, with the kind of Being of 
the entity which is understood.
48
  
 
However, intraworldly entities, i.e. those which do not have the character of Dasein, do have 
possibilities only insofar as they “are projected upon the world –that is, upon a whole of 
significance, to whose reference-relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, has been tied up in 
advance.”49 This is the point I have made initially in this section and I will study this in more 
depth in the following chapter, namely, that entities are discovered only in view of the World 
which is in view of the disclosure of Dasein’s Being as a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. For this, 
entities have possibilities only insofar as they have been discovered according to Dasein’s as 
a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. Hence, Heidegger can say that intraworldly entities come to be 
understood when they are discovered along with the Being of Dasein.
50
 In other words, 
entities different from Dasein have possibilities insofar as they are projected and understood. 
But only Dasein, strictly speaking, projects and understands, and what is projected and 
understood most primordially is the Being of Dasein. As such, all understanding depends,
51
 
ultimately, on Dasein’s understanding of its Being [Seinsverständis], i.e. on the way in which 
the Being of Dasein has been taken over in its possibilities and, thus, ‘understood’. 
 
It is important to keep in mind, as I have already indicated, that the projection of the 
possibilities of Dasein’s Being, or, which is the same, Dasein’s understanding-of-Being, does 
                                                 
48
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.192, H.151. 
49
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.192, H.151. 
50
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.193, H.151. 
51
This does not mean that they depend on Dasein itself; rather they depend on the relation between Dasein and 
its Being. More on this will be said in Chapter 5 of the present dissertation. 
25 
 
not necessarily amount to a Sartrean ‘life-project’: “[p]rojecting”, Heidegger argues, “has 
nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in 
accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as 
Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting”.52 In other words, Dasein, 
as long as it is a Dasein, has to project and cannot ‘choose otherwise’. Can the fact that 
Dasein is always thrown in this ‘projecting’ be connected to the phenomenon of Dasein’s 
thrownness, discussed in the previous section of this chapter? Is Dasein’s thrownness, 
perhaps, exactly this: that Dasein is always, already thrown to project its possibilities 
according to its potentiality-for-Being? This obviously sounds paradoxical. Nevertheless such 
a paradox may begin to shed some light on the strict interconnectedness between Disposition 
and Understanding.  
 
Possibility, as an existentiale, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being, 
in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae). In every case 
Dasein as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite 
possibilities.”53 
 
To be sure the expression ‘definite possibilities’ does not only name what is factually actual 
for a given Dasein –one’s body-weight, one’s parents, one’s country of birth, one’s past 
experiences etc. Michael Gelven is not altogether wrong when, in his A Commentary on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, he argues that Disposition discloses Dasein’s actuality, whereas 
Understanding discloses its possibility.
54
 But what Gelven fails to point out, however, is that, 
at a more structural level, what is truly actual about Dasein is that it is possible. This is 
because, insofar as Dasein’s Being is essentially ‘projecting’, Dasein is existentially a 
potentiality-for-Being. 
 
Here the reader may finally begin to glimpse the structural connection between Disposition 
and Understanding within the constitution of Disclosedness. This is to say, while Disposition 
discloses the Being-in of Dasein in terms of the givenness of Dasein’s condition as ‘thrown’ 
[geworfen] Being-in-the-World, Understanding discloses Being-in-the-world according to the 
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projective nature of Dasein, whose Being ‘in-the-world’ is essentially a Being-in-
possibilities, i.e. a ‘potentiality-for-Being’. 
 
 
iv. Discourse and Language 
 
The third constituent of Disclosedness which Heidegger analyses is Discourse [Rede]. This is 
defined, in §32 as “the articulation of Intelligibility”55 and is said to be “existentially 
equiprimordial with Disposition and understanding”.56 
 
During the course of his analysis, Heidegger seems to deduce Discourse from the 
phenomenon of assertion [Aussage], which is an extreme case of interpretation [Auslegung], 
which, in turn, is ultimately grounded in Dasein’s Understanding. As such, Discourse 
appears, at first, to be a third order phenomenon grounded in Understanding. However, 
Discourse is a third order phenomenon only, so to speak, analytically, which is to say, only 
insofar as the economy of the investigation often requires that the most primordial elements 
be grasped through the study of those more trivial phenomena with which one is generally 
acquainted. Indeed, Heidegger explicitly states that Discourse, as the articulation of 
intelligibility, “underlies both interpretation and assertion”.57 Later in this section I shall show 
the full importance of this point. 
 
What needs to be clarified is whether Discourse may actually be dependent on Understanding 
and Disposition. In §28 Heidegger seems explicitly to state the opposite: 
 
State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by discourse.
58
  
 
This statement is especially controversial and, as I shall show in this dissertation, it has been 
used by some commentators in order to justify a purely linguistic interpretation of Being and 
                                                 
55
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.203-204, H.161. 
56
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.203, H.161. 
57
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.204, H.161. 
58
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.172, H.133. 
27 
 
Time. It is important therefore to clarify in what way Discourse may be equiprimordial to 
Disposition and Understanding, while ‘characterizing’ [bestimmen] equiprimordially the last 
two constituents. 
 
Now, the reader is told by Heidegger that Discourse is a constituent of Disclosedness or, 
which is the same, a ‘way’ of Being-in. I have also already explained that the constituents of 
Disclosedness –or Being-in- are equiprimordial; as such, any event of Disclosedness can be 
split in the different ways in which this very event is manifested. With any event of 
Disclosedness, these ‘ways’ are always given together, and since there is nothing more 
primordial than Disclosedness -or Being-in-, then none of the components can ever be more 
primordial than the other, unless becoming, in a way, more primordial than Disclosedness 
itself. The constituents may still be analysed singularly, as long as one is careful to stress the 
inalienable unity which grounds the possibility of such an analysis. I can now ask what it 
means that “State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by 
discourse”.59 It obviously cannot signify that the first two constituents are ‘grounded’ in the 
latter. One must pay attention to Heidegger’s choice of words here, since the verb used is not 
‘ground’ [grunden] but ‘characterise’ [bestimmen]. The latter term does not necessarily imply 
an idea of causation, as if Disposition and Understanding were ‘effects’ of Discourse. Indeed, 
both the original German ‘bestimmen’ and the English ‘characterise’ do not suggest a strictly 
causal relation. Rather, the emphasis is on the fact that Discourse gives to Disposition and 
Understanding a particular ‘character’ [Bestimmung]. What is this character? 
 
The verb bestimmen and its derivative have a wide range of meanings which, however, 
essentially revolve around the root-noun Stimme, which simply means ‘voice’. Thus be-
stimmen means: ‘to induce’, in the sense of talking someone into something; ‘to determine’, 
in the sense of voicing a resolution; ‘to dispose’ in the sense of uttering an order; ‘to 
organize’, in the sense of dividing a choir in different voices or voicing a piece of music; ‘to 
choose’ in the sense of having a vocation. Is Heidegger arguing that, through Discourse, both 
Disposition and Understanding are given a ‘voice’, are rendered ‘expressible’, or are supplied 
at least with the possibility of being expressible? Yes and no. After having disclosed 
something mood-wise and having understood it, Dasein is granted by Discourse the 
possibility of expressing this event of disclosure. However, the word ‘expressing’ here does 
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not merely mean ‘putting into words’, despite the fact that the latter may be a possible way of 
expression. Strictly speaking, the reason why a disposing-understanding [befindlichen-
verstanden] Disclosedness of something can be, so to speak, put into words, is that Discourse, 
first and foremost, confers to that Disclosedness its ‘character’. This is the character of ‘being 
articulated’, as Discourse is, states Heidegger, “the Articulation of Intelligibility”60 and, more 
generally, of Disclosedness tout court.
61
 Importantly, Articulation is not firstly to do with 
expressing oneself with words but constitutes the ground of the possibility of analysis. 
Hence, Discourse, insofar as it possesses ‘the character of articulation’, grants that 
Disclosedness itself may be articulated in its equiprimordial constituents. In other words, 
without Discourse no articulation is possible; and without articulation, no analysis can be 
achieved. In this sense, for Discourse to ‘characterise’ Disposition and Understanding means, 
first and foremost, to organize Disclosedness in its parts, in its ‘voices’. The articulation of 
Disclosedness allowed by Discourse makes possible for the former to be analysed in terms of 
its constituents or, which is the same, for Being-in to be analysed in terms of equiprimordial 
‘ways of Being-in’. Since Being-in is nothing but Dasein’s essential way of existing as a 
Being-in-the-World, then the analysis of Being-in/Disclosedness
62
 consists ultimately in an 
analysis of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World as that entity whose Being is an issue for it.63 This is 
not to say, as is argued by commentators such as Cristina Lafont, that the constitutive role of 
Discourse can be interpreted as grounding in respect with Disclosedness. In Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation I will attempt to demonstrate the shortcomings of Lafont’s reading of Being and 
Time, specifically in respect to this point. For now I shall try to clarify why, at least at a 
technical level, it is not possible for Heidegger to hold the strong claim that Discourse 
grounds Disclosedness. 
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At the outset of the present section, Discourse has been defined as that which allows a given 
Disclosedness to be made intelligible by means of an articulation. The fact that Discourse is 
the articulation of intelligibility implies, strictly speaking, that Disclosedness, as the unitary 
phenomenon which includes the thrown projection [geworfenen Entwurf] of a ‘disposing 
intelligibility’ [befindlichen Verständlichkeit], may be in some way independent from its 
articulation.
64
 Clearly, given the constituting status of Discourse in relation to Disclosedness, 
it is not possible to disclose anything without it being articulated in Discourse. At the same 
time, it is also not possible to articulate anything without at once understanding it and 
‘disposing’ one’s self in relation to it. However, deducing from this that the constituents of 
Disclosedness actually ‘cause’ the latter to be in one way or another, is to have completely 
misunderstood the intention of Heidegger’s analysis of Being-in. For the constituents 
themselves are nothing but the way in which the unitary-everyday phenomenon of 
Disclosedness is analytically interpreted. Importantly, the analysis of a primordial 
phenomenon, by definition, does not and cannot discover phenomena that are more 
primordial but can only afford better access to the unitary phenomenon itself. Heidegger is 
clearly supporting this point as he argues that analysis does not necessarily get to more 
fundamental phenomena; indeed, the reverse is always true in the case of primordial 
phenomena such as Being-in and Disclosedness.
65
 
 
Finally, I must devote a few lines in order to clarify where I believe the Heidegger of Being 
and Time stands on the rapport between Discourse and Language. Such a discussion will be 
propaedeutic to both my critique of Lafont’s Hermeneutic Interpretation, which will be 
developed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, as well as to the very important discussion of the 
role of Discourse in relation to the phenomenon of authentic [eigentlich] Disclosedness which 
constitutes an important component of the central claim of the present work, and will be 
expounded in Chapter 4. Discourse, Heidegger argues in §34, is “[t]he existential-ontological 
foundation of language”,66 and is “the way in which discourse gets expressed”.67 Understood 
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in terms of ‘Expression’ [Aussprechen], 68 Language is ultimately the existentiell-ontic 
embodiment of the way of Being-in which is ‘Discourse’. Hence, the distinction between 
Discourse and Language may be successfully likened to Saussure’s dualism of Langue and 
Parole, or to Humboldt’s dialectic of enérgeia and érgon. In other words, Language refers to 
‘actual’ ways of expressing Disclosedness, namely, languages, signs, body-language, facial 
expressions, art, etc. Language is ontic as it is discovered in its intraworldly embodiments, 
i.e. a road sign, a written word, a national language etc.; as such its character is essentially 
‘worldly’.69   Furthermore, Language is existentiell: this means that having language is not an 
intrinsic character of Dasein’s Being, as I will attempt to demonstrate in what follows.  
Discourse, on the other hand, is nothing but the articulation which allows a disposing-
understanding Disclosedness to be ‘expressed’.70 Hence, while Language consists in the 
actual ‘expression’ of Disclosedness, Discourse amounts to that ‘potentially for expression’ 
that is grounded in an articulation of intelligibility. This potentiality of expression is both 
existential, insofar as Dasein must have discourse [reden] in order to be a Dasein, and 
ontological, as it is a necessary element of that fundamental Disclosedness of Being which 
makes Dasein what it is, i.e. an ontological entity. 
 
The question now is whether or not the distinction drawn by Heidegger between Discourse 
and Language implies Discourse to be a pre-predicative phenomenon. In other words, I need 
to clarify if Discourse requires necessarily to be expressed as Language, lest not to be at all. 
Furthermore, due to the constitutive role of Discourse, this problem invests the totality of 
Disclosedness. As such, our analysis will ultimately have to elucidate whether Disclosedness 
constitutes the ground of expression or whether Language warrants the Disclosedness of 
anything. In order to assess Heidegger’s position on the matter, I shall begin by quoting an 
often misinterpreted passage from Being and Time: 
 
The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive 
understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse [Rede] in general as an 
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existentiale. It is not a task that can be carried through later on by improving and 
rounding out what has been handed down. Bearing this in mind, we must inquire into 
the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do 
so in accordance with significations; and this articulation must not be confined to 
entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and 
which we express in sentences. A doctrine of signification will not emerge 
automatically even if we make a comprehensive comparison of as many languages as 
possible, and those which are most exotic. To accept, let us say, the philosophical 
horizon within which W. von Humboldt made language a problem, would be no less 
inadequate. The doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether 
it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this ontology.
71
  
 
Commentators often take this passage as a plain dismissal of von Humboldt’s philosophy of 
language.
72
 This seems all the more inexplicable given that Heidegger’s conception of 
Discourse and Language appears at times extremely close to von Humboldt’s. In my view the 
point Heidegger is trying to make in this passage is slightly more subtle. Heidegger does not 
disagree with von Humboldt’s results. Indeed, Heidegger’s analysis of Signification and the 
distinction between Discourse and Language owe very much to von Humboldt’s work. 
Instead, Heidegger must disagree with von Humboldt’s method, namely, the studying of 
ontic-existentiell linguistic instances (Language) in the hope of uncovering its underlying 
ontological structure (Discourse). Insofar as Language is essentially ontic and ‘worldly’, 
devoting oneself to the study of it would essentially reinforce what Heidegger calls Dasein’s 
fascination for the world of intraworldly entities, i.e. its Fallenness. Certainly, as I shall 
clarify, Dasein’s average fallen [verfallen] state consists in a necessary launching pad 
towards the Disclosedness of Dasein’s Being. Nevertheless, Heidegger is clear that the ontic 
by itself cannot bring about the disclosure of the ontological, just as much as the 
discoveredness of intraworldly entities cannot on its own yield the Disclosedness of Being. 
Therefore, the most comprehensive study of Language will never by itself provide a 
substantial insight into the ontological nature of Discourse. Conversely Heidegger believes 
that, since Discourse is a way of Being-in of that Being-in-the-world which is Dasein in its 
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Disclosedness, Discourse may itself be more successfully grasped through the study of the 
phenomenon of Disclosedness in terms of the ontological structure of Dasein.
73
 
 
I have already mentioned that Dasein does not necessarily have language, i.e. it does not 
necessarily need to express itself to be a Dasein. Heidegger’s seems explicitly to reject this 
point when he states plainly: “Dasein has language”.74  It is important therefore to clarify 
what I mean when I say that, for Heidegger, Dasein does not necessarily have language. The 
sentence preceding the latter quote can be of assistance here: 
 
Because discourse is constitutive for the Being of the ‘there' (that is, for disposition 
and understanding), while ‘Dasein’ means Being-in-the-world, Dasein as discursive 
Being-in, has already expressed itself.
75
  
 
Dasein’s Disclosedness is always necessarily articulated in Discourse, so that the possibility 
of expressing itself is connatural to Dasein itself, so that Dasein may express itself without 
fail. Nonetheless, the fact that Dasein expresses itself without fail does not imply that it must 
necessarily do so. Even less, it entails that its discursive Being can be studied beginning from 
the phenomenon of expression. Finally, this cannot mean, as commentators such as Cristina 
Lafont have argued, that the discursive Being of Dasein can be derived from the ‘fact’ that it 
expresses itself. This is because, as I shall soon explain, it is possible for Dasein’s potentiality 
for expression, i.e. for Discourse, not to expresses itself. Heidegger calls this exception the 
phenomenon of ‘keeping silent’ [Schweigen].76 Keeping silent manifests Discourse in a 
dimension different from that of expression, in which it lingers for the most part. Heidegger 
refers to this other dimension of discourse as Hearing [Hören].  Hearing, Heidegger says, as 
well as expression “...is constitutive for discourse”77 and it is “the primary and authentic way 
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in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being -as in hearing the voice of the 
friend whom every Dasein carries with it.”78  In other words, just as much as expression, 
hearing is a fundamental way of discourse.
79
 Now, if hearing and expression are, in some 
way, distinct, then keeping silent must itself be a form of discourse, albeit not ‘expressive’. 
As such the phenomenon of keeping silent constitutes the way in which Discourse is ontically 
and existentiell-y hearing. These phenomena of hearing and keeping silent will be especially 
important later in this dissertation. In the course of the analysis of the notions of ‘Being-
towards-death’ and that of the ‘call of conscience’, which shall be conducted in Chapters 4 
and 5 of this dissertation, I will ask whether hearing constitutes the primary authentic 
[eigentlich] way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a 
potentiality-for-Being which in turn characterises Dasein’s Disclosedness of Being, and 
whether this implies that Language and expression are in some respect inauthentic ways of 
Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being and, therefore, of its Disclosedness of Being 
[Seinserschlossenheit]. There I will show that the phenomenon of keeping silent represents a 
key moment of that which Heidegger calls Dasein’s authentic Disclosedness of its Being. 
 
 
v. The Status of Falling 
 
Having analysed the three general constituents of Disclosedness, i.e. Disposition, 
Understanding and Discourse, Heidegger moves on to consider each constituent in its 
everydayness. As such, Disposition is discussed in terms of ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit], 
Understanding in terms of curiosity [Neugier] and Discourse as idle talk [Gerede]. Heidegger 
says: 
 
Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterize the way in which, in an everyday 
manner, Dasein is its 'there' -the Disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As definite 
existential characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help to make up 
its Being. In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is 
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revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the 
''falling'' of Dasein.
80
 
 
In other words, the way in which the constituents of Disclosedness manifest themselves 
inauthentically in Dasein’s everydayness shows forth a further fundamental character of 
Disclosedness itself, i.e. falling. The latter names two important tendencies of Dasein: first, 
its inclination to lose itself in the ‘world’, alongside intraworldly entities, and interpret itself 
in terms of such entities; second, the propensity to fleeing its existential unsettledness which 
constitutes the core of its Being and hiding in the homely publicness of das Man. 
 
Nevertheless, “[t]he phenomenon of falling”, Heidegger assures, “does not give us something 
like a ‘night view’ of Dasein”81 and “...makes no assertion about the ‘corruption of human 
nature’...”.82 For this phenomenon is prior to moral assertions regarding corruption or honesty 
and is rather “conceived ontologically as a kind of motion”.83 This motion is one in which 
Dasein forgets its fundamental transcendence and resigns itself to the way in which both the 
world and its Being are disclosed according to the average ‘one feels’ (disposition), ‘one 
knows’ (understanding) and ‘one says’ (discourse) of das Man. This average Disclosedness, 
Heidegger argues, is alienating and tranquillizing as it covers up the fundamental 
unsettledness which constitutes the core of Dasein’s Being in its fundamental ‘being at issue’, 
its existence, its transcendence. 
 
Hence, the question is: how can a phenomenon such as Disclosedness, apt at manifesting and 
uncovering, be constituted by an essentially concealing phenomenon such as falling? 
Heidegger is adamant concerning the status of falling as he affirms: 
 
In falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world is the issue, even 
if in the mode of inauthenticity. ... On the other hand, authentic existence is not 
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something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified 
way in which such an everydayness is seized upon.
84
 
 
But in what way is Dasein’s Disclosedness essentially ‘falling’? If one takes Heidegger 
analysis of everydayness seriously, it is clear that Dasein’s Disclosedness does not begin with 
an original quasi-platonic openness that is subsequently lost and needs being regained; it is 
instead a phenomenon whose primary status is that of fallen everydayness, in which all is first 
disclosed according to the way in which Dasein discloses the world and its Being in falling. 
As such, falling is never an utter covering-over, or complete closedness. In falling 
‘something’ is still disclosed according the fundamental constituents of Disclosedness itself, 
namely, disposition and understanding, and is still discursively articulated. Falling 
corresponds to a peculiar way of disclosing both the world and Dasein’s Being which consists 
in fleeing away from one’s ownmost potentiality for being, towards the ‘world’ understood in 
terms of Das Man as a mere collection of entities. The peculiarity of this ‘falling 
Disclosedness’ consists in that its disposition, its understanding and its discourse are not 
determined by a comprehensive Disclosedness of Dasein’s own Being, but by the average 
‘world’, according to a principle which Heidegger names das Man.85 Nevertheless, the 
superficiality of the falling way of Disclosedness does not make this constituent any less 
fundamental. On the contrary,  being-in-this-average-‘world’ still represents the primary way 
in which something is articulatingly disclosed to Dasein in terms of disposition and 
understanding, even though only inauthentically. This is to say that, this particular way of 
disclosing the World, even though only as ‘world’, as well as Dasein’s Being, even though 
only as a being-in-an-average-‘world’, i.e. a das Man, does not merely consist in an 
accidental phenomenon of Dasein’s Disclosedness, but in a necessary fact of Dasein’s Being 
as Being-in-the-World. For this, falling is also numbered by Heidegger among the 
existentiales of Dasein. Heidegger’s position in this respect is clear, as he reckons falling not 
only among the constituents of Disclosedness but also within the structural elements of 
Dasein’s Being, namely, the phenomenon which he defines by the term Care. 
 
In this, the reader may begin to see the importance of the connection between the 
phenomenon of Disclosedness and that of Care, which shall be considered in Chapter 4 this 
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dissertation. What I may attempt to clarify for now is the reason why the phenomenon of 
falling is also one of the elements of the structure of Care. 
As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 3 of the present work, Care refers to the way in which 
Dasein takes issue [es geht] with its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Hence, for falling to 
be a structural element of Care, it must consist in a particular way in which Dasein’s Being 
matters to Dasein itself. What is this way? Heidegger answers quite explicitly in what 
follows: 
  
Dasein's absorption in the "they"… make[s] manifest something like a fleeing of 
Dasein in the face of itself -of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.
86
 
…  
[Dasein] does not flee in the face of entities within-the-world; these are precisely what 
it flees towards -as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the "they", can dwell 
in tranquillized familiarity. When in falling we flee into the "at-home" of publicness, 
we flee in the face of the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness 
which lies in Dasein -in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been 
delivered over to itself in its Being.
87
 
 
However, this implies also that, in falling, Dasein also takes issue with its own Being-in-the-
world by trying not to take issue with it, as it flees in the face of its Being towards 
intraworldly entities. Lost in the averageness of das Man, Dasein forgets its own Being and 
becomes fascinated with the ‘world’, an attitude that Heidegger calls ‘Being-alongside’. 
Am I saying that falling can be understood as a ‘taking-issue-with’ Dasein’s own Being 
merely because, in falling, Dasein does not take issue with its Being? Is falling part of the 
structure of Care only in virtue of such a sophism? Not exactly. Rather, what Heidegger 
argues is that whenever Dasein flees in the face of its own Being, thus attempting not to take 
issue with it, “[t]hat in the face of which Dasein flees, is precisely what comes up ‘behind’. 
Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential 
manner through whatever Disclosedness belongs to it,” Heidegger continues, “can it flee in 
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the face of that in the face of which it flees”.88 In other words, in fleeing, a Disclosedness of 
what one flees away from is always implied.
89
 Similarly, by fleeing away from its own 
Being-in-the-world, Dasein must have already taken issue with that very Being-in-the-world; 
therefore, “in turning away from it, it is disclosed ‘there’”.90 
 
In falling, Dasein’s essential attitude is that of trying to avoid the question concerning one’s 
own Being, in order to escape one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The latter can be 
authentically taken up only in the anticipatory resoluteness which lets Dasein be a ‘being-
towards-its-death’. However, as Dasein in its fallenness struggles not to let its Being matter to 
it, this still attests that, to an extent, that very Being does essentially matter to Dasein itself.  
The existential stand of the phenomenon of falling within the constitution of Disclosedness 
and the structure of Care appears also to imply the stronger claim that the falling 
Disclosedness brought about by das Man constitutes the sufficient ground for the authentic 
Disclosedness of Dasein’s Being. As I shall argue in the next chapter, this is the position 
maintained by Hubert Dreyfus, which constitutes the basic assumption guiding Dreyfus’ 
Pragmatic Interpretation of Being and Time as it is developed in his famous Being-in-the-
world. 
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2. INAUTHENTIC DISCLOSEDNESS 
 
 
The phenomenon of Disclosedness, which I have taken to be one of the most fundamental 
facts about Dasein, if not indeed the most fundamental, refers, as I have said, to the mode of 
that relation between Dasein and both intraworldly entities, other Daseins and Being.  At the 
outset of Being and Time Heidegger makes an important point concerning the relation 
between Dasein and its Being when he states: “To be sure, [Dasein’s] ownmost Being is such 
that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its 
being has been interpreted in some manner.”91 This is to say, Being must be already ‘known’ 
to Dasein whenever Dasein sets itself to inquiring about Being, be its own Being or the Being 
of intraworldly entities. In other words, knowledge never begins with total ignorance, it never 
springs from two poles, i.e. subject and object, which are totally indifferent to each other and 
are brought together for the first time by an act of understanding. Heidegger’s first and 
fundamental intuition consists in this simple yet powerful hypothesis: when Dasein asks itself 
for the first time how it is possible to know anything, that question already presupposes a 
certain degree of acquaintance with the ‘thing’ of the ‘any-thing’. Similarly, when in the 
Meditations
92
 Descartes wonders about the possibility of the relation between the res cogitans 
and the res extensa, what, according to Heidegger, escapes him is that the question itself 
requires that relation to be, to some degree, already in place. 
 
Yet, would it be then sufficient to get to know this relation, that is, to reflect more deeply on 
our acquaintance with ‘things’, in order to provide an answer to the Cartesian problem which 
has plagued philosophy for centuries - i.e. how can a subject relate to an object? 
 
But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein’s own Being is thus interpreted pre-
ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an 
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appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when 
one’s ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme.93 
 
Hence, according to Heidegger, to affirm that Dasein always, already understands [versteht] 
what ‘things’  are, by always, already understanding their Being and, as I shall show, Being 
itself, does not entail that Dasein in any way ‘knows’ Being. Indeed, the understanding of 
Being which constitutes the basis of Dasein’s relation to anything and which Heidegger often 
characterizes with the adjective pre-ontological, cannot be thematised in the same way 
scholastic philosophy could thematise essentia and find out the common ‘what’ of all things. 
Understanding Being pre-ontologically does not disclose Being immediately; rather it results 
in Being itself being covered-over in favour of Dasein’s fascination with the ‘world’ of 
intraworldly entities. This is not to lessen the importance of this pre-ontological 
understanding of Being, which remains necessary and fundamentally a ‘first step’, but to 
draw attention to the inauthenticity of this pre-emptive Disclosedness. 
 
As I have briefly mentioned when discussing the notion of Falling, inauthenticity partly 
consists in that tendency of Dasein to be fascinated with intraworldly entities in such a way as 
to cover up the fundamental Disclosedness which is the source of their discoveredness. 
Hence, Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of Being manifests itself first and foremost in 
intraworldly entities, as they are primarily encountered by Dasein in its everydayness. But 
what is the primary way in which intraworldly entities are manifested to Dasein? 
 
Traditionally, philosophy has investigated our access to objects outside ourselves in terms of 
knowledge [Erkentnis], which in turn has been understood as “[the] ‘relation between subject 
and Object’.”94 The phenomenon of knowing consists in a subject entering into a relation 
with something which is external to it, and aims at re-constructing a mental representation of 
the object itself, i.e. an idea; the more accurate the representation, the more precise is the 
knowledge the subject possesses of the given object. For this reason, traditional epistemology 
begins by assuming a fundamental separateness between subject and object. This assumption 
is at the basis of the primacy of so-called detached knowledge, namely, the lesser the 
knower’s interference with the object, the more precise the mental representation will be. 
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Heidegger rejects this traditional subject-object dynamics and develops a hermeneutically 
driven conception of the understanding according to which the human Dasein stands always, 
already in a relation with other entities, encountered firstly as equipment [Zeug]; that is, in 
the immediacy of their utility and the involvement of their referentiality among intraworldly 
entities and towards Dasein. 
 
Contemporary Anglophone Heideggerian scholars such as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carman 
and Mark Okrent, in their interpretations of Being and Time, take the concept of equipment to 
be the pivot of Heidegger’s critique of traditional epistemology, partially reversing 
Heidegger’s strategy. This well known stream of scholarship, famous for what is commonly 
referred to as the pragmatic interpretation of Being and Time, interprets the Heideggerian 
analysis of Disclosedness as the way in which entities are discovered by Dasein on the basis 
of that pre-emptive Disclosedness which falls within Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding 
of Being, and further reducing the latter to a shared cultural background, which equates 
roughly to Heidegger’s concept of das Man. 
 
In an attempt to show the shortcomings of the pragmatic interpretation, especially in its 
Dreyfusian incarnation, I will firstly summarise Heidegger’s discussion of equipment, in 
Section i. of the present chapter. In section ii. I will then sketch the connection between 
equipment and Dasein’s understanding-of-Being, while in Section iii. I will give a brief 
overview on the notion of das Man and its role in the economy of Being and Time. Finally, in 
section iv., I will attempt to show that, by overstressing the importance of the analysis of 
equipment and interpreting das Man as the fundamental background of discoveredness of 
intraworldly entities and Disclosedness of the World, the pragmatic reading of Being and 
Time is doomed to grossly misinterpret the fundamental intention of Heidegger’s masterwork. 
 
 
i. Intraworldly entities and Dasein 
 
Entities are primarily discovered by Dasein in what Heidegger calls their alongsidedness with 
Dasein within the World. As I shall explain further in this chapter, this alongsidedness is 
possible as Dasein is not only a Being-in-the-world, i.e. it is always, already immersed within 
an understanding of Being, but it is also itself an entity. This is what Heidegger means when 
he says that Dasein is both ontological and ontic. Indeed, Dasein’s discovery of intraworldly 
41 
 
entities can take place since Dasein itself is, partly, the same as intraworldly entities. This 
‘discovery’, however, does not amount to the objective knowledge of an object by a subject, 
since the latter would require a difference between the knower and the known, a distance, 
which contradicts the alongsidedness Heidegger is suggesting. But how are entities 
discovered in their alongsidedness if they do not come to be, strictly speaking, ‘known’? 
Given that Dasein’s Being consists, existentially, in a Being-in-the-world and that in virtue of 
its Being-in-the-world Dasein is always, already alongside intraworldly entities, Dasein itself 
no longer needs to ‘get to’ entities; and, as such, Dasein does not gain a better access to 
intraworldly entities by alienating from the way in which it encounters them in its 
everydayness. It is rather in Dasein’s most customary dealings with intraworldly entities that 
the latter reveal most primordially what they are. For this Heidegger believes that: 
 
The kind of dealing which is closest to us is … not a bare perceptual cognition, but 
rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use … .95 
 
The way in which entities are revealed to Dasein in its ‘concern’ is called by Heidegger 
‘readiness-to-hand’ [Zuhandenheit]; and in this way entities are discovered as ‘equipment’ 
[Zeug], in the fundamentally referential sense of ‘something in-order-to…’ [»etwas, um 
zu…«].96 This is in direct opposition to the way in which traditional epistemology reduces 
entities to mere ‘things’ by taking them in abstraction and, so to speak, objectively. On the 
other hand, when Dasein encounters an entity in its everyday dealings, it never encounters an 
entity in isolation, but always in terms of what Heidegger calls a ‘totality of equipment’ 
[Zeugganzheit]. That is to say, entities do not appear first in isolation only to later intermingle 
with other objects, but are discovered primarily within a referential ‘context’, within a totality 
of equipment. Indeed, “Taken strictly, there ’is’ no such thing as an equipment;”97 this is 
consistent with the definition of equipment as ‘something in-order-to…’,98 which implies that 
the single item of equipment is, in its Being, always in view of something other than itself. 
 
                                                 
95
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.95, 
H.67. 
96
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.97, 
H.68. 
97
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 
96, H.68. 
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.97, 
H.68. 
42 
 
Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of its 
belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, 
furniture, windows, doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show themselves proximally 
as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What 
we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; 
and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical spatial 
sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the ‘arrangement’ emerges, and it is 
this that any ‘individual’ item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so a totality of 
equipment has already been discovered.
99
 
 
The being always in view of something else which characterises equipment is what 
Heidegger calls ‘reference’ [Verweisung].100 Despite the difficulties in rendering the meaning 
of ‘Verweisung’ in translation, there cannot be much doubt that the Verweisung von etwas 
auf etwas is characteristic not only of the structure of the in-order-to [Um-zu], but also, more 
in general, of the way in which entities are ready-to-hand, as Heidegger in the example of the 
equipment for writing [Schreibzeug] cited above. 
 
In keeping with this principle, §18 of Being and Time affirms that “[a]n entity is discovered 
when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which it is”.101 
As such, intraworldly entities cannot be discovered as equipment unless, like in the 
schreibzeug-example, it refers to [verweist auf] other entities. In everyday German, the verb 
verweisen, of which Verwiesung is the noun-derivative, has a range of meanings which span 
from ‘referring to something or someone’ [Verweisen auf], to ‘relegating’ [Verweisen an]. 
Yet Heidegger seems to be using this term here in a more etymological sense, as a compound 
of weisen; the latter means something like to point, to locate, to direct, with a particular 
attention to either the physical or the figurative direction of the pointing, locating, directing. 
Understood in this way, the meaning of the verb verweisen would be more akin to ‘pointing-
away-to’ [ver-weisen auf/an]. This is exactly the meaning that seems to emerge in the 
schreibzeug-example, where the totality of equipment is described in terms of the way in 
which equipment points [weisen] away [ver-] from itself, to [auf/an] some other pieces of 
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 
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Cfr: “Equipment is essentially ‘something in-order-to…’.“ [Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. 
Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.97, H.68]. 
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equipment –i.e. the ink to the inkstand, the inkstand to the pen, the pen to the paper, the paper 
to the blotting pad etc. Hence, in order to deal with something in terms of what that 
something is, Dasein must have always, already, to some extent, discovered all those other 
pieces of equipment which are connected to that something in the task at hand. This is not to 
say that Dasein by dealing with a piece of paper must have necessarily dealt with a pen 
before, but rather that, faced with the task of writing, Dasein interprets different tools as 
reciprocally connected, in the perspective of the task at hand. This perspective is what 
Heidegger calls ‘Bewandtnis’. 
 
The term ‘Bewandtnis’ is admittedly one of the most challenging for the translators of Being 
and Time. It comes from the verb ‘bewanden’, which is used almost only in the idiomatic 
expression ‘bewanden lassen’, which means ‘letting be’, ‘letting go’, ‘letting rest’ etc. 
Etymologically, it is connected with the verb wanden which means ‘to turn’, hence the 
English translation used by Macquarrie and Robinson, namely, ‘involvement’ –from the 
Latin in-volvere. Yet a mere technical translation is still insufficient to capture Heidegger’s 
usage. This is because the term ‘bewandtnis’, on the one hand, has a meaning that stretches 
through a multiplicity of semantic realms and, on the other hand, comes from a longstanding 
philosophical tradition which has exploited its plurisemic qualities. 
 
As Theodore Kisiel has amply demonstrated,
102
 Heidegger inherits this term from Emil Lask, 
who, broadly speaking, employs it as synonymous with the categorial or logical ‘form’.103 In 
general, Bewandtnis is the formal condition of a material object; it names the relevance of the 
matter in relation to the truth of the object which is made relevant –in the etymological sense 
of throwing something into relief [rilevare]. More subtly, however, Bewandtnis has an array 
of meanings which can be used to extend the concept of ‘form’ into that of intentionality, 
embracing at once the noematic and the noetic aspect of intentionality itself, as well as its 
general character of directedness.
104
 
 
Heidegger uses the wide spectrum of this term, which had been already pointed out by Lask, 
in order to bring together empiricism and idealism into the embrace of transcendental-
hermeneutical phenomenology. In other words, Bewandtnis is Heidegger’s alternative term to 
                                                 
102Cfr: Theodore Kisiel, “Why students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask”, in Man and World 28, pp. 
197-240. 
103
Cfr: Emil Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre, (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), p.66. 
104Cfr: Theodore Kisiel, “Why students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask”, in Man and World 28, p.216. 
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name the intentional character of that intentionality which is no other than Dasein itself, in its 
being ontologically as Being-in-the-World. 
Given the lack of an English term capable of capturing the whole semantic space marked by 
the German ‘Bewandtnis’, I will leave the term untranslated for the purpose of this 
dissertation. In spite of the term’s extreme resistance to translation, it is not too difficult to 
understand the way in which Heidegger employs it, when he states: 
 
…with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call 
a ‘hammer’, there is an involvement [Bewandtnis] in hammering; with hammering, 
there is an involvement [Bewandtnis] in doing something fast; with making 
something fast, there is an involvement [Bewandtnis] in protection against bad 
weather; and this protection is for the sake of providing shelter for Dasein –that is to 
say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being.105 
 
This is to say that the Being of entities in their readiness-to-hand is revealed only in the 
equipmentality of their in-order-to [um-zu]; which means that a piece of equipment is in itself 
[an-sich] only in terms of some ‘thing’ else. The structure of Bewandtnis clearly underlies the 
fact that the condition of possibility which allows entities to be discovered most primordially 
in their Being is not, as for traditional epistemology, something contained within the thing 
itself. Rather, the condition of possibility by which an entity is what it is, consists, primarily, 
in the task at hand. This is also the reason why the totality of equipment, which can now be 
understood as the totality of tools organized in view of their Bewandtnis, is so to speak 
‘earlier’ than the single pieces of equipment; since tools are the tools they are only in view of 
the task at hand; or, better, they are only on the basis of their Bewandtnis. 
 
Therefore, it is never possible to single out a tool, for its being-a-tool always refers ‘away-
from’ itself, ‘to’ the task at hand; the latter constitutes the organizing principle of a totality of 
equipment, which, in turn, is the unity of all equipment taken in the perspective of the given 
task at hand. Thus, dealing appropriately with some equipment entails not only a reference to 
all other pieces of equipment, but it also, most importantly, requires that the given equipment 
be discovered in connection with its Bewandtnis. 
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.116, H.84. 
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Now, according to Heidegger, there can be different Bewandtnisse, which can be, so to 
speak, horizontally or vertically interconnected. Nevertheless: 
 
…the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a ‘towards-which’ in 
which there is no further involvement: this ‘towards-which’ is not an entity with the 
kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an 
entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, 
worldhood itself belongs. This primary ‘towards-which’ is not just another ‘towards-
this’ as something in which an involvement is possible. This primary ‘towards-which’ 
is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’106 
 
This primary ‘towards-which’, which is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, is nothing other than 
Dasein; it pertains to its Being, insofar as “…in its Being, that very Being is an issue for 
it”.107 
 
A full explanation of this vertical structure would require an extensive discussion of a few 
important notions, namely Understanding, Truth [Wahrheit], Care, Resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit] etc., which will be taken up only much later in this dissertation. Yet the 
following quote may suffice in explaining the importance of the vertical relation between 
intraworldly entities and Dasein, as well as justifying Heidegger’s conviction that equipment 
is the primary mode in which entities are discovered by Dasein. 
 
Any discovering of a totality of involvements goes back to a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’; 
and on the understanding of such ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ is based in turn the 
understanding of significance as the disclosedness of the current world.  In seeking 
shelter, sustenance, livelihood, we do so ‘for the sake of’ constant possibilities of 
Dasein which are very close to it; upon these the entity for which its own Being is an 
issue, has already projected itself.
108
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When Heidegger says that Dasein is the primary ‘towards-which’ of a totality of Bewandtnis, 
which is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, he means that the way in which all entities are discovered 
to Dasein depends on Dasein’s Being. As we know, the peculiarity of Dasein’s Being is that 
its own Being is an issue for it; this is to say, Dasein’s Being is its potentiality-for-Being, 
which refers to the fact that Dasein understands its Being always in terms of its possibilities 
to be. Hence, by stating that “…the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 
‘towards-which’ in which there is no further involvement”,109 Heidegger implies that the way 
in which entities are, which depends directly on their Bewandtnis, i.e. the condition for 
entities to be discovered in their Being, is ultimately grounded in the possibilities of Dasein’s 
Being. But why is there no further Bewandtnis beyond Dasein’s Being? 
 
If the Bewandtnis of a given entity consists in that condition through which that entity is 
discovered within a world in terms of Dasein’s possibilities, then no entity can be discovered 
if Dasein has not already been disclosed in its possibilities, that is to say, in its Being.  
Let us go back now to the discussion concerning the primacy of readiness-to-hand as a mode 
of the discoveredness of entities. The statement “Taken strictly, there ’is’ no such thing as an 
equipment”110 may appear less arbitrary if one agrees with Heidegger that Dasein’s relation 
to entities depends on Dasein’s having always, already a certain understanding of Being.  
From this, Heidegger’s attempts to demonstrate that Dasein’s primary way to discover 
entities is such as to show the origin of this discoveredness in Dasein’s own understanding of 
Being. 
 
As already mentioned, equipment constantly refers [verweist] to other items of equipment, 
and ultimately to the totality of equipment which is constructed in view of its Bewandtnis. 
Equipment is discovered in its Bewandtnis, when that equipment shows itself within a system 
of reference [Verweisung].  The ontological structure that underlies this totality of 
Bewandtnis consists in this vertical relationship of the ‘in-order-to’, the ‘towards-which’, the 
‘towards-this’, and the ‘for-the-sake-of’.111 This underlying referential [Verweisung], 
relational structure, where Dasein constitutes the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which of all 
Bewandtnis, is called by Heidegger ‘significance’ [Bedeutsamkeit].  In §18 Heidegger adds 
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that significance, showing forth in the totality of all Bewandtnis, is constitutive for what 
Heidegger calls the ontological basis of the world, that is, its worldhood. This is not 
surprising if one keeps in mind that, according to Heidegger, the world is not the totality of 
entities, but the relational space wherein entities can be disclosed in their Being.
112
 Indeed, 
the ontological basis underlying the totality of Bewandtnis is nothing else but the totality of 
the conditions within which entities are discovered in their Being; the totality of these 
conditions is the world in its worldhood and consists in that background according to which 
entities are disclosed in their being. In this way, through the reference to the totality of 
equipment and in connection with the structure of significance as the totality of Bewandtnis, 
equipment is grounded in the world in terms of its worldhood; its ready-to-hand character, 
openly shows that equipment is grounded in the world itself. 
 
On the other hand, Heidegger is adamant in affirming that the character of the present-at-
hand consists in nothing more than a deficient way of disclosing entities. This is because, in 
order to apprehend an entity as an object present-at-hand [Vorhanden Objekten], it is 
necessary to abstract that entity from its relations 1) with other entities, 2) ‘in-order-to’ the 
totality of all entities in their Bewandtnis, 3) for-the-sake-of Dasein, and consider that very 
entity only in itself, that is, in terms of itself. Hence, an object present-at-hand amounts to 
nothing more than an item of equipment taken in abstraction from its World. 
 
 
ii. Intraworldly entities and Dasein’s understanding-of-Being 
 
As I have demonstrated in the previous section, the worldhood of the world is nothing but the 
Being of the world, intended as “...that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities 
within-the-world to be discovered at all.”113 Disclosing a world in its Being, that is, in its 
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primordially, in their being only insofar as Dasein has already an understanding of their Being, which is to say, 
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worldhood, means something like disclosing the condition of possibility of the totality of all 
systems of reference [Verweisung]. Insofar as any system of reference depends hierarchically 
on Dasein, the disclosure of the world in its worldhood is possible only ‘according to Dasein’ 
[bei Dasein]. As such, any Bewandtnis ultimately refers [verweisen] to Dasein’s Being as its 
‘for-the-sake-of-which’; and the discoveredness of ready-to-hand entities in their Bewandtnis, 
which is grounded in a Disclosedness of the world in its worldhood, strictly depends on the 
understanding projection of Dasein’s own Being. This is to say that, for example, what a 
hammer ‘is’ is grounded in its Bewandtnis, i.e. in ‘hammering’; ‘hammering’, in turn, makes 
sense only within the context of those activities which have to do with building. Ultimately, 
all possible activities, and not only those, but indeed all possible Bewandtnis, ‘make sense’ 
solely in connection with Dasein’s needs, expectations, projects, dreams; in short, with 
Dasein’s Being, which in turn is nothing but the continuous ‘projection of this very Being 
into possibilities’. 114 
 
Now, the fact that Dasein’s Being is, in some sense, the ground of the discoveredness of the 
intraworldly entities, as well as of the Disclosedness of the world, helps us to understand why 
Heidegger defines Dasein as “…essentially its [own] disclosedness.”
115
 For, if Dasein’s Being 
consists in a continual ontological projection into its possibilities, and this projection, in turn, 
grounds the Disclosedness of the world, as well as the possibility of the discoveredness of 
Entities, then that openness which frees the space for all understanding projection, and which 
Heidegger calls the ‘there’, is not merely a property of Dasein’s Being; rather, insofar as Da-
sein’s Being consists in an ‘understanding projection’ of its own Being, it names an 
existential character of Dasein itself.  As I shall explain in a moment, this is what Heidegger 
calls the ontological character of Dasein. This character does not consist in the Disclosedness 
of anything, but refers to the potentiality of any Disclosedness, which, in turn, grounds the 
discoveredness of all entities. This is the same as saying that discoveredness, as well as 
Disclosedness, is grounded in that for Dasein “…in its very Being, its Being is an issue.”116 
                                                 
114To understand these possibilities in terms of the Sartrian ‘life-project’ may be helpful at this stage in order to 
understand some of the final connections between the Disclosedness of the totality of Bewadntnis and the 
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Later in this dissertation I will return to the fact that this ‘being an issue’ refers to Dasein’s 
fundamental relationality to its Being. 
 
I can, at this point, establish a further connection between the discoveredness of entities, 
especially as ready-to-hand equipment, and Dasein’s Being, since the latter stands as the 
ultimate ground of the discoveredness of entities. On the basis of this inference, one may 
further argue that the discoveredness of all entities ‘depends’, strictly speaking, on Dasein, or, 
at least, on its Being. But in what sense do entities ‘depend’ on Dasein, or on its Being? Does 
this ‘dependence’ necessarily entail that, for Heidegger, the way in which Dasein understands 
entities causes the way these entities actually are in their Being? Does this position 
Heidegger as an idealist? In order to answer these questions, this ‘dependence’, which I have 
already mentioned in the previous section, needs to be further analysed. 
 
Let us start with an excerpt from Being and Time, already mentioned in the previous section, 
which seems to spell out the way in which Heidegger conceives this ‘dependence’. In §39 
Heidegger says: “[e]ntities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are 
disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their 
nature is ascertained.”117 But he immediately adds: “...Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of 
those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs.”118 Hence, 
the question is: how can intraworldly entities ‘be’ independently from their being-discovered 
(disclosed or grasped), if their Being depends on Dasein’s understanding of Being, which is 
in turn the condition of possibility of any discoveredness (Disclosedness or grasping)? 
Indeed, it appears at best contradictory to maintain that intraworldly entities –such as birds, 
planets, hammers, etc.- would continue to be independently of whether or not Dasein existed, 
while that which allows intraworldly entities to be, namely, Being, is strictly dependent on 
Dasein’s understanding of it; so much so that “only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long 
as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Being.”119 Is Heidegger 
suggesting that intraworldly entities somehow ‘are’ in-themselves, yet they exist for Dasein 
only as long as they are understood against an a priori condition which allows these entities 
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to be what they are for Dasein? If this were the case, Heidegger’s philosophy would not be 
very far from Kant’s transcendental idealism.120 
 
In his essay “Heidegger’s Kantian Idealism Revised”, William Blattner suggests a different 
approach. According to him, the only plausible interpretation of the aforementioned excerpt 
from Being and Time relies on the fact that: 
 
…dependence and independence are concepts that are in turn defined in terms of 
existence. For x to be dependent on y is for it to be the case that x would not exist, if y 
did not. Likewise, if x is independent of y, then x can exist, even when y does not. 
This means that dependence and independence are concepts that are defined in terms 
of further concepts (existence and non-existence) that are themselves undefined, when 
the conception of objectivity or understanding of being (the rules of the existence 
game, as it were) are suspended.
121
 
 
Heidegger makes the same point in §43, albeit in a rather more cryptic manner, when he 
states: 
 
Only because Being is ‘in the consciousness’ – that is to say, only because it is 
understandable in Dasein – can Dasein also understand and conceptualize such 
characteristics of being as independence, the ‘in-itself’, and Reality in general. Only 
because of this are ‘independent’ entities, as encountered within-the-world, accessible 
to circumspection.
122
 
 
And further: 
 
When Dasein does not exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself. In such a 
case this sort of things can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case 
even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor hidden. In such a case it 
                                                 
120There is indeed a transcendental ‘signature’ in Heidegger’s Being and Time, which may have to do with the 
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cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long 
there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-
hand, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be.
123
 
 
A passage from Blattner’s paper helps to clarify Heidegger’s final sentence further: 
 
Right now, as I look out of the window of my study, I see a house finch at my bird 
feeder. Neither the feeder nor the finch depends on me or my mind; in fact, neither 
depends on the existence of human beings at all. All human beings could 
simultaneously cease to exist right now, and the finch and the feeder would persist. In 
order to assert in this way the independence of the finch and feeder from my mind, I 
have to assume a set of causal facts about the world: although my psychological states 
are sustained in existence by the operation of my mind, and therefore depend upon my 
mind, neither the finch nor the feeder are thus sustained. They are causally 
independent of me, indeed, of us. We thus see that if we take for granted our basic 
conception of objectivity, the world is mostly independent of us.
 124
 
 
In other words, entities are independent of Dasein’s discoveredness of them; yet, their being 
independent is possible only insofar as a certain understanding-of-Being already belongs to 
Dasein. The reason for this lies in the fact that, as I have demonstrated previously in this 
chapter, Dasein’s continual standing within an understanding [Verständnis] of its own Being 
[Sein] results in that projection [Entwurf] according to which a world is disclosed in its 
significance. On the basis of this disclosure of the world, intraworldly entities are discovered 
in their Bewandtnis. This is because it is only through a disclosure of the world in its 
worldhood -i.e. according to significance- that a ‘potentiality for discoveredness’ can be 
established. In this sense, entities may be encountered independently from Dasein only there 
where the possibility for their discoveredness has already been established; only there where 
a world has already been disclosed in its worldhood.
125
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I have already mentioned that the Disclosedness of the world in its worldhood is possible 
only on the ground of Dasein being its ‘there’. This ‘there’ names Dasein’s fundamentally 
ontological character, that is, Dasein’s fundamental Being consists in its taking issue with its 
very own Being; or, which is the same, in always, already entertaining a relation with that 
Being.  Dasein takes issue with its own Being by projecting its possibilities according to the 
meaning of its very Being; as such, this kind of projecting is intrinsically ‘understanding’. 
This understanding projection signals the fact that Dasein’s own Being is constantly ‘an issue 
for it’. Hence, this projecting understanding is strictly speaking Dasein’s understanding-of-
Being. In this understanding relation with, or projection of its own Being, Dasein is that 
Disclosedness which grounds the disclosure of the world in its worldhood, in its significance 
for Dasein; and this disclosure, in turn, grounds the potentiality for the discoveredness of 
entities. The question one needs to ask now is: in what way does Dasein always, already 
possess a fundamental understanding-of-Being? 
 
 
iii. Dasein’s Pre-Ontological understanding-of-Being and das Man 
 
At the outset of Being and Time the dependence of the Disclosedness of the world in its 
worldhood from Dasein is interpreted in light of Dasein’s understanding-of-Being 
[Seinsverständins]. This understanding-of-Being is defined as pre-ontological, as it 
fundamentally precedes Dasein’s explicit questioning regarding its Being. This is to say that, 
in Heidegger’s words, “...the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an 
essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein –the pre-ontological understanding of 
Being”.126 This is what, at the outset of this chapter, I have called Heidegger’s first and 
fundamental intuition, namely, that Dasein behaves as if its Being has always, already been 
interpretatively understood.
127
 Thanks to its pre-ontological understanding-of-Being, Dasein 
can explicitly raise the question of Being; the latter affords Dasein its primacy among all 
other entities, as the only entity which can both ask and answer the question of Being. This 
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primacy does not depend on an explicit theory about Being which is in some way ‘innate’ to 
Dasein, but on Dasein’s innate possibility to develop an ontology, starting from this pre-
ontological understanding. 
 
The ‘discovery’ of the pre-ontological basis of ontology, constitutes Heidegger’s crucial 
premise in view of his fierce critique of traditional –especially Cartesian- epistemology, 
because it undercuts one its most fundamental issues, namely the epistemological connection 
between subject and object. For Heidegger, Dasein is always, already alongside other entities, 
in a world where a certain understanding of the Being of these entities has always, already 
been disclosed to Dasein itself. Hence, the primary concern of philosophy would no longer be 
to establish the nature of the connection between subject and object, but would consist in 
attempting to render explicit the disclosing relation between the human Dasein and the 
ground of all Disclosedness, its Being. Within this framework, Dasein’s pre-ontological 
understanding of Being should be interpreted as a special kind of disclosing relation between 
Dasein and its Being. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to clarify that, while this pre-ontological relation of 
understanding constitutes the launching pad of Heidegger’s innovative philosophical 
expedition, it does not and cannot constitute its fundamental ground. This point is clearly 
expressed by Heidegger in §5 of Being and Time, when referring to Dasein, he states: 
 
To be sure, its [Dasein’s] ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that 
Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in 
some manner. But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein's own Being is thus 
interpreted pre-ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be 
taken over as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must 
emerge when one's ownmost state of Being is considered- as an ontological theme. 
The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its 
own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it 
comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant-in terms of the 
'world'. 
128
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Hence, despite emphasising the important role which Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-
of-Being plays in the development of an explicit ontology, Heidegger certainly has no 
intention of reducing ontology to a pre-ontological phenomenon. In fact, the pre-ontological 
understanding-of-Being, which functions as the primary way in which Dasein understands its 
Being, does not render Dasein’s Being in any way explicit; its outcome is a basic 
discoveredness of entities in the world, which effectively conceals the Disclosedness of 
Being within which it is grounded. 
 
In the previous section, I have established that entities are primarily discovered according to 
the world; the latter is that ‘significant space’ within which all entities, including Dasein, are 
manifested. Such a space is fundamentally grounded in Dasein’s own understanding 
relationship with its Being. Hence, entities are discovered according to the way in which 
Dasein understands its Being. Now, as specified in the previous quote, Dasein has the 
tendency to understand its Being in terms of intraworldly entities, which, in their 
everydayness, are primarily discovered as equipment, that is, according to their ready-to-hand 
character. Since all discoveredness of entities ultimately depends on Dasein’s understanding 
of Being, there has to be a corresponding primary, everyday way in which Dasein 
understands itself in its Being. This is what Heidegger calls das Man. Despite there being still 
much disagreement among scholars regarding the interpretation of the phenomenon of das 
Man, it is possible to provide an uncontroversial description concerning its general features. 
 
In relation to equipment, das Man refers to that pre-ontological ground according to which 
entities are discovered in terms of what ‘one does’ with them, ‘one understands’ of them, 
‘one says’ about them. In this sense entities such as forks, hammers, nails, houses, art, 
happiness, are what they are, i.e. have Being, insofar as an average Dasein would relate to 
them in accordance with a set of ‘standard aims’, or, with Heidegger, a set of normal ‘in-
order-tos’ [Um-zu]. Now, as I have stated more than once in the course of this dissertation, 
all ‘in-order-tos’ ultimately depend on that ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ that is Dasein itself. Das 
Man is nothing but the way in which Dasein, through its pre-ontological, average 
understanding of Being, constitutes the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of a set of average ways to 
discover entities according to their average ‘in-order-tos’. For this reason, das Man is, 
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according to Heidegger, the answer to the question “who it is that Dasein is in its 
everydayness?”129 
 
As I shall consider more thoroughly later in this chapter, through this phenomenon, 
Heidegger begins to highlight the fact that, even in its average everydayness, Dasein’s 
primary way to disclose its Being and discover intraworldly entities is not isolating, as is 
supposed by traditional epistemology. Instead, it strongly relies on a shared ‘background’, so 
connatural to Dasein that is itself an existential way of Dasein’s Being. This is what 
Heidegger names Dasein’s Being-with [Mitsein]. In its everydayness, however, as Dasein’s 
Being remains fundamentally hidden, what shows itself as das Man is the pre-ontological 
understanding of intraworldly entities which Dasein shares with other Daseins, in its 
indistinguishableness from them. As such, das Man neither refers to a particular Dasein, nor 
to the totality of Daseins, but to ‘any Dasein’, in the sense of what ‘anyone does’. 
Additionally, it is fair to define das Man as an essentially inauthentic phenomenon, since the 
pre-ontological shared Disclosedness of Being granted to Dasein in a ‘das Man’ state-of 
Being is one that interprets Dasein in terms of the shared world, by covering up Being 
itself.
130
 
 
The fact that the phenomenon of das Man is rooted in inauthenticity does not mean that das 
Man is itself a negative phenomenon.  Far from it, das Man is what affords Dasein’s primary 
discoveredness of entities in their ready-to-hand everydayness, that is, according to the way 
in which ‘anyone discovers’ them. This is because, at bottom, das Man represents the 
primary, everyday way a Dasein understands its Being. Hence, insofar as the primary way in 
which Dasein understands its Being is pre-ontological, it should be fair to define das Man as 
pre-ontological. By the same token, since das Man is classified by Heidegger as the 
inauthentic way in which Dasein at once reveals and conceals its own Being, I may argue that 
Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-of-Being needs be at bottom inauthentic. And given 
that all understanding-of-Being is, more appropriately, a Disclosedness of the latter, then I 
may be entitled to define Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-of-Being as an inauthentic 
Disclosedness. 
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The importance of this interpretation will be clear as the present analysis progresses. For 
now, I shall attempt to illustrate how an interpretation which overstates the importance of the 
inauthentic Disclosedness afforded by das Man inherently misses the central aim of 
Heidegger’s enterprise. One such interpretation is that of Huber Dreyfus. 
  
 
iv. Disclosing as ‘they do’: the Pragmatic Interpretation of Being and 
Time 
 
Long before its publication in 1991 under the title Being-in-the-World, Hubert Dreyfus’ 
commentary was already considered one of the most influential readings of Being and Time 
written or translated in English. Still today Dreyfus’ work needs to be included in any 
respectable bibliography of a study on Being and Time, and any scholar who dares to 
undertake an interpretation of this philosophical masterpiece in English must to a certain 
extent measure his or her own analysis against Dreyfus’ reading. 
 
Dreyfus develops his reading pivoting on Heidegger’s notions of equipment [Zeug] and das 
Man or, as he translates it, ‘the they’. The latter is particularly important, since Dreyfus’ 
answer to Heidegger’s ontological questions is based on a peculiar interpretation of the 
concept of das Man. In the previous section, I provided a general overview of the concept of 
das Man. In this present section, I aim to show that Dreyfus’ interpretation engages only with 
one half of Heidegger’s analysis and that, importantly, the questions he raises in relation to 
Heidegger’s masterwork can be better clarified through a careful reading of the Division Two 
of Being and Time. 
 
Dreyfus begins his analysis from the concept of existence. “For Heidegger,” he says 
“existence does not mean simply to be real. Stones and God do not exist in his sense of the 
term. Only self-interpreting beings exist”.131 Indeed, strictly speaking, only Dasein exists. But 
what does it mean for Dasein to exist in this way? Or else, what does it mean for Dasein to be 
a self-interpreting entity? In Heidegger’s words, “to be sure, [Dasein’s] ownmost Being is 
such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if 
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its being has been interpreted in some manner.”132 This is, according to Heidegger, what 
distinguish Dasein from those things which do not, so to speak, ‘dasein’,133 namely, 
intraworldly entities. In this sense, Heidegger affirms that “Dasein is ontically distinctive” 
from intraworldly entities “in that it is ontological”.134 ‘Being ontological’ means nothing but 
to have an understanding-of-Being. Hence, the issue is to clarify what an understanding-of-
Being actually consists in. Dreyfus begins explaining his view with an example taken from 
Caudill’s and Weinstein’s Maternal Care and Infant Behaviour in Japan and in America. 
 
A Japanese baby seems passive… He lies quietly… while his mother, in her care, 
does [a great deal of] lulling, carrying, and rocking of her baby. She seems to try to 
soothe and quiet the child, and to communicate with him physically rather than 
verbally. On the other hand, the American infant is more active… and exploring of his 
environment, and his mother, in her care, does more looking at and chatting to her 
baby. She seems to stimulate the baby to activity and vocal response. It is as if the 
American mother wanted to have a vocal active baby, and the Japanese mother 
wanted to have a quiet, contented baby. In terms of styles of care-taking of the 
mothers in the two cultures, they get what they apparently want… A great deal of 
cultural learning has taken place by three to four months of age… babies have learned 
by this time to be Japanese and American babies.
135
 
 
The way in which Americans and Japanese would relate to the world of objects would fit in 
to their respective understanding of what it means to be a human being. “It would make no 
sense for Americans” Dreyfus says, “who we are supposing to be active, independent, and 
aggressive –constantly striving to cultivate and satisfy their desires- to relate to things, [such 
as a tea cup], the way the Japanese do, or for the Japanese (before their understanding of 
being was interfered with by ours) to invent and prefer styrofoam tea cups”.136 
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More broadly, this suggests that the way in which our world is disclosed, as well as the way 
in which we discover entities in this world, is implicitly rooted in an ontology, that is, in a 
Disclosedness of Being. In itself, this is nothing new: from Plato to Husserl, philosophers 
have thought there was ‘something’ which grounded our knowledge. As such, the way in 
which objects are understood by a subject strictly depends on something like a system of 
beliefs, where the latter is constantly present to the subject whenever the subject itself is 
engaged in an intention of an object. 
Conversely, Dreyfus argues that according to Heidegger, Dasein’s discoveredness of entities 
is not determined by a pervasive system of rules, which can be brought to consciousness and 
studied at will. Rather, as in the example of the Japanese and the American tea cup, the 
underlying understanding-of-Being, from which all discoveredness of entities depends, 
remains for the most part in the background and “is contained in our knowing-how-to-cope in 
various domains, [rather] … than in a set of beliefs that such and such is the case”.137 In this 
sense the terms ‘American’ and ‘Japanese’ seem to “embody an understanding of Being 
which no one has in mind”.138 Having established this point, Dreyfus attempts to clarify the 
nature of this understanding-of-Being by drawing on another phenomenon developed by 
Heidegger in Being and Time, that of circumspection [Umsicht]. Circumspection names the 
fact that Dasein is always already aware of other entities in terms of their readiness-to-hand. 
Dreyfus then tries to explain what circumspection means byway of the following example: 
 
A person in the midst of the flow of experience is both keenly aware of his or her own 
actions and oblivious to that awareness itself. One rock climber remarks: “you are so 
involved in what you are doing you aren’t thinking of yourself as separate from the 
immediate activity… You don’t see yourself as separate from what you are doing”.139
  
 
The merits of this example need be investigated further. As it stands, Dreyfus risks stressing 
excessively the athlete’s unawareness of the set of rules and techniques which are generally 
associated with rock-climbing, concealing, on the other hand, the particular kind of 
                                                 
137
Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1991), p.18. 
138
Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1991), p.18. 
139
Richard Mitchell, Mountain Experience, The Psychology and Sociology of Adventure, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983); quoted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, Division I, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.66. 
59 
 
awareness which is characteristic of circumspection. Heidegger explicitly addresses this 
second aspect in §15, when he argues” 
 
‘Practical’ behaviour is not ‘atheoretical’ in the sense of ‘sightlessness’. The way it 
differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical 
behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour one acts, and that action must 
employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is 
a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of 
sight.
140
 
 
Yet, in what sense can this ‘sight’ be both ‘theoretical’ [theoretisch] and ‘a-theoretical’ 
[atheoretisch]? Dreyfus settles the question by appealing to the notion of the ‘knowing-how’, 
intended as a way of engaging with entities which does not involve explicit mental contents 
but a mere implicit understanding of how to perform a certain action, as in the example of the 
rock-climber. The fact that this understanding may be taught and learnt and, therefore, 
expressed explicitly as a set of rules or beliefs does not exclude the fact that, after having 
learnt how to do something, the given action can be performed, and indeed is best performed, 
without an explicit awareness of the set of rules and beliefs that are involved in the action 
itself. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that, in the example of the rock-climber, despite the 
fact that the action performed almost necessitates the lack of an explicit mental content to 
accompany the performance of the action itself, the very same action does rely on an implicit 
understanding. But what, then, is this implicit understanding? To answer this question, 
Dreyfus draws once again from Heidegger’s discussion of readiness-to-hand, where Dasein’s 
primary relation to entities is described in terms of practical engagement rather than detached 
contemplation. According to Dreyfus, within the context of this discussion, Heidegger 
replaces “the constituting activity of detached transcendental consciousness with the 
constituting activity of involved existential Dasein”.141 This is to say that whenever Dasein is, 
for example, hammering a nail, the hammer and the nail are discovered by Dasein in their 
Being, within the context of the activity of hammering. However, the hammer and the nail are 
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not manifested as objects, so to speak, abstractly. Rather, as I have as already discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter, their primordial discoveredness shows them in terms of 
their relation to other entities, whose reciprocal reference [Verwesisung] is grounded in the 
world, disclosed according to Dasein’s Being. Keeping this in mind, let us turn to Dreyfus’ 
analysis of circumspection, beginning with the following passage: 
 
For Husserl the intentional content of individual transcendental consciousness was 
self-sufficient, intelligible, immediately and indubitably given to phenomenological 
reflection, and could be made explicit. The skills of Dasein, on the other hand, have 
been shown to be neither self-sufficient (since they are not analysable in terms of 
intentional content), nor intelligible apart from the world (which is not directly given 
but necessarily stays in the background), nor explicable (since they do not involve 
conscious or unconscious beliefs and rules).
 142
 
 
Circumspection is therefore that implicit understanding which gives ‘sight’ to Dasein’s 
practical involvement with intraworldly entities in terms of their ready-to-hand 
equipmentality.  The kind of circumspection described by Dreyfus is fundamentally a ‘know-
how’ which is not in a subject’s mind, but consists in the primary relation between Dasein 
and intraworldly entities. 
 
Regrettably, Dreyfus does not explore the actual ground of the possibility of this relation. 
Such an exploration is necessary given that, if a certain ‘knowing-how’ is always, already 
implied whenever Dasein relates to entities, it is unclear whether this background may be 
initially learnt, as Dreyfus seems to suggest.
 143
 Undoubtedly, all relations between Dasein 
and intraworldly entities imply always, already some form of knowing-how. Is Dasein’s 
understanding therefore just ‘given’?  If so, then it cannot be wholly learnt. Yet, all human 
Daseins certainly do seem to learn what a hammer is and how to use it. In order to avoid this 
impasse, Dreyfus’ interpretation appeals to the notion of das Man. 
 
For Dreyfus, das Man essentially equates to a broad concept of society, in which the most 
common ‘knowing-hows’ come to be shared as what ‘one does’. In this sense, the concept of 
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das Man refers to the ‘normal user’, “as in ‘one eats one’s peas with a fork’”.144 What this 
‘normal user’ amounts to is dependent on a set of normal ‘for-the-sake-of-whichs’, that are 
not personal to individual Dasein, but are instead “provided by society”.145 More importantly, 
according to Dreyfus, someone is a Dasein only insofar as he or she is socialized into these 
‘for-the-sake-of-whichs’. This fact also implies that Dasein does not actually become 
socialized, but rather, it finds itself always already socialized insofar as it is a Dasein. 
 
Public skills and for-the-sake-of-whichs must be taken over (presumably by imitation) 
before there can be any Dasein with thoughts and activities at all. Society is the 
ontological source of familiarity and readiness that makes the ontological discovering 
of entities, of others, and even of myself possible.
146
  
 
This passage constitutes the heart of Dreyfus’ interpretation of Being and Time. In it, Dreyfus 
summarily argues that das Man, understood as a sort of social principle, is the source of that 
average understanding which constitutes the basis for the Disclosedness of the world as the 
totality of the ‘normal’ Bewandtnis according to [bei] Dasein’; this, in turn, grounds the 
possibility of discoveredness of all entities in their Being. Yet this does not mean that das 
Man is the source of an explicit set of rules and norms which can be shared or taught ‘in 
theory’. Rather, since the for-the-sake-of-whichs that determine the Being of an entity must 
be taken over ‘presumably by imitation’, Dasein can uncover entities only by practically 
engaging with them in a way which does not involve an explicit mental content, i.e. in 
action.
147
 
 
Now, Dreyfus insists that the Disclosedness of the World can happen only against the 
background of shared cultural practices which, in Dreyfus’ interpretation, coincides with das 
Man. In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that, whilst a dependable interpretation of this 
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phenomenon would constitute the necessary basis for a consistent reading of Being and Time, 
Dreyfus fails to provide a sound interpretation of Heidegger’s text concerning the 
phenomenon of Disclosedness itself. 
 
In the previous section, I have clarified in what sense Heidegger suggests that discoveredness 
of intraworldly entities is dependent on Dasein’s Being, even though intraworldly entities 
may ‘be’ independently of it. I have also reached a further conclusion concerning the nature 
Disclosedness; that is, while it is true that Dasein’s Being ‘is’ the ground of the Disclosedness 
of the world, and the discoveredness of entities, it is so only on the basis of its having an 
understanding relation with its  Being. The question is whether such an understanding 
relation may be equated with das Man, as Dreyfus seems to suggest, and whether this 
interpretation is ultimately in keeping with the intention of Heidegger’s text, as I have 
presented it in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
 
Dreyfus does indeed identify the grounding structure which goes from the discoveredness of 
intraworldly entities to the understanding relation between Dasein and its Being, passing 
through the Disclosure of the world in its worldhood as significance, in terms of Dasein’s 
understanding projections. He writes: 
 
The basic idea is that for a particular person to be directed towards a particular piece 
of equipment, whether using it, perceiving it, or whatever, there must be a correlation 
between that person’s general skills for coping and the interconnected equipmental 
whole in which the thing has a place. On the side of Dasein’s, originary transcendence 
(disclosing) is the condition of the possibility of ontic transcendence (discovering), 
and on the side of the world, disclosedness is the condition of the possibility of 
anything being discovered.
148
 
 
The hierarchy that Dreyfus proposes here is therefore identical to what I have already 
established in the course of this dissertation. Furthermore, in his final conclusions, Dreyfus 
establishes a grounding connection between what he calls “Dasein’s pre-ontological 
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understanding of various ways of being”149 – something that probably coincides with what 
Heidegger more often calls understanding-of-Being – and “the disclosedness opened by 
Dasein’s self-interpreting activity”.150 Indeed, according to him, “[t]here would be no 
understanding of being without primordial disclosedness, and no disclosedness without this 
understanding of being, and both depend on Dasein”.151 
 
While this is superficially correct, Dreyfus’ interpretation appears more preoccupied with 
answering the pragmatic and analytic question ‘why we understand things the way we do?’ 
rather than focus on the central issue of Being. This is reinforced by Dreyfus’ apparent 
obliviousness to the constitutive connection between the phenomenon of understanding and 
that of Disclosedness, as well as his utter disregard for Division Two of Being and Time 
where the discussion about Dasein’s understanding of entities is to an extent superseded by 
the more foundational investigation concerning the Being of Dasein and its meaning. 
 
Guided by his concern to ground the average human understanding of intraworldly entities, 
Dreyfus’ reading of Being and Time completely strays from Heidegger’s intention, and from 
my interpretation, as it considers the dependence of Disclosedness from Dasein to be 
grounded wholly in Dasein’s thrownness, determined inauthentically by its existential falling; 
that is to say, within the phenomenon of das Man. In other words, according to Dreyfus, 
intraworldly entities are understood/discovered only insofar as Dasein is, so to speak, 
‘socialized’ in a world in which everything already possesses a ‘normal way of being’, which 
would determine the way entities are discovered ‘for any-one’. The average understanding 
which is provided by das Man would afford Dasein a kind of pre-emptive knowledge 
concerning what entities ‘are’, or, which is the same, concerning their Being. In this sense, 
the term das Man refers to Dasein as it understands its Being in a pre-given, average way. 
Yet, is the latter not just what Heidegger refers to with the phrase ‘pre-ontological 
understanding-of-Being? For this phrase names nothing but that existential phenomenon for 
which Dasein finds itself always, already thrown into an understanding relationship with 
Being prior to having ‘consciously’ taken it up. Arguing that, to Dasein, this understanding is 
always necessarily given, implies that entities are always, already uncovered for it, as well as 
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that, to it, a world is always, in some sense, disclosed. As such, Dreyfus is correct in arguing 
that das Man constitutes that background which first allows Dasein to enter into a relationship 
of discoveredness with intraworldly entities, and to find out a world in its Disclosedness. 
 
Nevertheless, this should not be taken to mean, as Dreyfus does, that das Man would in fact 
constitute the definitive ground for the discoveredness of all entities, the Disclosedness of the 
world, as well as, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being, in general. Rather, if das Man can 
be associated with the phenomenon of the pre-ontological understanding-of-Being as the 
‘who’ of such understanding, it may be legitimate to infer that das Man itself engenders 
nothing more than a particular kind of understanding-of-Being; indeed, this kind of 
understanding is not necessarily the most primordial, despite being the first which Dasein 
happens to encounter. This is in line with Heidegger’s peculiar understanding of ‘first 
phenomena’, where their being ‘first’ is due to their being encountered in the first instance 
rather than to their being more ‘ontologically grounding’.  This is consistent with Heidegger’s 
belief that what is ontologically most primordial, i.e. Being, is at first hidden, as it is 
primarily covered over. 
 
Therefore, it may be fair to define Dreyfus’ interpretation as only superficially correct, since 
it mistakenly takes das Man to be what grounds the Disclosedness of Being in general. 
Since by Disclosedness of Being in general what I refer to is the condition of possibility for 
the emergence of truth, which is Dasein itself, due to its being ontological -i.e. always having 
an understanding relation to its Being-, then das Man itself has surely to do with the notion of 
understanding-of-Being. Yet, the phenomenon of das Man merely names that condition of 
Dasein in which its Being, i.e. the fact that it has always already an understanding relation 
with its Being, is constantly assumed, covered-over, and neglected. Surely, das Man names a 
fundamental way of Dasein’s Being, which consists in the inalienable starting point for any 
question concerning Dasein’s Being and a necessary condition for the possibility of any 
ontological Disclosedness.
152
 However, das Man constitutes the subject only of a mere 
subspecies of Disclosedness, that is, the kind of inauthentic Disclosedness which we have 
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equated with Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-of-Being. Now, if Heidegger’s project 
is at all feasible, if Dasein does indeed have a chance to formulate correctly the question of 
Being, or, even further, devise an explicit ontology, then a pre-ontological understanding of 
Being cannot be but a starting point, and cannot certainly be taken as the ultimate ground 
onto which Dasein may stand in its openness to the truth of Being. For, if Dasein in its 
Disclosedness can in fact be the clearing within which the truth of Being may be manifested 
in terms of an ontology, then the Disclosedness which is to allow for such an ontology cannot 
be closed in principle to an explicit understanding of Being. 
 
For the reasons I have outlined above, Dreyfus’ interpretation concerning das Man as the 
fundamental way of Dasein in its understanding, disclosing relation with its Being must 
ultimately be rejected. In other words, Dasein’s ‘das Man’ way of Being, which shows itself 
in that pre-ontological understanding-of-Being which I have termed ‘inauthentic 
Disclosedness’, cannot be taken to be paradigmatic in respect with that Disclosedness of 
Dasein’s Being which Heidegger refers to with the words “[Dasein] is its ‘there’.”153 On the 
other hand, Dreyfus makes his position clear when, in a crucial section of Being-in-the-world 
he writes “…human beings, by the time they have Dasein in them, are ‘always, already’ 
socialized. … One cannot ask: ‘at what age does Dasein get socialized? Babies get socialized, 
but they do not Dasein [verb] until they are already socialized.”154 Yet this cannot be taken to 
imply that Dasein’s Being can be ultimately disclosed solely within the horizon of an 
inauthentic Disclosedness, that is, pre-ontologically. Indeed Heidegger is quite explicit on 
this point as he argues: 
 
But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein's own Being is thus interpreted pre-
ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an 
appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when 
one's ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme.
155
  
 
Dasein must instead develop an explicit ontology which is to reveal the meaning of its own 
Being. And this can only be achieved if Dasein can be found to entertain an explicit 
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understanding relation with its Being, through which its own Being is constantly projected 
upon its meaning. As I will attempt to show in the following chapter, this relation is in fact 
one of Disclosedness and depends upon the specific meaning of Dasein’s Being, namely, 
temporality.  
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3. DISCLOSEDNESS AND THE MEANING OF 
BEING 
 
 
If the conclusion of the preceding chapter is correct, any discussion concerning the role of the 
phenomenon of Disclosedness in Being and Time cannot be attempted without having first 
carried out a thorough analysis of the concept of meaning [Sinn] and its role in the broader 
economy of Heidegger’s masterwork. For whenever something is disclosed, it is always so as 
that which that something is, that is, in accordance with its ‘meaning’. The hermeneutical 
model implicit in this statement entails a fundamental shift away from the traditional 
correspondence theory of truth, where the latter depends on the correct access of the 
understanding to the ‘in-itself’ of its object. 
 
As previously described, whilst Heidegger does not believe this model to be inherently 
incorrect, in Being and Time he questions the primacy of the separateness between subject 
and object on which any correspondence theory of truth is based. Conversely, hermeneutic 
truth is grounded in the fundamental unity which in the previous chapter has been identified 
with Dasein’s Being-in-the-World. This is because the world is Dasein’s hermeneutic 
situation,
156
 where entities are discovered and Being is disclosed according to the projectual 
‘aim’ of the possibilities of Dasein’s Being, that is to say, in terms of meaning. This meaning 
is nothing other than Dasein’s Being itself as it enters into a relation of intelligibility with 
Dasein, which is possible 1) on the ground of Dasein’s primordial falling, 2) on the basis of 
Dasein’s fundamental disposition, and 3) in such a way as to be inherently expressible in 
language. From this, commentators such as Cristina Lafont have inferred that, according to 
Heidegger, meaning must fundamentally determine the Being of entities, so much as to be the 
primary source of truth. Building on the connection between meaning and language, Lafont 
has proposed a model where truth is not only hermeneutically but also linguistically 
construed. In the context of this model language becomes the limiting space within which 
anything can be articulated. Keeping in mind that according to Heidegger meaning is “that 
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which can be Articulated in interpretation”,157 Lafont has further argued that, firstly, anything 
can be discovered or disclosed only within the framework of language and that, secondly, 
language determines the way in which anything is actually discovered or disclosed. 
 
Other commentators, such as Steven Crowell, have also engaged seriously with the 
connection between truth and meaning, albeit less radically.  Crowell himself interprets the 
phenomenon of Disclosedness in terms of meaning, and defines it as ‘the space of meaning’. 
This space, which is essentially phenomenological, enshrines the fundamental relation 
between the intentional subject, Dasein, and its transcendental ground, Being. 
 
In the present chapter I intend to demonstrate that, whilst some of the core tenets of Lafont’s 
interpretation are deeply flawed, Crowell’s research into the phenomenological roots of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of meaning puts us on the route towards a more comprehensive 
interpretation of Being and Time. In an attempt to demonstrate these points, I will begin with 
an analysis of the concept of meaning, by expounding on the connections between meaning, 
understanding and articulation, in Section i.; in Section ii. I will consider the role of the 
concept of meaning in relation to Dasein’s Being, namely, Care, which will lead me into a 
discussion concerning the very meaning of Care, i.e. temporality. This will help me to set the 
scene for a direct analysis of Lafont’s and Crowell’s interpretations which I will undertake in 
final two sections, Section iii. and Section iv, and this will assist me to ascertain their 
relevance in the context of my own attempt to develop a more relational reading of Being and 
Time. 
 
 
i. Meaning, Understanding and Articulation 
 
The concept of ‘meaning’ in Being and Time is possibly one of the most central and yet one 
of the most elusive notions in the book. Despite seemingly framing the entire discussion 
concerning the question of Being [Seinsfrage] from the onset of the book, the concept of 
meaning itself does not begin to be investigated until §32, in the course of Heidegger’s 
analysis of Understanding and Interpretation. According to Heidegger, “[w]hen entities 
within the world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein –that is, when they have 
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come to be understood- we say that they have meaning [Sinn].”158 Since the meaning of 
something is primarily attributed to the something itself, traditional notions of meaning tend 
to interpret it as that which an entity ‘possesses’. Conversely, Heidegger insists that meaning 
is not a “property attaching to entities, lying ‘behind’ them, or floating somewhere as an 
‘intermediate domain’.”159 Hence, an understanding interpretation does not deal with a mere 
‘mental image’ of that which is understood, as if meaning were a middle realm between res 
cogitans and res extensa. Rather it shows the thing itself “as it enters into the intelligibility of 
Dasein”.160 Indeed, whenever something is understood in its meaning, what is understood 
“taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or, alternatively, Being.” 161 When something 
enters into the intelligibility of Dasein, it means that it has been understood, that is to say, it 
has been projected according to its ownmost possibilities. These possibilities are interpreted 
according to a formal existential framework which “makes possible what has been 
projected”.162 This formal existential framework is nothing other than ‘meaning’, that is, “the 
‘upon-which’ of a primary projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as 
something”.163 
 
In this way, meaning comes to be understood as a kind of transcendental condition of 
possibility, in that it allows something to be manifested in its ownmost possibilities, as what 
that something is. Hence, entities ‘are in-themselves’ as they are understood and interpreted 
within the space of significance which is open in accordance with the projectual 
Disclosedness of Dasein’s Being. Here Heidegger demonstrates a very phenomenological 
point, that is, entities do not have meaning independently from Dasein, as their significance 
consists in their being understood according to their for-the-sake-of-which, that is, according 
to Dasein’s ‘intentions’. As such, only Dasein has meaning, since entities become significant 
only within Dasein’s projectual Disclosedness.164 As such, while Signification [Bedeutung] is 
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what is ontically articulated when something is made intelligible, meaning is that which in an 
understanding disclosure can be articulated, and as such is what defines the general field of 
articulateness. 
 
In Chapter 1. of the present dissertation, I have shown how the articulation of the 
intelligibility of an understanding projection is itself a constituent of Disclosedness, that is, 
Discourse.
165
 Since meaning can be roughly defined as the condition of possibility of 
articulation, i.e. the where-upon any articulation rests, it follows that Discourse itself rests 
upon meaning. It is important to remember that Heidegger’s notion of articulation is not 
primarily about expression but analysis. Therefore, as meaning opens up the field of what can 
be articulated, it simultaneously makes possible the analysis of Disclosedness according to its 
constituents, releasing Dasein to the fundamental relation with its Being. 
 
However, not only entities are discovered according to their meaning. Rather, insofar as 
Heidegger’s attempt is that of developing an explicit ontology, Being also comes to be 
understandingly projected upon a meaning. Indeed, since meaning is ultimately something 
which only belongs to Dasein in its ‘there’ [Da], the meaning of Dasein’s Being represents 
the most fundamental field of Disclosedness, which defines the way in which Being can be 
explicitly articulated as to become the subject of an ontology. This does not mean, however, 
that meaning is something more primordial than Being. Rather, it is Being itself in the 
potentiality of its Disclosedness, that is, as part of a disclosing relation with Dasein. As such, 
in considering its meaning, Being becomes the theme of an ontological enquiry which is 
made explicit as a questioning concerning Being. 
 
The fact that when asking about Being what one ultimately finds out is its meaning, does not 
entail that something ‘deeper’ than Being itself has been attained;166 rather, the question 
about the meaning of Being “asks about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the 
intelligibility of Dasein”.167 In this Heidegger shows most eminently the phenomenological 
roots of his thinking. For just as it is for Husserl, a phenomenon is such only as it entertains a 
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relation to a consciousness through an intention; for Heidegger nothing is intelligible unless 
through the Disclosedness of Dasein which opens up the field of articulation, i.e. meaning, 
upon-which a relationship between Dasein and its Being is possible. Yet what is specifically 
the meaning of Dasein’s Being? 
 
 
ii. Care and the Question of the Meaning of Dasein’s Being 
 
While in the course of Being and Time the question concerning the meaning of the Being of 
Dasein is tackled multiple times and at different levels, it is possible to identify two main 
phases: the first, where Heidegger equates Dasein’s Being with the phenomenon of Care; and 
the second in which the meaning of Care is fleshed out through the concept of Dasein’s 
temporality. Let us begin, therefore, with a short summary of Heidegger’s concept of Care 
and then proceed to discuss the reasons behind the equation between temporality and the 
meaning of Dasein’s Being, i.e. Care. 
 
In the final chapter of Division One of Being and Time, following from the discussion 
regarding the structural totality of Dasein’s Being, Heidegger declares: 
 
[t]he formal existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole must… be 
grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-
already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world).
168
  
 
This tripartite structure is in keeping with the structure of Disclosedness which Heidegger 
discusses in the chapter that precedes this quote; hence, while providing a more existential 
and unitary outlook to the structure of Disclosedness, this quote does not add anything 
entirely novel to the discussion developed in Division One, Chapter V. 
 
Then, abruptly, Heidegger adds: “[t]his Being fills in the signification of the term ‘care’, 
which is used in a purely existential manner.”169 To be fair, this is not the first time in which 
the term ‘Care’ is mentioned in Being and Time; it is however the first time in which the 
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discussion regarding the phenomenon of care is developed beyond the mere, undiscussed 
equation between Care and Dasein’s Being. In keeping with the previous passage, the term 
Care names the structural whole of what I could call a ‘disclosing structure’, insofar as the 
three components of this very structure mirror the three fundamental constituents of 
Disclosedness. But where the structure of Disclosedness describes the way in which entities, 
in general, manifest themselves in their Being, the structure of Care names the way in which 
Disclosedness takes place for Dasein, that is, existentially. As such, the phenomenon of 
understanding shows itself existentially as Dasein’s Being-ahead-of-itself; Being-already-in-
(the-world) names Dasein’s existential disposition; while Being-alongside designates 
Dasein’s existential way of Falling. These existential ways of Disclosedness correspond to 
Dasein’s three fundamental characteristics of existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen, which 
in turn coincide with the three constituting elements of the structure of Care proper. These 
are: existence, which names Dasein’s fundamental projecting attitude, as it constantly 
maintains itself, its Being and its world open in their possibilities; facticity, which defines 
Dasein’s existential situation of projecting itself from a set of pre-existing possibilities which 
Dasein itself has not chosen; and falling, which designates Dasein’s inalienable tendency to 
lose itself in the world of entities, thereby trading its ownmost possibilities for those of the 
Das Man’s world. 
 
In this sense I can say that Care consists in a definite kind of Disclosedness which is, so to 
speak, ‘Dasein-specific’, that is, purely existential. As such, Care is nothing more than the 
term signalling the unitary structure of Dasein’s Being in its fundamental disclosing attitude. 
This attitude is what Heidegger defines from the outset of Being and Time in terms of that 
‘taking issue’ which figures in the definition of Dasein as ‘that entity for which, in its being, 
that very being is an issue’.170 As previously discussed, this is connected with Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-Being, which refers to the fact that Dasein understands its Being always in 
terms of its possibilities to be. These possibilities exist only as part of Dasein’s existential 
project, in which the world in general is disclosed in terms of Dasein’s fundamental 
Disclosedness; through such a disclosure, Dasein takes care of its world by both concerning 
[besorgen] itself with entities and being solicitous  [fürsorgen] towards other Daseins. 
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It should be clear, therefore, that the structure of Care is that of Disclosedness, yet as in a 
mirror, since the attention has moved from entities, the world or Being, to Dasein itself. As 
such, while the notion of Care helps Heidegger to shift the focus of his analysis from the 
question ‘about’ the discoveredness of entities and the Disclosedness of the world and Being, 
to the question concerning Dasein’s existential ‘who’, I may say that Heidegger’s discussion 
of Care does not fundamentally add anything to what has already been said concerning 
Dasein’s fundamental disclosing attitude. This is not to deny the significance of this notion at 
a purely philosophical level, but rather to reframe its importance in the economy of Being and 
Time. For the structure of Care is no more than a half-way step between the analysis of 
Disclosedness and the discussion of temporality. This is why, in spite of the relevance many 
commentators have attributed to the phenomenon of Care, the present dissertation will not 
analyse this notion further, but, in keeping with the spirit of Heidegger’s discussion, will 
proceed to utilise the structural analysis of Care in order to tackle the more central question 
regarding the meaning of Dasein’s Being. 
 
By way of analysing the structure of Disclosedness and Dasein’s primordial mode of 
inauthentic being-in-the-world, the first division of Being and Time provides, if not an actual 
demonstration, at least a profound insight into Dasein’s fundamental way of Being. This 
insight is that for Dasein, in its Being, that very Being is an issue; and this ‘taking issue’ is 
what the term ‘Care’ stands for. From this staring point, Heidegger proceeds to argue that an 
entity whose Being is Care has a tendency towards existential wholeness. For by constantly 
taking issue with its own Being, Dasein continually projects itself towards those possibilities 
which are proper (or improper) to its Being. The final resolution of these possibilities into a 
resolved totality, what Aristotle would call a pure actuality, on the one hand projectingly 
drives Dasein ahead-of-itself into its possibilities, while on the other hand constitutes the 
upper limit of Dasein’s possibilities of Being. Yet this totality is achieved only when Dasein 
no longer ‘is’; that is, when it can no longer take issue with its possibilities of Being. While a 
more extensive discussion on this topic of will be tackled in the following chapters of this 
dissertation, what is important to underline at this point is that this potential wholeness, which 
is inseparable from Dasein’s Being, constitutes the basis for what I could call Dasein’s 
existential finitude. The latter must not be understood as a mere characteristic of Dasein; 
rather, as I will see later in this dissertation, this finitude constitutes the inalienable character 
which makes Care, i.e. Dasein’s constant taking issue with its possibilities of Being, possible. 
74 
 
The finite character of Care is itself a further unitary structure and is defined as Having-Been, 
Future and Making-Present,
171
 and is what Heidegger calls ‘temporality’. 
 
Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity and falling, and in this 
way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of Care… [Yet] temporality 
‘is’ not an entity at all. It is not but temporalizes itself.  Nevertheless, we cannot avoid 
saying, ‘Temporality ‘is’… the meaning of care’, ‘Temporality ‘is’ … defined in such 
and such a way’. [However we can say that] temporality temporalizes, and indeed it 
temporalizes possible ways of itself.
172
 
 
Temporality is not an entity, but a phenomenon that relates to entities. This is why, strictly 
speaking, one cannot say that temporality is. Yet, what does it mean for temporality to 
‘temporalize’ itself? While the standard English translation seems merely tautological, a 
closer analysis of the German verb ‘zeitigen’ may shed some light on the very meaning of 
temporality and the role it plays in the analytic of Dasein. While the ordinary meaning of this 
verb is that of ‘bringing to fruition’, in the second division of Being and Time, Heidegger 
attempts to disconnect the term from its original meaning and to exploit the connection with 
the term’s etymological root ‘Zeit’, meaning ‘Time’. Yet, what a number of commentators173 
have not recognised is that, in itself, this connection not only fails to provide the reader with 
any information concerning the very role of temporality, but reduces Heidegger’s discussion 
to an empty play on words. It may be possible to avoid this by reconnecting the term to its 
ordinary meaning, arguing that Heidegger’s intent is to establish temporality as a kind of 
transcendental structure which is ‘fulfilled’ through its concrete ecstases, that is, as having-
been, future and making-present. While I do not intend to downplay the importance of the 
single ecstases in concretely manifesting the unitary phenomenon of temporality, this 
approach fails to recognise the primary reason for which the question concerning temporality 
has been raised by Heidegger: that is, providing a ground for the unity of the structure of 
Care. As such, explaining temporality in terms of its ecstatic fulfilment only begs the 
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question as to how the individual phenomena of having-been, future and making-present can 
constitute a unitary whole which underpins the totality of Dasein’s Being as Care. 
 
A possible solution is to connect the verb ‘zeitigen’ not only with the noun ‘Zeit’, but also 
with the adverb ‘zeitig’, meaning ‘early’. This would suggest a certain priority of the 
phenomenon of temporality as it ‘makes itself earlier’ [zeitig-en] than the ‘possible ways of 
itself’, that is, earlier than its structural components, the ecstases. This priority must be 
interpreted in a structural-transcendental sense, where temporality is nothing but the 
condition of possibility of its ecstases. In turn, the latter constitutes the concrete ways in 
which Dasein is in its possibilities. These are intended as 1) existential possibilities, which 
show themselves as future possibilities; 2) factical possibilities, which consist in what is 
possible due to the limits imposed on Dasein by its having-been; and 3) fallen possibilities, 
which are manifested both in Dasein’s lack of genuine possibilities and in its escaping from 
its finitude – the lack of infinite possibilities. 
 
Now, as I have discussed in the previous section, Heidegger applies the term ‘meaning’ to 
those phenomena which constitute the condition of possibility for something to be the 
something that it is. I can call this, with Kant, the ‘transcendental condition’, or I can define 
it, with Heidegger, as the ‘upon-which of a projection in terms of which something becomes 
intelligible as something’.174 If this is correct, the question concerning the meaning of 
Dasein’s Being can therefore be made explicit by asking: what makes Dasein possible as 
being-possible? This question has already been answered when, in the course of this section, 
Dasein’s finitude has been defined as the drive of all possibilities of Dasein’s Being as well 
as their fundamental limit. Hence, Dasein’s finite temporality is what makes Dasein’s Being 
fundamentally possible, as it makes its concrete possibilities significant in so far as they come 
to be articulated according to the upon-which of all of possibilities of Dasein, i.e. Dasein’s 
potentiality-to-be a finite whole. As such, temporality is nothing but Dasein’s fundamental 
horizon, that is, the condition of possibility according to which Dasein’s Being can be 
disclosed in terms of its possibilities; and for this, temporality can be defined as the meaning 
of Care, that is, as the meaning of Dasein’s Being. 
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While the above certainly cannot be considered an exhaustive analysis of the notions of 
temporality and meaning, the elements which have been discussed should be sufficient to 
inform my discussion, as I shall now move on to analyse two more possible interpretations of 
Being and Time. 
 
 
iii. Discourse and Truth: the Hermeneutic Interpretation of Being and 
Time 
 
In recent years a new interpretation of Being and Time has surfaced within the Anglo-
American tradition, thanks to a Spanish scholar working first in Germany and, more recently, 
in the United States, namely, Cristina Lafont. In her book Heidegger, Language and World-
Disclosure,
175
 Lafont argues in favour a strong continuity between the so called first and 
second Heidegger - particularly concerning the issue of language. More or less explicitly she 
also rejects Dreyfus’ pragmatic interpretation, arguing for what she calls a ‘hermeneutical 
reading’. It should be noted that Lafont’s hermeneutical approach is certainly not the only 
such approach in Heidegger’s scholarship. A large number of commentators have supported 
what they have defined as a hermeneutical reading of Being and Time, including Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Gianni Vattimo, Karl-Otto Apel, and Thomas Sheehan, and their understandings of 
what constitutes a ‘hermeneutical interpretation’ of Heidegger are extremely different from 
Lafont’s and from each other’s. Indeed, when compared to other hermeneutical readings of 
Being and Time, especially those from the European tradition, Lafont’s interpretation is 
possibly not the most exemplary overall. Nevertheless, its significance and influence in the 
Anglo-American tradition makes it paradigmatic for the purpose of this dissertation. 
I have argued in the previous chapter that Dreyfus reads Heidegger as grounding all 
Disclosedness on a set of socially determined ‘knowing-hows’, which never constitute 
explicit mental contents, Lafont argues that Being must be linguistically structured and, at 
least potentially, expressible. This is because, according to Lafont, Language, or Discourse, is 
not only an ontic phenomenon, namely, a system of signs which can be used as equipment in-
order-to ‘showing’, but also an ontological one, as it represents a necessary condition for any 
understanding of Being. Therefore Heidegger, Lafont says, would distinguish between an 
ontic side of articulation, which he calls language [Sprache], and an ontological side, to 
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which he would refer to with the term discourse [Rede]. Any understanding would be 
linguistically structured since the possibility of any understanding is grounded in discourse, 
intended in the sense of what Humboldt would call Energéia. This is not to say that any 
understanding must be actually expressed in a linguistic form before it can understood, but 
rather that its being understood is grounded in that it has a potentiality to be linguistically 
expressed. 
 
Despite the fact that I believe Lafont’s use of the term ontological in this context is, at best, 
spurious, I nevertheless agree with her account, up to this point. What I find more difficult to 
consent to is the claim that Lafont wants to derive from the aforementioned discussion. 
Lafont argues that, given that world’s Disclosedness, which in turns grounds discoveredness 
of entities in their Being, is founded on a previous understanding of Being, then language, or 
better, discourse must determine the way in which the world is disclosed and, consequently, 
the way in which entities are discovered in their Being, since all understanding is 
linguistically structured. 
 
The correctness of this inference depends on the correct interpretation of this word ‘to 
determine’. Now, Heidegger himself implies that entities ‘are’ only where Dasein ‘is’, insofar 
as “Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an 
understanding of Being belongs”;176 this understanding Disclosedness of Being is, in fact, 
what essentially constitutes Dasein. If all understanding is linguistically structured, which is 
to say, if all understanding is grounded in the expressible-ness of what is understood, then 
discourse must indeed play a fundamental role in determining what can be understood and 
therefore disclosed, insofar as all that is understandingly disclosed must fall within the 
domain of discourse. 
 
Prioritizing language is, according to Lafont, a move Heidegger is forced to make, as it is 
required in order for him to challenge the model of perception championed by traditional 
epistemology. According to this model, empirical knowledge of objects is always constructed 
out of the synthesis of what one may refer to as simple perceptions. These are no more than 
immediate snapshots of perceptual experience, like the different visual impressions one gets 
walking around a statue, or the single notes of a symphony. Heidegger is very clear in 
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reversing this paradigm, arguing that the ‘simple seeing’ of immediate perceptions is no more 
than an abstraction from what he calls the ‘as’. Famously, Heidegger argues that one never 
hears a bare sound, which one then interprets as the engine of a car or the whistle of the train. 
Rather, one always first hears the whistle of the train or the noise of the car. In other words, 
entities are accessible only insofar as they are interpreted as what they are, which is to say, 
insofar as they are ‘understood’. Yet, understanding in the sense of the ‘as’ can never consist 
in the understanding of a single entity in isolation: rather, the pen is understood in its 
reference [Verweisung] to the ink, the notepad, the desk, and all these things can be taken in 
reference to each other since they are all ultimately ‘involved’ [Bewandtnis haben] in the 
action of writing. The totality of the way in which entities are ‘involved’, which is to say, the 
totality of Bewandtnis, constitutes the worldhood of the World. In other words, entities 
cannot be ‘understood’ as the entities they are unless from within a world in its worldhood. 
This is why Heidegger can say that the Disclosedness of the world, i.e. the primordial 
openness of the space in which entities can be ‘understood’, or better, discovered, grounds 
the discoveredness of entities. 
 
Yet, in what way is that totality of involvements [Bewandtnisganzheit] which constitutes the 
worldhood of the World first disclosed? Briefly, all Bewandtnis corresponds to a projection 
of the understanding, which renders an entity intelligible according to its meaning. The one 
who understands is Dasein, which, therefore, projects according to the meaning of its own 
Being, in such a way as to open up that totality of Bewandtnis in-which Dasein always, 
already, essentially is, i.e. the world in its worldhood. From this, Lafont affirms, infamously, 
that, if “the meaning ‘in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something’ not 
only is involved de facto in our understanding of intraworldly entities, but also enjoys a 
constitutive role for our access to them… [then] the meaning in question becomes a prior 
determinative for all attainable a posteriori knowledge (about those entities).”177 With a more 
effective yet perhaps confusing formula, Lafont says that, for Heidegger, meaning must 
determine reference. 
 
There is little doubt that meaning plays a constitutive role in the Disclosedness of the world 
as well as in the discoveredness of entities. However, this should not necessarily entail, as 
Lafont seems to believe, that meaning, strictly speaking, determines the very Being of 
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entities; or, which is the same, that Heidegger’s notion of understanding forces him to agree 
that discourse shapes what is understood through and through. Indeed, should the latter be the 
case, would the way in which Being is understood also be determined by the very discourse 
which is said to be grounded in Dasein’s understanding of Being? 
Before attempting to clarify these matters and make sense of Lafont’s interpretation of Being 
and Time, I must clarify the following two issues: first, in what sense understanding-of-Being 
is a form of understanding; and second, whether or not Heidegger actually holds that all 
intelligibility is linguistically structured. 
In order to address the first problem, let us begin by quoting Heidegger when in §44 he 
writes: 
 
Our early analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world has 
shown… that the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is grounded in the 
world’s disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to 
which it is its ‘there’. Disclosedness is constituted by state of mind, understanding 
and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to world, Being-in and the Self.
178
 
 
If understanding is merely one of the constituents of the phenomenon of Disclosedness, then 
how can an expression of such an understanding, namely understanding-of-Being, be itself 
the ground of Disclosedness in general. And furthermore, if world’s Disclosedness must be 
analysed in terms of all the three constituents of Disclosedness, why would Being only be 
understood, rather than being itself disclosed? The solution to these problems will 
nevertheless have to be delayed for the moment, as this constitutes the final aim of the 
present dissertation. On the other hand, the second issue, concerning whether Heidegger 
holds that all intelligibility is linguistically structured, may be addressed in the present 
section. According to Lafont: 
 
Entities that are equipment for us can surely exist without language, they can even be 
used in their function by creatures who do not have language, but they cannot be 
experienced as the equipment that they are by those who do not have an 
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understanding of being, those who do not have the possibility for the manifestness of 
beings.
179
 
 
Indeed, within the context Being and Time, it is not hard to find textual evidence suggesting 
that, without an understanding of Being, entities do not manifest themselves as the entities 
they are, i.e. in their Being. On the other hand, Heidegger never openly affirms in Being and 
Time that Dasein’s having an understanding-of-Being is directly connected with the 
phenomenon of discourse. Nevertheless, if entities are discovered on the ground of 
Disclosedness, and if Disclosedness is constituted by “state-of-mind, understanding and 
discourse”,180 then discourse must indeed play a role in the Disclosedness of the world, as 
well as in the discoveredness of entities. 
 
Yet, this does not provide an explicit connection between Dasein’s understanding-of-Being 
and discourse. The reader may however reflect on the fact that, within the analysis of the 
everydayness of Dasein, the understanding-of-Being is discussed not in the sense of Dasein’s 
understanding of Being in general, an understanding which is never attained in Being and 
Time, but only insofar as it names that ‘relation’ between Being and Dasein, to whom “in its 
very Being, that Being is an issue for it”.181 In this sense, by opening up the meaning of 
Dasein’s Being to Dasein,182 an understanding-of-Being discloses a totality of Bewandtnis, 
i.e. a world, within which particular entities can be uncovered in their Being. In this sense 
Dasein’s understanding of Being names nothing else but the primary emergence of that very 
Disclosedness which manifests itself always in terms disposition, understanding and, also, 
discourse. What remains to be justified is why the phenomenon of discourse should hold any 
priority among the three constituents of Disclosedness. Indeed, how can Lafont justify her 
claim that Disclosedness is not only necessarily linguistically structured, but that discourse 
shapes Disclosedness through and through? Additionally, would this be connected with her 
interpretation of Heidegger as holding that meaning determines reference?  
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Lafont interprets the notion of meaning in connection with that of discourse. However, as I 
have stated in section i. of the present chapter, the most extensive treatment of meaning 
within Being and Time can be found in the context of Heidegger’s discussion about the 
phenomenon of understanding, in connection with his explication of the notion of 
interpretation. In §32 Heidegger characterizes meaning as “that which can be Articulated in a 
disclosure by which we understand...” and “...the ‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of 
which something becomes intelligible as something”.183 As I have explained in the previous 
section, this projection is that through which the world is disclosed in the light of Dasein’s 
existential project, i.e. its towards-which. According to the latter’s disclosure of the world, 
entities become intelligible [verständlich], and thus can be articulated. This does not mean 
that entities must first be understood in order to be discovered according to the meaning of 
Dasein’s Being through an articulation. Rather, as one can be infer from the aforementioned 
excerpt, any understanding projection can be pro-jected only insofar as there is a meaning 
‘upon-which’ that very projection can be pro-jected. This is to say that not only in the 
absence of a projection no meaning can be articulated, but also that without meaning, 
projections lacks their pro-, i.e. the ground which pro-pels them forward and to which 
projections ultimately return. 
 
Since meaning is strictly connected with the phenomenon of articulation, Lafont infers that 
meaning must be inseparable from discourse/language. Despite the fact that this formulation 
may be misguiding, insofar as meaning is an essential element not only of discourse but also 
of disposition and understanding, affirming that meaning is inseparable from 
discourse/language is to some extent unproblematic. Less justifiable is Lafont’s connection 
between the fundamental relation of meaning and discourse, and what she calls “the world-
disclosing function of language (as the bearer of an ‘interpretedness,’ of an understanding of 
being that discloses the world to Dasein)”.184 What is hard to substantiate is not so much the 
inference itself, but the reason why discourse/language should be so radically severed from 
the other two constituents of Disclosedness and thus bear the whole weight of Disclosedness, 
as if the former would entirely determine the latter’s constituents.185 
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This interpretative line is rendered possible thanks to the way in which Lafont silences the 
relation between meaning and the other two components of Disclosedness, and propounds a 
notion of meaning which is entirely discourse-oriented. On the strength of this omission, 
Lafont can then equate the fact that Dasein “‘is never able to withdraw from’ this 
interpretedness [the one of which language, in its world-disclosing function, is the bearer] 
that ‘determines what and how one ‘sees’’”,186 with Dasein’s inability of separating the ontic 
from the ontological, insofar as all that has meaning must necessarily be articulated. In other 
words, according to Lafont, Heidegger’s conception of discourse/language carries implicitly 
with it the fatal reduction of the ontic to the ontological. In other words, if all entities are 
discovered on the ground of the world, which, in turn, is disclosed according to the meaning 
of the Being of Dasein,
187
 once meaning is reduced to the mere content of linguistic 
articulation, and exists only dependently on the latter, then language does certainly bear the 
whole weight of the Disclosedness of the world and Being in general; therefore, language is 
taken to be the sufficient condition for the discovery of entities. By this interpretation, 
however, the other two constituents of Disclosedness, i.e. disposition and understanding, 
become secondary and ultimately subsidiary to the phenomenon of discourse. 
 
But perhaps Lafont’s interpretation of the notion of discourse/language in Heidegger can be 
broadened in order to include disposition and understanding as well. Despite the stark 
contradiction between such an interpretation and Heidegger’s clear-cut distinction of the 
constituents of Disclosedness, such a broadened notion of language would be consistent with 
Lafont’s critique of the reduction of the ontic to the ontological. In this sense, for entities to 
be anything, they must be uncovered according to the meaning of Dasein’s Being. This is to 
say, in order to be, entities need to be uncovered on the ground of an ontological 
Disclosedness. Indeed, Disclosedness for Heidegger is an ontological phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the ontological nature of the phenomenon of Disclosedness, together with its 
primordial character, need not be taken as to imply a reduction of the ontic to the ontological, 
but can be interpreted to underline the more primordial nature of the ontological in respect 
with the ontic. In other words, the fact that the phenomenon of Disclosedness is ontological 
and that entities, in order to be, need to be uncovered on the ground of an ontologically 
                                                 
186
Cristina Lafont, Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp.79-80. 
187
The meaning of the Being of Dasein, i.e. temporality, is at the same time the meaning of the Being of the 
entities that are uncovered, and is, in this sense, their meaning. 
83 
 
disclosed world, implies that the ontic manifestation of entities as present-at-hand is merely 
derivative on their discoveredness as ready-to-hand items of equipment on the ground of the 
world, disclosed by Dasein’s Being. In this sense, Lafont’s argument seems even more 
surprising insofar as, since the very first pages of Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly 
acknowledges this hierarchy. 
 
Nonetheless, it must also be acknowledged that Heidegger’s discussion concerning the 
priority of the ontological discoveredness operated by Dasein over the ontic manifestation of 
entities, often runs the risk of falling into idealism. Now, the notion of facticity [Faktizität] 
constitutes Heidegger’s attempt to avoid the charge of idealism. The point is that Dasein, 
despite being in some sense the necessary condition of possibility for the Disclosedness of the 
world, is itself always already in-the-world. This is to say that whatever world is disclosed by 
Dasein, it is disclosed according to the factual possibilities in which Dasein is always, already 
thrown [werfen]. In this sense, facticity constitutes, if not the actual Realia which determine 
Dasein’s possibility of Disclosedness -as much as, for example, an ‘actual’ electron would 
determine the way in which the scientist describes its properties-, at least the background 
which constitutes the formal limit of any possibility of Disclosedness. This background is 
Dasein’s ‘projectiveness’ and is fundamentally transcendent. This is to say, it is not ‘caused’ 
by Dasein despite fundamentally constituting the latter. More on this will be said later in the 
present dissertation. 
 
Despite agreeing that the notion of facticity may actually deliver Heidegger from the charge 
of idealism, Lafont believes that such a discussion prevents the philosophy of Being and Time 
from transcending the immanent possibilities of understanding from ‘within’. In other words, 
if the ‘possibilities of knowledge’ are not set by Dasein itself, then Dasein on its own cannot 
revise these very possibilities and challenge the boundaries of what is possible to know. 
Nonetheless, modern science and the scientific method would provide proof of the opposite. 
Indeed, if one was to limit their analysis to Division One of Being and Time, Lafont’s critique 
is definitely justified. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s main aim in Being and Time is to overcome 
both realism and idealism –including transcendental idealism; and certainly, in the context of 
Heidegger’s struggle to do just that, he seems now to support one side, now to champion the 
other. Yet, despite not being able, at least within Division One, to show a path towards a 
possible synthesis, he makes clear that the weight of Disclosedness, i.e. its ground, cannot be 
laid either upon Dasein, or merely on the factical element of Dasein’s Being. Later in this 
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dissertation I will discuss how Division Two contains some of the elements of a possible 
solution. I will explain this with reference to the Call of Conscience, in which Dasein is urged 
to take up its own null basis. For now, I will devote the remainder of this chapter to 
considering the shortcomings of Lafont’s readings of Being and Time, particularly in the light 
of the issues concerning the nature of the ground of the world’s Disclosedness, as the 
condition of possibility of the discoveredness of entities to Dasein. 
 
Certainly, Lafont’s interpretation has the important merit of having clearly highlighted 
Heidegger’s paradigm-shift from a philosophy of perception to a philosophy of understanding 
Disclosedness.
188
 She consistently acknowledges the fundamental disclosive function of the 
notion of understanding-of-being in Heidegger, and goes as far as to say that “[our prior 
understanding] fulfils a world-disclosing function, for it is only through understanding that 
intraworldly entities become accessible as such”.189 However, Lafont goes a step further, and 
argues that “...discourse or language contains an interpretedness in itself, which ‘is just as 
little only present-at-hand as language is; rather, its being has itself the character of 
Dasein.’190 In this way language comes to be identified in its ontic and at the same time 
ontological status as responsible for Dasein’s particular understanding of being...”.191 In this 
sense, Lafont wants to ground Dasein’s understanding-of-Being on that fundamental 
intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] which, according to Lafont, is provided by discourse.
192
 The 
justification for this funding connection lies, however, in a third term which links 
understanding [Verständnis] with discourse [Rede], i.e. meaning [Sinn]. Indeed, as I have 
already mentioned, meaning is what defines the framework of understandableness of an 
entity that is disclosed and, as such, can be articulated: that is, analysed in terms of the 
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constituting parts of that Disclosedness. Conversely, Lafont takes the phenomenon of 
articulation to be somewhat equivalent to that of expression, and exploits the connection 
between meaning and articulation in order to define meaning in terms of discourse/language. 
According to her, “the knowledge of meaning contained in a language provides the 
ontological framework for anything that can be referred to within such a language, such a 
projection of meaning”.193 It is language/discourse that, according to Lafont, ‘contains’ that 
knowledge of meaning which constitutes “the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
identification of the referent”.194 With this move, Lafont succeeds in detaching the 
phenomenon of meaning from two of the three constituents of Disclosedness, thus restricting 
meaning to a phenomenon wholly dependent on language/discourse. From this it is only 
natural to infer that, if meaning is grounded in language/discourse, then Disclosedness and 
discoveredness are also fundamentally linguistic phenomena. 
 
As I have previously argued, the main problem of Dreyfus’ interpretation consisted in the 
lack of a ground which would grant the possibility of an explicit ontology beyond that of 
everyday Dasein in which Being is constantly hidden. Hence, it may seem that Lafont’s 
choice of privileging language/discourse as the grounding constituent of Disclosedness 
overcomes the main issue of Dreyfus’ reading. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that, 
according to Heidegger’s definition, meaning refers only to ‘that which can be articulated 
[Articulierbare]’,195 while “that which gets articulated [Gegliederte] as such in discursive 
Articulation, we call the ‘totality-of-significations”.196 In this sense, meaning [Sinn] 
constitutes a horizon of possibility of discursive (linguistic) articulation. Yet how can 
something be at once the horizon of a certain phenomenon, i.e. language/discourse, while 
depending from the phenomenon itself? Perhaps Lafont would admit that meaning is not 
merely contained within language/discourse, and that it is indeed a notion which characterises 
all three constituents of Disclosedness and, in a way which I shall explore later in this 
dissertation, underpins them. 
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On the other hand, I may grant to Lafont that ‘meaning determines reference’. Yet, strictly 
speaking only Dasein ‘has’ meaning.197 Entities do not ‘have’ meaning, but when they are 
discovered “…along with the Being of Dasein –that is when they have come to be understood 
– we say that they have meaning [Sinn]”.198 Thus, meaning certainly determines reference: 
but this is not due to the fact that something like a language supplies a set of pre-given 
meanings which Dasein applies to entities in order to discover them within their referential 
totality, which constitutes significance. Rather, insofar as only Dasein ‘has’ meaning, then the 
only meaning which is, strictly speaking, involved in a projection of the understanding is that 
of the Being of Dasein.  
 
Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, the ‘meaning’ of Being, or that of an entity names 
nothing but the way in which Being, or that entity, enters into the intelligibility of Dasein.
199
 
Hence, when Heidegger talks about the meaning of Dasein’s Being, he is referring to 
Dasein’s Being itself, in its being understood by Dasein. But, in this sense, the meaning of the 
Being of Dasein, which, as explained in the previous section, is temporality [Zeitlichkeit], 
stands in close relationship to the fundamental phenomena of understanding-of-Being and 
Disclosedness. Indeed, to say that Dasein’s Being has a meaning is to say nothing other than 
that Dasein stands in a relation of understanding Disclosedness to its Being. From the fact 
that an understanding-of-Being always already belongs to Dasein, it follows that Dasein, in 
its Being, ‘has’ a meaning, which is the meaning of its Being. According to this meaning, a 
world in its worldhood, is disclosed, and entities are discovered within it. But it is only 
because Dasein stands always already in a relation to its Being that Dasein’s Being can be 
disclosed according to discourse [Rede], understanding [Verstehen] and disposition 
[Befindlichkeit] and may belong to Dasein itself in terms of the primordial openness through 
which the world is disclosed and entities are discovered. This does not mean that Dasein’s 
understanding-of-Being needs being prior to any discourse, understanding and disposition; 
rather the former grounds the latter three only insofar as those grant the former to disclose 
itself. But in no way can discourse, or understanding, or disposition, on their own ground the 
disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being that primarily manifests itself in Dasein’s 
understanding-of-Being or, less confusingly, in its Disclosedness of Being. Because of this, 
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Lafont’s interpretation must also be rejected, at least concerning its main line of argument. In 
this sense, the fundamental shortcoming of Lafont’s interpretation is that of conferring a 
foundational role to discourse/language, based on its alleged dual status, i.e. ontic and 
ontological, and therefore disregarding the grounding status of the phenomenon of 
Disclosedness and the equiprimordiality of its constituting elements. As such, Lafont’s 
reading, just like Dreyfus’, overlooks the importance of Disclosedness in the economy of 
Being and Time and fails to deliver a consistent interpretation of Heidegger’s masterwork, by 
limiting its analysis to only one of the constituents of this phenomenon, i.e. discourse, 
without ever considering Disclosedness in its entirety. 
 
 
iv. The space of Meaning: the Phenomenological Interpretation of Being 
and Time 
 
Many commentators, especially those of the Dreyfus’ school, have interpreted the philosophy 
of Being and Time as a more or less explicit critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. One 
commentator within the Anglo-American tradition who in recent years has attempted to 
reverse this paradigm is Steven Crowell. Throughout his work, Crowell engages in a reading 
of Heidegger’s masterwork in terms of its transcendental-phenomenological inspiration, in 
order to show that Heidegger’s philosophy: first, is  ultimately transcendental, which is to 
say, concerned with the description of the conditions of possibility of the manifestness of 
entities, and Being, as they are; second, is still importantly engaged in an analysis of 
intentionality, albeit in terms of the human Dasein; third, does not reject the transcendental 
reduction, although does away with Husserl’s version of it; fourth, is based on a notion of 
Being better understood in terms of Meaning or, as Crowell calls it, ‘Space of Meaning’. One 
can easily agree with the first point, although a thorough discussion of it would be beyond the 
scope of the present dissertation. The second point is slightly more controversial. The 
difficulty lies in whether or not Dasein can be appropriately described as ‘intentional’. In 
order to assess whether or not this is the case I must begin by clarifying Husserl’s notion of 
intentionality. 
 
According to Husserl, “Intentionality [is] the unique peculiarity of experiences ‘to be the 
consciousness of something’.”200 The term refers therefore to the intrinsic directedness of 
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consciousness towards its object. Yet the object itself is nothing ‘outside’ consciousness, but 
is internal to an intentional experience (or act). All intentional experiences in this sense are 
‘conscious experiences’, yet “...not every real phase of the concrete unity of an intentional 
experience has itself the basic character of intentionality, the property of being a 
‘consciousness of something’. This is the case, for instance, with all sensory data, which play 
so great a part in the perceptive intuitions of things.”201 The question Crowell poses then is 
whether Dasein, as Heidegger understands it, may be considered in some sense an intentional 
consciousness. To rephrase this question in more Heideggerian terms I may ask: can Dasein 
be best described in terms of its directedness-towards…? 
 
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I have analysed the way in which Dasein, in its 
everydayness, is directed towards intraworldly entities. Thus directed, Dasein primarily 
discovers entities in its engagement with them as ready-to-hand equipment. This is because, 
according to Heidegger, an entity can be discovered as it is in-itself only in terms of 
'something other than itself'. As it has been said more than once in the course of this 
dissertation, all entities 'are' in terms of that for-the-sake-of-which that is Dasein, or, which is 
the same, according to a certain interpretedness of their Being in the light of Dasein’s Being. 
Hence, if one takes Husserl’s intentionality to refer eminently to the way a conscience and its 
object are necessarily intertwined, Dasein, at least in its everydayness, may be accurately 
described in terms of its directedness towards intraworldly entities, and of the dependence of  
the former’s and the latter’s Being on this directedness. 
 
As I have previously mentioned, for Heidegger, the discoveredness of entities is possible only 
insofar as Dasein finds itself always, already in-the-World, alongside entities which are 
significant for Dasein itself. Dasein’s fundamental character of Being-in-the-world refers to 
Dasein’s existential situation of finding itself always, already within a certain, often pre-
ontological, Disclosedness of Being. This Disclosedness may still be interpreted as implying 
a certain ‘directedness towards...’ although the object of this directedness is no longer an 
entity but Being itself. This does, however, not contradict Heidegger’s discussion of 
understanding in §§31-32, where this constituent of Disclosedness is described as pro-
jectedness upon meaning. Thus, Dasein’s understanding Disclosedness of Being, and for that 
matter of anything, does not consists for Heidegger in a conscious appropriation of an 
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external object through the confrontation of the object itself with an internal mental content, 
i.e. its meaning. Rather, understanding, as Heidegger wants it, implies Dasein’s self-
projection towards what is understood; while the jetting of the projection is ‘directed’ by the 
meaning of what is understood. 
This existential projectedness of Dasein towards its Being (from itself and beyond itself), that 
is to say, Dasein’s transcendence, constitutes a fundamental character of Dasein’s Being, 
which Heidegger names the ‘Da’ of Dasein. As the reader knows, the ‘Da’ makes reference 
to the phenomenon of Disclosedness; and insofar as Dasein, in its Being, is so necessarily 
disclosive as to be ‘its own Disclosedness’, its Being itself can be understood as Care. 
In his book Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning, Crowell insists on this point, 
namely, that Heidegger does analyse Dasein as a consciousness directed intentionally 
towards... . Yet, Crowell believes that Being and Time constitutes an attempt to go beyond 
Husserl’s epistemological version of intentionality. Crowell states: 
 
Instead of starting with a being who doubts, knows, and thus posits the world, 
Heidegger identifies the philosophically more primary sense in which the beginning 
philosopher is a questioner. To ask about the meaning of being is thus first to ask 
about the being of the one who raises the question, and that means, about the 
conditions for the possibility of raising questions at all. The systematic heart of Being 
and Time lies in the idea of a “preontological” understanding of being 
(Seinsverständnis) as the first such condition that any entity capable of raising the 
question of being must fulfill. For this reason Heidegger introduces “Dasein” as a 
terminus technicus to indicate that being for whom “in its very being that being is an 
issue for it,” namely, a being for whom questioning is possible.202  
 
Dasein can be described as an intentional consciousness; nonetheless, its intentions are not 
merely directed towards the discoveredness of entities in the world, but also, and in this case 
authentically, towards the Disclosedness of its World and its Being as Being-in-the-World. 
This is confirmed by Crowell as he argues: 
 
Finally, being-in-the-world can be conceived according to the character of its “in,” the 
Da (here/there) of Dasein. Taking aim at the tradition that sees this phenomenon 
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primarily in terms of consciousness viewed on the model of a subject knowing an 
object, Heidegger shows how consciousness, intentionality, itself derives from a more 
complex structure, whose aspects he terms “disposition” (Befindlichkeit ), 
“understanding” (Verstehen), and “discourse” (Rede). These aspects—which must 
ultimately be understood as modes of Dasein’s temporality—together yield that space 
of meaning thanks to which both subjects and objects can be encountered.
203
 
 
Hence, according to Crowell, Heidegger does not abandon the intentional-consciousness 
model typical of phenomenology, but radicalises it in order to describe not only the ‘wherein’ 
within which entities are discovered, but also and most importantly the space which allows 
for the manifestation of the ground of intentionality itself. This is what Heidegger calls 
Authentic Disclosedness [Entschlossenheit], and in it both Dasein and its Being are 
manifested intentionally, that is to say, in their inextricably intertwined relation. In this 
interpretation of Being and Time, Dasein is described therefore as a radical intentional 
consciousness, directed not only towards entities in their discoveredness, or towards itself in 
its peculiar transcendental-ontological character - something which Husserl already discusses 
in terms of the self-directedness of consciousness, but also towards the transcendent ground 
of its very intentionality. This is because to direct one’s consciousness towards one’s Being, 
or towards Being in general is indeed still an intentional act, albeit of a special kind. 
 
Some commentators disagree with Crowell on this point, arguing that Dasein cannot be 
understood in terms of intentional consciousness. I have already argued that Dreyfus
204
 in his 
interpretation of Being and Time insists on the fact that Dasein’s understanding is primarily 
non-conscious and can be better understood in terms of a ‘knowing-how’ which depends on 
an unreflected background. This is essentially the way in which Dreyfus understands the 
distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’, as a distinction between conscious 
beliefs which are present in the mind of the believer, and background beliefs that can never 
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be brought to consciousness. Other commentators such as Theodore Kisiel, dispute that 
Husserl’s understanding of consciousness is irreflexive enough for Heidegger to agree on. 
 
Nonetheless, I must hold fast to the core of Husserl’s understanding of intentionality as it is 
defined in Ideas I, namely, as “the unique peculiarity of experiences ‘to be the consciousness 
of something’.”205 The point is that, if one buys into Husserl’s essential definition of 
intentionality, it is hard to refuse the intentional nature of Dasein’s Disclosedness of Being, 
even though it has the peculiarity of being the foundation of all intentional acts of that 
consciousness, i.e. Dasein. Certainly Dasein’s intentionality is not that of Husserl’s pure 
consciousness, which is essentially constituting for all phenomena. For Heidegger, Crowell 
believes, Dasein is, in the authentic Disclosedness of its Being, something like the facilitator 
rather than the ground of its ‘Da’, which Crowell calls ‘the space of meaning’. This definition 
brings me to the third point of my summary of Crowell’s phenomenological interpretation of 
Being and Time. This point is at the heart of Crowell’s interpretation and constitutes its most 
controversial tenet. According to him, Heidegger, in Being and Time, would maintain 
Husserl’s transcendental reduction. But what is exactly this ‘transcendental reduction’? The 
latter is achieved by means of a suspension of judgement concerning the existence of the 
World; this is Husserl’s famous epoché. By means of the epoché, the philosopher discovers 
the so called Pure Consciousness, as a residuum of the bracketing out of the ‘real’ from all 
theoretical concerns. This pure consciousness is not, so to speak, subjective –despite the fact 
that Husserl often describes it in subjective rather than objective terms. For Husserl’s 
discovery is that once judgement of the ‘real’ is suspended, philosophy is left with a 
‘transcendental field of activity’ in which subject and object are subsumed within the unitary 
structure of consciousness. Yet how can one reconcile Husserl’s epoché with a philosophy, 
such as Heidegger’s, aimed at reconnecting the human Dasein with both its Being-in-the-
World, entities and other human Daseins, as discovered and disclosed on the background of 
the fundamental Disclosedness of the World? 
 
Obviously, if one interprets Husserl’s notion of pure consciousness as an attempt to reduce 
res extensa to res cogitans, then Heidegger is just as far from Husserl as he is from Descartes. 
While Husserl at times brings the charge of idealism on himself, many commentators, 
including Crowell, have been extremely successful in distinguishing between 
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Phenomenology and Idealism –albeit perhaps not Transcendental Idealism. The point is, once 
the epoché  is carried out, according to Husserl, what is manifested is no longer objects but 
phenomena, that is to say, entities which are shown in the way a consciousness is directed 
towards them, i.e. intentionally. At the same time, consciousness itself does not appear 
‘absolutely’, but is itself revealed only in terms of phenomena, as an ‘intentional 
consciousness’; that is to say in its ‘directedness-towards’ phenomena. Yet Pure 
Consciousness for Husserl is not synonymous with either subject or object. Rather, as Ryan 
Gable puts it: 
 
[It] encompasses both ends or ‘poles’ of the intentional relationship of consciousness 
to its object, but each term considered in its purity, that is, only as correlative to the 
other (its status as an existent in the world being excluded). Thus, real objects are 
considered only insofar as they are meaningful unities of sense for consciousness, that 
is, in their phenomenality or appearing to consciousness, while my own actual, 
empirical ego and its conscious activities are considered only as correlative to the 
objects to which they are directed, that is, as ‘pure’, ‘transcendental’ 
consciousness.”206 
 
Hence, bracketing the World does not imply a reduction of the World to Consciousness, but 
the discovery of a new approach where it is possible to overcome subject-object dualism in 
view of the unified field of consciousness. The epoché is only a method to attain the 
perspectival shift that is the transcendental reduction. Indeed, as Gable suggests, the term 
‘reduction’ here must be understood in its etymological sense of bringing-back [re-ducere]. 
Hence, by bracketing the World as it is taken to be ‘in reality’, Husserl attempts to bring back 
the World to the transcendental space where it belongs. This is by no means a reduction in the 
sense of a narrowing down of theoretical reflection to a less comprehensive space, but exactly 
the opposite; namely, the regaining of a broader understanding of entities by means of a more 
exhaustive and, so to speak, primordial structure. Hence, the transcendental reduction has the 
specific goal of showing that “all the world, and therefore whatever exists naturally, exists for 
me only as accepted by me, with the sense it has for me at the time –that it exists for me only 
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as cogitatum of my changing and, while changing, interconnected cogitationes.”207 
Understood in this way, the transcendental reduction, at least in its intent, is certainly not far 
from Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as Being-in-the-World.  As I have already discussed, 
the latter term refers to the inevitability for human Dasein to be always already within a 
horizon in which entities can be discovered in their Bewandtnis to Dasein, which in turn 
depends on their significance. Outside this inalienable ‘within’, neither human Dasein ‘is’, 
nor other entities ‘are’. This is because in order for anything to be manifested, discovered or 
disclosed, that is to say, in order for anything to be a phenomenon, something has to fall 
inside the horizon within which things may ‘be’. This is not altogether different from saying 
that a phenomenon can appear only there where the condition of possibilities for its 
appearance are fulfilled -only within the transcendental field of intentional consciousness. 
 
If there is a difference between Husserl and Heidegger, this is certainly not in the outcome 
but in the method. For Heidegger, as argued by Crowell, following Tugendath, “no longer 
needed the epoché in order to investigate the dimension of modes of givenness because . . . he 
stands within it from the outset.”208 The term Being-in-the-World means precisely this, 
namely, that Dasein, in its Being, is always already within a transcendental field of 
Disclosedness and, as a consequence, discoveredness. For this, Crowell believes, rightly I 
think, that Disclosedness for Heidegger can be said to coincide with the field of 
consciousness. Yet Heidegger is keen to stress that Disclosedness, just as much as 
consciousness, if one understands the latter radically enough, is not merely an 
epistemological notion, but has, as Crowell puts it, “a more complex structure whose aspects 
he terms ‘disposition’ (Befindlichkeit ), ‘understanding’ (Verstehen), and ‘discourse’ 
(Rede).”209 This shift is important, as it marks the difference between Heidegger’s and 
Husserl’s brands of phenomenology. This is not to say that Husserl’s phenomenology is 
merely epistemological rather than ontological. Crowell insists that phenomenology, even in 
its Husserlian version, is at bottom ontological.
210
 What is different about Heidegger’s 
approach is the way in which ontology is understood, namely, as a complex, structured 
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relation between Dasein and its Being, which cannot be reduced to a ‘pure’ understanding of 
Being. In the final chapters of this dissertation I will analyse this point further, as I hope this 
shall help to clear the way for a more satisfactory interpretation of Being and Time. 
 
From here, Crowell takes a further step in his interpretation of Being and Time. This brings 
me to discuss the fourth and final point of Crowell’s phenomenological reading of Heidegger. 
According to this reading, it is by embracing Husserl’s transcendental reduction, albeit in its 
radically ontological form, that Heidegger comes to the realization that ontology must be 
understood in terms of the (intentional) relation between Dasein and Being, taken as the 
ground of all Disclosedness. It is only within the transcendental field of this relation -a field 
identified earlier with the ‘Da’ of Dasein, i.e. its Disclosedness- that the Being of Dasein is 
itself disclosed as it enters the intelligibility of Dasein in terms of its ‘meaning’. Indeed, 
according to Heidegger, anything that enters within the intelligibility of Dasein does so as 
‘meaning’. 
 
As I have already discussed in the course of the present chapter, Heidegger’s notion of 
meaning is constructed in order to provide an alternative to the correspondence theory of 
truth, one which would avoid both crude realism and psychological idealism. Crowell agrees 
on this point and, discussing Heidegger’s early notion of meaning, remarks: 
 
The transcendental-logical explication of the correspondence theory demands that the 
object itself be seen as meaning. Heidegger supports such an equivalence between the 
object as such and truth (valid meaning) as such by an appeal to the scholastic notion 
of the’ covertability’ of ens and verum. … The ‘difference’ between the ens and the 
verum is no ‘real’ difference, but only the reflective recognition of the object’s 
essential relation to the subject.
211
 
 
Crowell continues: 
 
…[T]he object in the regulative sense necessary as the criterion of correspondence 
simply is meaning. Meaning is the ‘being’ of the object. … [Nonetheless] Heidegger 
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emphasizes the ‘idea of immanence’212, i.e. the recognition that the ‘object as 
meaning’ cannot be understood apart from a serious phenomenological reflection on 
the subjectivity of the subject
213
.
214
 
 
It is clear therefore why Crowell names the transcendental field of Disclosedness, within 
which entities are discovered to Dasein, the ‘space of meaning’.  Indeed, neither 
discoveredness nor Disclosedness are possible if not in terms of ‘meaning’. This is the case 
also for the Disclosedness of Being, despite it being the ground of all possible Disclosedness. 
Heidegger confirms this point in §32: 
 
[I]f we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation ... asks about 
Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. This meaning of 
Being can never be contrasted with entities or with Being as the 'ground' which gives 
entities support, for a ground becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself 
the abyss of meaninglessness"
215
 
 
It is worthwhile now to compare this last quote with another excerpt from §39. I have argued 
many times in this dissertation that Dasein stands, without fail, within an understanding of 
Being, lest it be not Dasein at all. Heidegger makes this point once more, albeit in a slightly 
different way, when he argues: 
 
…Being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like 
an understanding of Being belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, 
but it never completely fails to be understood."
216
 
 
This cross-reference is particularly instructive. For, if Being is always already understood 
[verstanden] by Dasein, and if meaning is Being itself, as it enters into the intelligibility 
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[verständlichkeit] of Dasein, I can conclude that it is not possible, at least from the standpoint 
of the human Dasein, to distinguish between Being and its meaning. For this, Crowell 
believes that if one agrees that Heidegger in Being and Time supports a version of the 
transcendental reduction, one must also agree that, within this reduction Being must manifest 
itself only in terms of ‘meaning’; that is to say, in terms of a relation of Disclosedness 
between Being itself and Dasein. Yet, by identifying Being and meaning, or, better, Being 
and the ‘space of meaning’ within which that Being is disclosed to Dasein in terms of 
meaning, Crowell is not pursuing a mere terminological equivalence, but rather making a 
point concerning the importance of the transcendental space of Disclosedness as opposed to 
the two poles between which this space has been traditionally split. This point constitutes the 
important lesson that a phenomenological reading of Being and Time can teach, namely, that 
for Heidegger what is important is not Being as the objective counterpart of a subjective 
Dasein, nor Being as the mere bridge between a subjective sphere and an objective sphere, 
but Being as the transcendent ground of Disclosedness, within which the subjective and 
objective spheres are rejected in favour of a sphere of significance - a sphere which is 
metaphysically and epistemologically foundational in respect with the split between subject 
and object. This phenomenological interpretation is confirmed by Heidegger when he argues 
that “...for a ground becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of 
meaninglessness."
217
 Indeed, maintaining this correspondence between Being as the ground 
of all Disclosedness and meaning is paramount, if one does not want to forfeit the ontological 
difference. Crowell’s phenomenological interpretation succeeds exactly in avoiding turning 
Being into ‘something’ in order to talk about it. Being, understood as the transcendental field 
of Disclosedness, ‘is’ only insofar it enters within the intelligibility of Dasein as its meaning. 
And insofar as the meaning of Being turns out to be itself that transcendental field of 
Disclosedness itself, i.e. what Crowell calls the ‘space of meaning’, then Being itself is 
disclosed within this ‘space of meaning’ as the ‘space of meaning’ itself -or, which is the 
same, as the ground of all Disclosedness. 
 
But if all of the above is correct, why then does Heidegger maintain a terminological 
difference between meaning and Being, or indeed between meaning and any entity which is 
discovered from within the field of Disclosedness? Shouldn’t Heidegger explicitly develop an 
ontology of meaning rather than a hermeneutical ontology? Indeed, despite the important 
                                                 
217
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.194, H. 152. 
97 
 
merits of Crowell’s interpretation in tracing the connection between Being and meaning, the 
phenomenological reading of Being and Time does not appear to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the questions I have just raised. Certainly Heidegger explicitly states that Being as 
“ground becomes accessible only as meaning…"218 Nevertheless, this does not seem to urge 
Heidegger to collapse terminologically ‘meaning’ into ‘Being’ or vice versa. This may 
indicate that indeed Heidegger wants to maintain some difference between Being and 
meaning. Yet if Being as ground enters within the intelligibility of Dasein only as meaning, 
and if one agrees with Heidegger’s commitment to the spirit of the transcendental reduction, 
one must admit that the distinction between Being and meaning is at best superfluous. This 
would be correct unless ‘being a ground’ is not all there is about Being; unless, in other 
words, I can demonstrate that, despite the fact that Being, understood as the transcendental 
ground of all Disclosedness, must be equated with meaning; or, as Crowell would say, with 
the ‘space of meaning’, the notion of Being itself is not completely exhausted by that of 
‘ground’. If this is the case there may be ‘something else’ to Being, a residual difference that 
would prevent a complete equation between Being and the way that very Being enters into 
the intelligibility of Dasein. Hence, there could be a sense in which Being lies utterly 
‘beyond’ the transcendental space of meaning. Yet if Being can be disclosed only within the 
space that it itself grounds, how can there ‘be’ anything beyond that space? And insofar as 
Being itself, as ground, is the condition of possibility of its own Disclosedness, how can 
Being ‘be’, so to speak, ‘beyond itself’? 
 
This profound tension within Heidegger’s masterwork is noted by Crowell: 
 
Readers of Heidegger quickly sense the presence of two voices in his work. There is, 
first, the Heidegger who seeks the proper name of being; the Heidegger who, in spite 
of his best insights into the ontological difference, often seems to imagine being as 
some sort of primal cosmic “event,” a hidden source or power. Seeking the “meaning 
of being,” this Heidegger appears to want philosophy to “eff the ineffable.” There is, 
second, the Heidegger who is concerned with the reflexive issue of the possibility of 
philosophy itself, the Heidegger who constantly chastises other thinkers for not being 
rigorous enough, for succumbing to metaphysical prejudice and losing sight of the 
things themselves. This Heidegger seems precisely to shun the excesses of what the 
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first Heidegger appears to embrace. Though these voices are indelibly entwined in 
Heidegger’s text, there is a real temptation to separate them out and to weight them 
relative to each other.
219
 
 
Crowell obviously actively pursues the second ‘voice’, through which Heidegger discusses 
ontology in terms of the transcendental field of Disclosedness defined by the ‘object’ of 
ontology itself. And his conclusion is that Being and Time should be read as a fundamental 
attempt to redefine philosophy from within itself. In order to achieve this, Heidegger’s first 
voice remains partly neglected by Crowell. Nevertheless, I maintain that it remains a 
fundamental aspect of Being and Time and must be taken into account. The question is what 
does this voice say? Where and how can one hear it? 
 
I have already mentioned that if Heidegger’s notion of Being is to allow for some difference 
with the ‘space of meaning’ within which that notion itself appears, then ‘something’ about 
Being must be ‘beyond’ that very ‘space of meaning’. And where is Being discussed in terms 
of this ‘beyond’? As I will analyse in depth in the following chapters, this is the case in the 
context of the discussion of authentic Disclosedness, where through the analysis of the Call 
of Consciousness, Being is discussed in terms of its relationship with Dasein. It is Being that, 
so to speak, initiates this relation, to which Dasein has to respond. But this does not entail that 
Being is the ground of this relationship. Indeed, if one takes Crowell’s point on the 
transcendental reduction, the relationship itself is this transcendental ground. On the other 
hand, Being itself remains fundamentally ‘beyond’ this ground, and yet it discloses itself as 
this very ground, that is, in terms of meaning. Beginning from the next chapter, I shall 
attempt to show the importance of the point I have just raised. 
 
Nevertheless, this does not imply that the phenomenological interpretation of Being and Time 
is to be dismissed. Indeed, attempting to read Heidegger’s text against phenomenology by 
championing only the Being that emerges from the discussion on authentic Disclosedness, 
would mean to present a crudely mystical and unfair version of Being and Time. Rather what 
I am suggesting here is the project of enhancing the phenomenological reading through a 
careful analysis of those sections where Heidegger discusses the concept of authentic 
Disclosedness, in order to provide an interpretation of Being and Time that does not shy away 
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from that intimate and irreducible tension which is, according to Crowell, at the core of the 
book itself. Indeed, in what follows I will attempt to show just how the juxtaposition of 
Heidegger’s ‘two voices’, namely the mystical and the phenomenological, opens a space in 
Being and Time within which it is possible to ask the timeless question of the ‘source of the 
ground’ in such a way as to bring philosophy, so to speak, into its post-metaphysical era. 
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4. AUTHENTIC DISCLOSEDNESS 
 
 
It should be clear by now that any effort to provide an exhaustive interpretation of Being and 
Time without paying close attention to the notions of temporality, finitude and death, are 
doomed to misconstrue Heidegger’s fundamental intention. For, while the analysis of the 
discoveredness of entities and the Disclosedness of Dasein’s world carried out in Division 
One is certainly ground-breaking, any attempt to achieve an explicit formulation of the 
concept of Being is unattainable without an appropriate understanding of the meaning of that 
very Being. This is clearly stated as early as §2, where the meaning of Being is taken to be 
the answer to the fundamental question of ontology. As I have explained in the previous 
chapter, the phenomenon of temporality constitutes the meaning of Dasein’s Being, insofar as 
it grounds the unity of the structure of that very Being, i.e. Care. The notion of temporality 
names neither a mere system of reference for counting time nor a simple intuition which 
provides a general framework for human understanding. Rather, it is defined in terms of its 
existential significance for Dasein, which is why its definition as the meaning of Care is 
justified. In analysing this notion, Heidegger harnesses the concept of finitude to define the 
temporal nature of Dasein in terms of its possibilities, most importantly, the possibility of 
being-a-whole which finds its fulfilment in Dasein’s death. As I shall discuss shortly, death 
itself is not a ‘time’ of Dasein’s life, nor the sheer lack of life, but a possibility, indeed the 
most proper possibility of Dasein’s life. In anticipatorily facing the possibility of dying, 
Dasein discloses the profound, authentic significance of its finite life. Nonetheless, due to its 
fallen nature, Dasein constantly avoids facing the deep groundlessness brought about by the 
finitude which death defines. Dasein must therefore be called out to face itself. The 
phenomena of the call, finitude and death are among those terms most often overlooked by 
Anglo-American commentators, who rather tend to focus their attention on the gnoseological 
dimension of Dasein. Nevertheless, a new wave has recently begun to wash the Western 
shores, thanks most eminently to the work of François Raffoul. As I shall explain in the 
course of the present chapter, what I consider to be Raffoul’s more ‘ethical’ reading will 
provide some important insights regarding the connection between call, finitude and death 
with that of Disclosedness of Being. Drawing on the long-standing French interpretative 
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tradition of the Heideggerian text, Raffoul begins redefining the disclosive relation between 
Dasein and its Being in terms of an ethical relation between one and ‘another’. As will 
become clear, the themes which Raffoul considers, along with his interpretative insights will 
constitute the basis from where, in the final chapter of this dissertation, I shall launch my own 
reading of Being and Time. 
 
It is my intention to present some of Raffoul’s important findings and I shall do so in the 
following manner: I will begin in Section i. by defining the concept of Anxiety in connection 
with Dasein’s death and will proceed to provide a brief overview of Heidegger’s definition of 
death. In so doing it will become clear that while death is not a moment in Dasein’s life, it is, 
however, the most proper possibility of its Being, which Dasein itself must take up in order to 
attain an authentic Disclosedness of its Being. In Section ii. I shall harness notions of Guilt 
and the Call to demonstrate the need for a fallen Dasein to be ‘called out’ of itself in order to 
face its death and, in so doing, to disclose itself in its finitude. This will provide a sufficient 
introduction for my discussion of Raffoul’s interpretation of Being and Time which I shall 
develop in Section 3. and through which I hope to begin demonstrating the importance of the 
relational, ethical dimension of Dasein’s Disclossedness. 
 
 
i. Dasein’s Anxiety and Death220 
 
In §40 of Being and Time, Heidegger turns his attention to a particular mood of Dasein, 
namely, Anxiety [Angst]. As I have already mentioned in the previous chapters, moods are 
always strictly connected with the phenomenon of understanding, so much so that it is not 
possible to understand something unless, at the same time, that something presents itself 
mood-wise. Therefore, it is only natural that, in enquiring about the meaning of Dasein’s 
Being or, which is the same, about the way in which Being enters into the intelligibility 
[verständ-lichkeit] of Dasein, Heidegger begins by attempting to spell out the mood which 
accompanies Dasein’s understanding of its own Being; this mood is Anxiety. Anxiety is 
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distinguished from the mood of fear [Furcht], insofar as fear is always directed toward an 
entity within-the-world; hence, while the latter is a shrinking back from an entity which is 
detrimental to Dasein itself, it is still a mood in which Dasein remains essentially concerned 
with intraworldy entities. As such, fear is a mood of Dasein’s falling, insofar as, in the face of 
something fearsome, Dasein becomes so concerned with the entity it fears as to flee in the 
face of itself towards those intrawordly entities which are threatening. 
 
On the other hand, when Dasein is in the grip of Anxiety, what presents itself as detrimental 
is not an entity within-the-world, that is, an entity which is capable of having a Bewandtnis. 
In this state Dasein is not anxious about the specific threat of a definite, factical potentiality-
for-Being and is not concerned with the detrimentatlity of a particular possibility of an entity 
or, even, of its own Being. Rather, in the grip of Anxiety, Dasein is anxious about something 
completely indefinite, as the threat itself does not seem to come from an entity within-the-
world. “That in the face of which one has anxiety”, Heidegger says, “is Being-in-the-World as 
such”.221 In this sense, Anxeity is an authentic mood of Dasein, insofar as, in experiencing it, 
Dasein does not become concerned with any intraworldly entity as such. Rather, given 
Anxiety’s indefinite threat, intraworldly entities become absolutely irrelevant. Yet, in what 
way can Dasein be anxious about its fundamental character of Being, one of its deepest 
existentiales, namely Being-in-the-World? It is important here not to lose sight of 
Heidegger’s analysis of Being-in-the-world conducted in the five chapters which precede the 
discussion concerning Anxiety. In these chapters, the term ‘World’, strictly speaking, is used 
by Heidegger to refer to “that 'wherein' a factical Dasein … can be said to 'live'”;222 the ‘a 
priori character’ of the world is its Worldhood, which is defined by Heidegger as that totality 
of Significance upon which a totality of Bewandtnis is grounded. In other words, the World is 
nothing but the concrete totality of the ways in which entities within-the-world are significant 
to Dasein. For an entity to be significant means that it has been discovered according to the 
way in which Dasein is in-the-world. Heidegger refers to this as Disclosedness and describes 
it according to the structure the reader should know so well by now. Heidegger’s study of this 
structure is of paramount importance as it shows that Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-World is 
not according to a fixed background in terms of which entities are discovered. Rather this 
very background, the World, depends on Dasein’s understanding projection, a projection 
                                                 
221
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.230, H.186. 
222
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
p.93, H.65. 
103 
 
which, as the reader knows, is both thrown moodwise and articulated. This projection is 
always according to the possibilities of Dasein’s own Being, and for this reason one can say 
that Dasein is-in-the-world in such a way that its very Being(-in-the-World) is constantly at 
issue [es geht]. As I have argued in the preceding chapter, this phenomenon is what 
Heidegger calls Care, and it constitutes the very Being of Dasein. If this is right, the 
underlying structure of Dasein’s way of Being-in-the-world is nothing but Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-Being, namely, that openness of Dasein which makes Dasein’s thrown 
articulated projection of Being possible. 
 
From this it should be clear that, if the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is inextricably 
linked to Dasein’s Being as openness to potentiality, what Dasein must be anxious about is 
nothing but that potentiality-for-Being which makes of Dasein’s very Being-in-the-world an 
issue for Dasein itself. “Therefore”, Heidegger states, “with that which it is anxious about, 
anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible ... [and] makes manifest in Dasein its Being 
towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being”.223 This does not mean that Dasein is anxious 
about some particular possibilities which it may or may not ‘actualize’. Rather, Dasein’s 
Anxiety is essentially about nothing in particular, and its threat comes from nowhere. 
 
Accordingly, when something threatening brings itself close, anxiety does not 'see' 
any definite 'here' or 'yonder' from which it comes. That in the face of which one has 
anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety 'does not 
know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. 'Nowhere', however, does not 
signify nothing: this is where any region lies, and there too lies any disclosedness of 
the world for essentially spatial Being-in. Therefore that which threatens cannot bring 
itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already 'there', and 
yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is 
nowhere. 
In that in the face of which one has anxiety, the 'It is nothing and nowhere' becomes 
manifest. The obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as a 
phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety. The 
utter insignificance which makes itself known in the ‘nothing and nowhere’, does not 
signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so 
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little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is 
within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.
224
  
 
What anxiety is anxious about is Dasein’s own Being, which is to say, the way in which 
Dasein is-in-the-world, and this Being is characterized at bottom by unsettledness, 
summarized in the formula: ‘Dasein is that entity for which, in its being, that very being is an 
issue’.225 
 
According to Heidegger, Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with itself, which is to say, face 
to face with its own ‘being an issue for itself’, thus showing the fundamental unsettledness of 
that articulated projective thrownness by which Dasein is thrust towards its authentic 
potentiality-for-Being itself. Now, if Dasein, through its Anxiety, is to be brought face to face 
with itself, or better, with its own Being, this means that the phenomenon of Anxiety must 
manifest Dasein’s Being, so to speak, in its totality. While the question concerning the 
possibility of disclosing Dasein’s Being as a whole has already been discussed in the previous 
chapter, any attempt to solve the issue has been delayed until now. We must now try to 
understand in what way Anxiety may be able to bring Dasein face to face with its own Being 
as-a-whole. 
 
In the first chapter of the second Division of Being and Time, Heidegger tries to clarify the 
way in which it may be possible for Dasein to grasp itself as a whole. Despite the fact that it 
may seem paradoxical to look for the totality of an entity whose Being is existence, which is 
to say, whose Being is that of being constantly ahead-of-itself, Heidegger believes that it is 
precisely because this entity is constantly ahead-of-itself that Dasein may be able to grasp 
itself as a whole. This is because, in being-ahead-of-itself, Dasein is constantly a potentiality-
for-Being, which is a Being-towards. 
 
In Heidegger’s view, what Dasein is constantly towards is nothing but its own ‘end’, that is, 
its death [Tod]. Heidegger distinguishes death from 1) ‘perishing’ [Verenden], which refers 
to the event of the ending of those intraworldly entities which live, and 2) ‘demise’ 
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[Ableben], which names the event of the ending of ontological entities.
226
 The reader must 
keep in mind here that an ‘event’ must necessarily be contained within the experiential 
horizon of Dasein. On the other hand, death signifies the ‘end of Dasein’ proper. And since 
Dasein in its ‘there’ [Da] constitutes its own horizon, the end of Dasein can in no way fall 
within the very horizon which it annihilates. Despite the fact that there is still disagreement 
among scholars concerning the correct interpretation of the term ‘death’, it is clear from 
Heidegger’s text that, insofar as it consists in the end of those ontological entities whose 
essential structural character is existing as thrown and fallen, death at its most basic level is 
Dasein’s impossibility to have any more possibilities; that is, the impossibility of existing any 
longer, of being ahead-of-itself.
227
 As such, the notion of death refers to nothing which can be 
experienced by Dasein; for when Dasein comes to its end in death, that is, once Dasein’s 
possibilities have been exhausted, Dasein exists no longer. Therefore, strictly speaking, death 
is not an event of Dasein’s life, for it is the impossibility of Dasein’s living further. 
 
Yet, since Dasein exists constantly ahead-of-itself, death represents that possibility which is 
constantly impending on all other possibilities. Now, Dasein’s Being, i.e. Care, is the way in 
which Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is an issue to Dasein itself. From this one can infer that 
death must also be an essential possibility of such a Being. For death is that “possibility in 
which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world ..., [as] the possibility of no-
longer-being-able-to-be-there”.228 In this sense, death consists in what Heidegger calls the 
‘Dasein’s ownmost possibility’, insofar as it is that possibility (of impossibility) towards 
which Dasein’s existence is constantly projected. 
 
Nevertheless, if death is essentially ‘nothing’ to Dasein, i.e. not-an-event, or the impossibility 
of all possibility, why should it consist in Dasein’s ownmost possibility? Indeed, how can 
death be a possibility at all? Many have criticized Heidegger on the ground that his 
discussion of death is nothing more than a play on words
229
 containing flagrant 
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contradiction.
230
 Certainly one must agree that Heidegger’s discussion of death often dances 
on the edge of the paradoxical. Nonetheless, it may seem much less contradictory if this 
phenomenon is analysed while keeping in mind the ultimate aim of Heidegger’s discussion of 
death. For what Heidegger is attempting through his discussion of death is to offer an analysis 
of death which manages to describe it ontologically, without excluding altogether the 
everyday understanding of this notion. As such, death is ontologically that possibility 
towards-which Dasein is constantly ahead-of-itself. Now, if one considers this through the 
lens of the phenomenon of finite temporality which I have discussed in the preceding chapter 
of this dissertation, it is clear that death cannot be taken as a point in a future which is ‘not-
yet’ but that, at some point in time, will be ‘now’. As I have said, authentic temporality, by 
temporalizing itself into strictly interconnected ecstases, constitutes the essential unity which 
grounds the unitary structure of Dasein’s Being, i.e. the Care-structure. For this, death shows 
itself as the aim of Dasein’s fundamental way of Being, that is, ‘Being-towards’; and the 
latter in turn constitutes the essential character of the Care-structure. 
 
In this sense, Dasein’s Being-towards-Death is fundamentally ahead-of-itself, thrown and 
fallen. It is fallen because Dasein, being fascinated with intrawordly entities in its 
everydayness, cannot face death, as the latter is nothing-in-the-world, and reduces it to the 
experience or potential experience of a worldly event, i.e. Perishing or Demise. It is thrown 
for it is a possibility which is essentially unavoidable and into which Dasein constantly finds 
itself, since as long Dasein lives it is ‘dying’. Most importantly, it is ahead-of-itself. This 
does not necessarily mean that Dasein actively projects itself towards its own death, nor that 
Dasein actively strives to actualize its own death. The fundamental point to be understood 
here is that, for Heidegger, death is not an event of Dasein’s life, nor a possibility in the sense 
of a possible event which can be ‘actualized’. Instead, death is the lack of all possibility; is 
the “the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of [Dasein’s] existence”.231 This lack is not 
something which Dasein needs to ‘fill in’ or overcome but is deeply rooted in that condition 
of possibility of Dasein’s Being which has been called its ‘meaning’, that is, Dasein’s finite 
temporality. In this sense, Dasein dies because the condition under which its Being can be a 
unitary phenomenon is the finitude of temporality. Insofar as temporality is finite, Dasein’s 
Being is fundamentally ‘possible’, and its concrete possibilities are significant; this is to say, 
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they have been articulated according to meaningful projection of the understanding, that is, a 
projection according to that horizon upon which Dasein’s Being can be disclosed. This 
horizon is nothing but the meaning of Dasein’s Being which, as I have said, is temporality. 
To put it more plainly, albeit more simplistically, I may argue that an atemporal or temporally 
infinite Dasein would not be ‘possible’ in the way a finitely temporal Dasein can be. For 
without temporal differentiation there can only be unchanged actuality, whereas with infinite 
time no possibility is more significant than another, as all possibilities will eventually be 
fulfilled. Hence, it is only against the background of finite temporality that Dasein’s Being is 
significantly ‘at stake’, and that it makes sense for Dasein to take issue with its possibilities. 
From this it is clear why death is the essential possibility for an entity such as Dasein, whose 
temporality is fundamentally finite. Indeed, it is because Dasein’s temporality is finite that 
Dasein may be-a-whole, as death constitutes the necessary element of Dasein’s potentiality-
for-Being-a-whole. However, this is not because, by anticipating its own death, Dasein can 
imagine a state of itself in which all its possibilities have been ‘actualized’, but because by 
taking up death as one of its essential possibilities, it is possible for Dasein itself to grasp this 
complete lack of possibility as one of its possibilities, so that by anticipating death and being 
towards it, Dasein is made ‘whole’. Yet, this is not to say that in anticipation all of Dasein’s 
possibilities are actually grasped; rather by being towards death Dasein takes up all the 
‘possible possibilities’ of its Being, including the total lack of possibility. Indeed, death, as a 
possibility of Dasein, is peculiar in that it cannot be actualized in Dasein’s existence; rather, it 
is “the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all”.232 In this sense, by Being-
towards-death, Dasein is essentially taking up its finitude, hence its temporality; and insofar 
as the latter constitutes the meaning of Dasein’s Being, when Dasein acknowledges its death 
it enters into a disclosing relationship with its Being as it becomes intelligible as its meaning. 
 
Indeed, according to Heidegger, by existing towards-its-death Dasein constitutes, in a way, 
the basis of its own Being. For it is only by existing that Dasein is a potentiality-for-Being, 
and it is only through being a potentiality-for-Being that the ultimate finitude of its existence 
can be disclosed so that Dasein itself may be delivered over to it. This basis, that is, Dasein’s 
finite temporality as it is disclosed in being-towards-death, is obviously a ground that Dasein 
itself has not laid. This is the same as to say that Dasein’s being-towards-death is 
fundamentally a possibility into which Dasein is thrown ‘for as long as it lives’. And yet, in 
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order to die, Dasein has to live. This is the reason why in §58 of Being and Time Heidegger 
states that Dasein, “[a]lthough it has not laid that basis itself, it reposes in the weight of 
it...”.233 This is to say, Dasein is the basis of its own Being, because by existing Dasein is. 
Yet, it has not chosen its own Being. Hence, in existing as a potentiality-for-Being(-a-whole), 
Dasein may choose one possibility or another, but it cannot choose whether or not to be a 
potentiality-for-being, which is to say, whether or not to choose possibilities tout court. This 
interpretation is confirmed by Heidegger: 
 
Freedom ... is only in the choice of one possibility that is, in tolerating one's not 
having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. In the structure of 
thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity.
234
  
 
In other words, Dasein’s basis is essentially thrown in its finitude and projected towards this 
finitude itself. For this Heidegger can affirm that Care –Dasein’s Being- “is permeated with 
nullity through and through”;235 this is because, in its very Being, Dasein is both: 1) the basis 
of a nullity, namely itself as being-towards the impossibility of all possibility -i.e. its death-; 
and 2) is itself null, by being itself a thrown basis, as it is not able to choose its own self from 
the ground up. 
 
The fact that the Being of Dasein is described in terms of nullity is important and requires 
special attention. What does it mean in fact to say that Dasein’s being is fundamentally 
‘null’? The answer to this question requires a partial step back. In the course of the present 
section, I have argued that Being-towards-death means: to be brought face-to-face with the 
fundamental groundlessness of Dasein’s Being, with the ‘lack’ which stands beyond the 
temporal finitude of Dasein as its limit. In being-towards-death Dasein faces its ownmost 
possibility; yet this possibility is essentially nothing, namely, not a thing (in the world). 
However, if the reader recalls the discussion about Anxiety conducted in this section, it 
should be quite clear that, in being-towards-death, Dasein is fundamentally anxious. And, 
insofar as Anxiety forces Dasein to face its own Being in its fundamental nullity -that is, in 
that constant lack which is structural for an entity that exists as constantly ahead of itself into 
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possibilities-, then it is the same Anxiety that forces Dasein to face its own death. As such, in 
facing the abyss of its own ultimate impossibility of existence, Dasein comes face to face 
with its very own Being in terms of its meaning, that is, as the finitude of Dasein’s 
temporality. 
 
The Being which comes to be disclosed thus is therefore nothing in the world, and it is 
fundamentally null, as it consists in the thrown impossibility not to choose possibilities as 
projected towards the ultimate impossibility of all possibilities. In this way Heidegger seems 
to anticipate something that will be clearly formulated only after the publication of Being and 
Time, in the famous address entitled What is Metaphysics?, where Heidegger states Dasein’s 
Being to be essentially Nothing.
236
 While a thorough discussion concerning the status of 
Being in the context of What is Metaphysics? falls outside the scope of the present 
dissertation, it is evident that once one accepts that the Being of Dasein, in its meaning as 
finite temporality, is essentially Nothing, one is left with the difficult problem of whether 
anything can be said of this Being and whether ontology is at all possible. I shall attempt to 
answer this fundamental question in the following chapter. Before doing so, however, it is 
necessary to analyse in more depth the fundamental nullity of Dasein’s Being and, in 
particular, the way in which Dasein comes to face itself as this nullity. 
 
 
ii. The Call of Conscience and Dasein’s Vocation 
 
I have shown that, in the phenomenon of Anxiety which characterizes Dasein’s way of 
Being-towards-death, Dasein comes to face its groundlessness. As an entity whose existence 
is thrown and fallen, Dasein is constantly thrown towards a nullity, namely, towards the 
possibility of the impossibility of all possibilities, i.e. Being-towards-Death. Additionally, 
Dasein is thrown into nullity, that is, in the impossibility of not being-towards-possibilities. In 
this way, Dasein comes face to face with its Being in terms of the meaning of this Being 
itself, and in so doing, comes face to face with the finite temporality which constitutes its 
potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the context of the previous 
section, Dasein itself has to exist as thrown and fallen in order for its grounding finitude to 
‘be’. This is why I have agreed with Heidegger that Dasein ‘is the null basis of a nullity’. I 
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have also explained that the Being which Dasein is by existing is fundamentally defined in 
terms of a ‘not’, that is, as finitude. The fact that Dasein, in existing as thrown and fallen, 
must take up its own null Being-a-basis is what Heidegger names Guilt [Schuldig]. This 
definition is stated plainly by Heidegger in §57 of Being and Time, where he states: “…we 
define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as ‘Being-the-basis for a Being which has 
been defined by a ‘not’ –that is to say as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’”.237 
 
Heidegger uses the term Guilt in connection with its root ‘schuld’, meaning ‘debt’. Being-
guilty means ‘to be indebted’, in the sense of the expression ‘schuld haben an’ which in 
ordinary German means ‘to be blamed for...’, but which can be taken in a more neutral sense 
as ‘to be responsible for’. Hence, Dasein is ‘guilty’ because by being its-own-basis it is also, 
in a technical sense, ‘responsible for’ the way it itself is, that is, it is responsible for its Being. 
Yet the use of the word Schuldig to describe the way in which Dasein is ‘responsible for’ its 
Being also draws attention to the fact that, in its Being-the-basis of its Being, Dasein is 
fundamentally ‘in debt’; this is because it ‘owes’ that Being-a-basis not to itself. Dasein can 
therefore appropriately be said to be guilty, insofar as its Being, of which Dasein itself is the 
ground, contains within itself a fundamental lack.
238
 Yet this lack, this indebtedness, is what 
actually makes Dasein its-self, i.e. that entity for which in its Being that Being is an issue,
 239
 
or, which is the same, that ontological, finite entity which exists as thrown and fallen. 
 
Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, Dasein, in its fallen everydayness, cannot face the 
nullity of its Being. This impossibility is implicit in that, when falling, Dasein falls alongside 
intraworldly entities and becomes fascinated with them; so much so that it wants to ground its 
Being and Being in general in the totality of those entities which Heidegger calls the ‘world’. 
Being thus entangled in the ‘world’, all that Dasein faces are those entities within-the-world. 
Nonetheless, since its Being, which is ontologically different from entities, is essentially 
nothing in the world, Dasein, being fallen, cannot face its own Being unless in the ‘reflection’ 
that intraworldly entities give of it, as in a mirror. In falling, Dasein is absorbed in the ‘world’ 
and covers up what is most authentic to, that is to say, most proper [eigentlich] of, its own 
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Being -namely, its Being-an-issue-for-itself, its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, its Being-
towards-Death, and its finite temporality. 
 
Yet, falling is at the same time a fundamental constituent of the structure of Care. This is 
because, according to Heidegger, falling is the inevitable starting point of his 
phenomenological ontology; or, which is the same, the necessary launching pad from which 
Dasein is able to discover and disclose entities and its own Being. The reader may begin to 
understand what Heidegger is getting at by saying that, loosely speaking, it is not possible to 
uncover something which is not covered-up, as it is not possible to disclose what is not closed 
over. Yet Heidegger is not merely asserting the dependence of two opposites, but making a 
crucial point concerning the nature of the human Dasein; that is, authentic Disclosedness of 
Being, despite being essential to Dasein in both its inauthentic and authentic Self, is not 
intrinsic to Dasein but can happen only insofar as the Being of that Dasein is initially closed-
off to it. The question now is under what circumstances can Dasein ‘disclose’ out of its 
closedness? Is it a case of Dasein bootstrapping itself out of its closedness and into Dis-
closedness, as in the adventures of a famous Baron, or is this transition dependent on factors 
that are extrinsic to Dasein? It must be clear by now that nothing, i.e. nothing in-the-world, is 
extrinsic to Dasein, insofar as the discoveredness of everything in the world is strictly 
dependent on the Disclosedness of Dasein’s Being. If the transition from closedness into Dis-
closedness must be brought about from something outside Dasein, then it means that nothing 
can make Dasein’s Disclosedness happen. That is, nothing in the World, but also no-thing in 
the sense of not-an-entity, be it an intraworldly entity or an ontological entity like Dasein. 
Yet, what does it mean to say that ‘nothing’ is responsible for Dasein’s Dislcosedness? While 
this cannot refer to an absence of external intervention, it must be attributed to an intervention 
that cannot be tracked down to anything from within the horizon of Dasein. However, if this 
question is to be pursued further we need to find a way to speak positively of this nothing, at 
least insofar as its intervention can be ascertained from within the horizon of Dasein. 
 
Let us begin by asking how Dasein can become aware of its being guilty; according to the 
definition of Guilt, this is the same as asking how Dasein’s basic nullity is manifested to 
Dasein. According to Heidegger, Dasein, in its everydayness, is fallen away from itself and 
alongside the ‘world’. In this situation Dasein is lost in the average interpretation of its Being 
which is given to it, which consists in the phenomenon Heidegger has called Das Man. 
Heidegger says: 
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[B]ecause Dasein is lost in the "they", it must first find itself. In order to find itself at 
all, it must be 'shown' [gezeigt] to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its 
possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this 
potentiality attested.
240
 
 
It should be noted that Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-its-Self is nothing other than its 
potentiality for ‘Being-a-finite-whole’. The question is, how is this potentiality ‘pointed out’ 
[gezeigt] or attested to Dasein? According to Heidegger, it is so by that which he calls the 
‘voice of conscience’ [Stimme des Gewissens].241 But what is this phenomenon? And in what 
way does it attest to Dasein its lostness in the ‘world’ as it is interpreted by Das Man? 
Heidegger continues: 
 
Conscience gives us 'something' to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this 
phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the 
disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we 
ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. If 
we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call [Ruf]. Calling is a 
mode of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by 
calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of 
summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty.
242
 
 
In other words, the call of conscience calls Dasein to that guilt which constitutes Dasein 
authentically as the ‘null basis of a nullity’. In this sense, this call is nothing but a call for 
Dasein to face its temporal finitude which underpins its Being, i.e. Care, through and through, 
and which grants Dasein’s authentic Being-towards-Death. In this sense the call is also an 
appeal to authenticity, or, as Heidegger puts it, a call “to [Dasein’s] ownmost potentiality-for-
Being-its-Self”.243 
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Now, Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self is the same as Dasein’s Being-
towards-its-ownmost-potentiality-for-Being-a-whole; and the latter is nothing but Dasein’s 
Being-towards-death. I can say, therefore, that the call of conscience, through an appeal to 
Dasein’ Guilt, calls Dasein to face its own death. Yet, what does it mean for Dasein to be 
called to face its death? In the course of this dissertation some hints have been offered. I have 
said that death is not an event of Dasein’s life and that to face death does not mean striving to 
actualize it. I have also said that it is rather in anticipating the possibility of death by being 
towards it that Dasein faces the nullity of the finite temporality which constitutes the 
condition of possibility of its Being. What I am now able to argue is that, through the call of 
conscience, Dasein is called to face its Guilt, to take responsibility for the nullity of its Being 
by taking up this nullity by choice. But in what way does Conscience call Dasein to face this 
nullity? With Heidegger: 
 
What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The 
call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. 
Least of all does it try to set going a 'soliloquy' in the Self to which it has appealed. 
'Nothing' gets called to [zu-gerufen] this Self, but it has been summoned [aufgerufen] 
to itself -that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being... The call dispenses with any 
kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less 
than obscure and indefinite. Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode 
of keeping silent.
244
 
 
Silence is a fundamental mode of discourse, where what is articulated is not expressed in 
language.
245
 At the same time it is still unclear whether something that calls by keeping silent 
may actually be heard by Dasein so that Dasein may take up the nullity to which this call 
calls it to, as the basis of its own Being. Yet, in order to take up something, be it a nullity, 
Dasein still needs to have heard the call, or, which is the same, it must have in some sense 
‘grasped’ this nullity. Yet a nullity is certainly ‘nothing’ which can be grasped in the sense 
that it can be ‘made present’ in a ready-to-hand fashion; for it cannot be turned into an 
intraworldly entity. How then can this nullity be ‘grasped’? 
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I have discussed different ways in which nullity ‘shows’ itself to Dasein. In Anxiety Dasein 
faces the nullity that grounds its finitude in a Disposition in which its mood is directed 
towards nothing in the world, but rather towards the impossibility of its possibilities. 
Furthermore, in my analysis of the phenomenon of Being-Guilty I have explained that Dasein 
comes to project itself upon the nullity of its finitude, and this nullity is discovered as the 
basis of Dasein’s potentiality for Being. Hence. Being-guilty consists in the projection of 
Dasein’s Being upon its nullity. This projection is what I could call ‘the understanding of 
nullity’. In addition, in the call of conscience, Dasein is silently called to its being-guilty, and 
this call is a mode of Discourse. Finally, I have argued that Anxiety, being-guilty and the call 
are all phenomena in the face of which Dasein, in its everydayness, constantly flees. Insofar 
as all the elements which have been named can be subsumed under one of the constituents of 
Disclosedness, I may be confident in affirming that the nullity of Dasein’s Being can be 
grasped in terms of its Disclosedness. 
 
I must note, however, that the Disclosedness of nullity is itself a special case of 
Disclosedness in general. This special case, Heidegger argues, consists in Dasein’s choice of 
taking up the nullity which is manifested in terms of Guilt, as the basis of Dasein’s own 
Being.
246
 This choice can arise in Dasein only as a response to the conscience which, in 
calling Dasein, attests to it the possibility of an authentic Disclosedness of its Being.  
The particular kind of Disclosedness which discloses Dasein’s nullity is called by Heidegger 
Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]. With this term Heidegger means the “reticent self-
projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety”.247 
Resoluteness is ‘reticent’ insofar as it projects its Disclosedness upon Dasein’s Being-guilty, 
that is, upon the nullity of its finitude. Resoluteness is also ready-for-anxiety since, by 
projecting Dasein’s Being upon the nullity of its finitude, it brings Dasein constantly in the 
face of its nullity. In bringing Dasein face to face with that nullity which constitutes the basis 
of the finitude of its temporality, Resoluteness discloses Dasein in its potentiality-for-Being-
a-whole. In this sense, Resoluteness is necessarily ‘anticipatory’, and it is so in two ways: 
firstly, in that it projects Dasein ‘right to the end’, as a finitude which is whole only in the 
constant anticipation of its potentiality-for-annihilation, i.e. as a Being-towards-Death; 
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secondly, in that it constantly discloses Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, in a 
projection which can never be concluded within Dasein’s existence, since the conclusion of 
that projection is the impossibility of any further projection and, as such, of Dasein itself. 
 
Now, despite the fact that in anticipatory Resoluteness Dasein ‘choses’ the call of 
consciousness, the call itself is still something which does not belong to Dasein in the sense 
that Dasein causes it. While conscience is indeed something which belongs to the Being of 
Dasein, indeed one of its existentiales, this does not mean it is a mere phenomenon of 
Dasein’s existence, nor that Dasein can decide whether to be called or not. This is why I have 
said that the call of conscience is external to Dasein. In turn, this underlies even further the 
nullity which structures Dasein’s essential finitude through and through. But if this is true, 
then, ‘who’ calls Dasein?  
 
The answer to this question requires us to look more carefully at the nature of the call. I have 
already said that the call says nothing, in that it remains silent. The reader must not forget that 
remaining silent is in fact a mode of Discourse, and it is that specific mode in which 
something is articulated without being expressed in Language. But what does the silence of 
the call articulate? In an attempt to answer this question it may be useful to refer to §56 of 
Being and Time, where Heidegger states: 
 
One must keep in mind that when we designate the conscience as a "call", this call is 
an appeal to the they-self in its Self; as such an appeal, it summons the Self to its 
potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities.
248
 
 
Perhaps, then, what the call articulates is Dasein itself, in its twofold nature as inauthentic 
das Man and authentic its-Self. Heidegger asks: “Shall we say that its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being-its-Self functions as the caller?”249 Would this ultimately mean that Dasein, in 
conscience, calls itself?
250
 While this, as I shall argue in a moment, is in fact partially the 
case, there is still something fundamentally ‘other’ about the nature of the call of conscience, 
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as well as about the nature of the caller. Heidegger seems to agree on this point when he 
writes: 
 
Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor 
prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls, against 
our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly 
does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from 
me and yet from beyond me.
251
 
 
Certainly it is Dasein that calls itself to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is grounded 
in its nullity, through and through. But the one that calls may itself be a nullity, insofar as it is 
essentially beyond Dasein. This nullity which essentially calls Dasein to its thrown, null 
potentiality-for-Being towards-death, is therefore fundamentally nothing (in-the-world). But 
what is this ‘nothing’? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that Heidegger 
wants to maintain a double provenance of the call, i.e. ‘from me and yet from beyond me’, 
which seems contradictory at best. While in fact one cannot deny that the call comes from 
something external to Dasein, i.e. a nullity, Heidegger makes clear this nullity is something 
which belongs essentially to Dasein. In what way therefore can the call come both from 
Dasein and from beyond Dasein? The answer lies in the interpretation of the fundamental 
‘nothing’ from which and to which Dasein is called. While in Being and Time the question 
concerning the nature of this ‘nothing’ is not addressed directly, I may wish to draw the 
reader’s attention once more to Heidegger’s address What is Metaphysics? where the concept 
of ‘nothing’ is equated to Being itself. This is in keeping with the fundamental tenet of Being 
and Time fundamental, namely, that Being is not an entity. 
 
Once the identity between Being and nothing is established, one can finally address the 
question of ‘who’ calls Dasein at once from Dasein itself and yet from beyond Dasein. It is 
Dasein’s Being that calls, calling Dasein to its ownmost potentiality for Being. In this sense, 
the call does belong to Dasein; indeed it is a fundamental existentiale of Dasein’s Being. 
Therefore, the call is internal to Dasein. Nevertheless, Dasein’s Being is essentially null 
through and through, where the call calls Dasein to face this essential nullity. As such, 
Dasein’s finite totality is grounded in that which is not within that very totality and cannot be 
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taken up within that totality, while still constituting that same totality through and through. 
Hence, the ‘nothing’ which calls Dasein to its null finitude is, strictly speaking, the very 
Being of Dasein. Being is the basic ‘not’, the nullity that grounds the finitude of temporality 
which characterizes Dasein’s very Being. For this I can say that Being is in fact nothing. 
The Call of Conscience is a call which essentially does not come from Dasein and which calls 
Dasein to something which is the possibility of the impossibility of its being a Dasein, i.e. 
death and finitude. Taken strictly this means that what the call calls to is Dasein’s very Being, 
and it calls it out of the nothing that that Being itself is. 
 
It is nothing therefore that calls Dasein to the nothing of its finitude. This is the same as 
saying: Dasein’s Being calls Dasein out of itself (as a das-Man-self), towards something 
which is beyond itself and yet fundamentally its very own; that is, towards Dasein’s ownmost 
Being as its-(authentic)-self. In other words, while it Being that calls Dasein from beyond 
Dasein itself, that very Being is that which is constantly at issue for Dasein; it is Dasein itself 
in its finite authenticity which calls Dasein to be, in anticipation, what Dasein must be. 
 
 
iii. Being-with Being: the Ethical Interpretation of Being and Time 
 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in the last decade a new and important 
influence has entered Anglo-American Heideggerian scholarship, most eminently through the 
work of the French born philosopher François Raffoul. Now, Raffoul’s reading of Being and 
Time would certainly not seem entirely novel to a French audience, however in the Anglo-
American context in which he works his understanding of Heidegger’s masterwork promises 
to provide the Anglophone philosophical world with an important alternative to the dominant 
readings of Dreyfus and Lafont.  
 
Many scholars
252
 have bitterly criticised Heidegger’s philosophy, and especially Being and 
Time, for its lack of engagement with the topic of ethics. Indeed, Heidegger systematically 
rejects any interpretation of his terminology in ethical terms -most famously in the case of the 
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notions of authenticity and inauthenticity.
253
 This reading is supported by two points that 
Heidegger makes concerning Dasein: firstly, that Dasein is that entity that, in its being, is 
always mine.
254
 And, second, that Dasein’s authentic being its-self can only be ‘achieved’ by 
facing up to that individualizing phenomenon which is death.  Both characterizations do 
indeed confer a certain aura of individualism to the analysis of Dasein, and have often been 
used to support charges of solipsism against Heidegger’s philosophy. 
 
In his book The Origin of Responsibility
255
 Raffoul acknowledges that “Heidegger has often 
been reproached for his alleged neglect of ethical issues, specifically his inability to provide 
or articulate an ethics, or even a perspective for practical engagement in the world.”256 
Certainly, there are places in Being and Time where Heidegger at least attempts to describe 
Dasein’s engagement with other Daseins. In this sense, the concept of being-with [mit-Sein] 
is a clear example of Heidegger’s attempt to make sense of Dasein’s relations with others. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger may appear not to develop this concept adequately, as the discussion 
of being-with remains confined to the realm of das Man and is not developed in terms of 
authenticity. On the back of this, Dreyfus, who believes das Man is all there is to say about 
being-with, is somewhat justified when he quickly provides his readers with a social reading 
of Dasein. And indeed, it is hard to deny that Division Two of Being and Time paints a rather 
isolating, if not solipsistic, picture of Dasein in its authenticity. Hence, if being-with were 
merely an inauthentic character of Dasein, then Heidegger would be sorely mistaken to define 
it as an existentiale of Dasein. What needs to be clarified therefore is in what way, if any, 
Dasein ‘is-with...’ in its authenticity. This is to ask: in what way can Heidegger maintain both 
that Dasein can only be called to itself by facing up to its own individualising death, and that 
Dasein is existentially being-with, namely, that, in its Being, it is never ‘alone’? 
 
In an attempt to reject this mainstream reading and showing that Heidegger, already in Being 
and Time, is deeply concerned with Dasein’s ethical dimension, Raffoul approaches the 
notion of being-with in terms of its being constitutive for the Being of Dasein. According to 
Raffoul, Dasein’s “being is from the outset a relation to an alterity, from the outset a being-
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with (others).”257 Yet Dasein, in its Being, is so always fundamentally ‘mine’, in a 
formulation that Raffoul calls ‘existential solipsism’. However, Raffoul believes that: 
 
[this] so-called ‘existential solipsism’ does not indicate Dasein’s closure on itself, but 
designates instead the solitude, isolation, or individuation of the existent. Now since 
the existent is defined by the openness to beings, it becomes necessary to think of the 
individuation of the self and the openness to the other being - and to the other- at the 
same time. Care supposes such an openness, and to that extent implies the relation to 
the other. This is why Dasein is constitutively being-with. Existential solipsism posits 
that Dasein, in its being-singular and in this very solitude, is being-with. It is as that 
singular entity that I am with the other.
258
 
 
Understood in this way, the concept of being-with does not merely apply to the relation 
between Daseins, but it has been broadened to encompass Dasein’s fundamental tendency to 
relate with something other than itself. The notion of being-with, understood in Raffoul’s 
terms, is indeed not simply a mere ‘inclination’ of Dasein, but that existential character which 
Heidegger on some occasions refers to as ‘transcendence’. As such, achieving a proper 
understanding of the concept of being-with represents the first step in illuminating the true 
relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and ethics. 
 
Concerning this relation, Raffoul argues, following Jean-Luc Nancy, that: 
 
Heidegger does not propose moral norms, but attempts to rethink the very site of 
ethics; by way of a critique of the metaphysical tradition, he attempts to re-appropriate 
the phenomenological and ontological origins of what has been called “ethics” in our 
tradition. ... Ethics is understood in terms of being and of what Heidegger calls 
Dasein, that is, the human being conceived in its relation to being itself.
259
 
 
This fundamental relation of Dasein with Being is referred to by Raffoul as ‘originary ethics’, 
according to Heidegger’s own definition in the Letter on Humanism.260  This relation, 
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according to Raffoul’s reading, is originary in the sense that it represents an original 
phenomenon of Dasein, rather than a mere expounding of ontology. Nonetheless, the term 
‘originary ethics’ does not refer to a set of moral norms; for Heidegger is certainly not 
concerned with providing a set of normative claims on how Dasein should or should not live. 
Rather, if anything like an ethics is developed by Heidegger, this should be understood as the 
description of the space of a relation of openness towards alterity. Taken in this way, ethics is 
a fundamental element, indeed, as I shall soon show, the fundamental element of the analytic 
of Dasein. If one understands ethics in the way of ‘originary ethics’, that is to say, the space 
in which Dasein ‘is’ being-with by relating with alterity, one cannot deny that Being and 
Time is concerned indeed with ethics, just as it is undeniable that Dasein has, as its 
fundamental existentiale, being-with. Having clarified this point, Raffoul sets himself to 
prove that the analytic of Dasein is fundamentally concerned with originary eithics, or better, 
with ontology as an originary ethics, so that the question concerning ontology is reframed in 
terms of Dasein ‘being’ authentically being-with. In order to do this, Raffoul begins by 
exploring Heidegger's analysis of authentic Disclosedness. 
 
In the present chapter, I have already illustrated in detail the Heideggerian analysis of 
authenticity in terms of Anxiety, Being-Guilty and the Call of Conscience, which together 
constitute the tripartite structure of authentic Disclosedness. However, within the discussion 
of authenticity, the use of the term Disclosedness is potentially misleading, since the latter is 
an existential phenomenon of Dasein, which is therefore neither authentic nor inauthentic per 
se. Therefore, when talking about authentic Disclosedness, Heidegger uses the less 
misleading term of anticipatory resoluteness [Ent-sholossenheit]. In anticipatory resoluteness, 
Dasein takes up its being-towards-death by facing the ownmost finitude disclosed through 
Guilt. However, given Dasein’s fundamental lostness in das Man, this is not achievable by 
means of an autonomous effort from the part of Dasein. Dasein must rather be called; and 
what Dasein is called to is ‘being-guilty’, that is, taking up its own null basis in an 
anticipatory ‘disclosedness’ (resoluteness) of its finite wholeness. 
 
Yet in what way can Dasein be something which it never actually is, such as being that finite 
whole which includes its very own basis, by merely resolving itself onto it? And how can 
Dasein ‘be’ anything by merely anticipating? In order to answer these questions and 
appreciate Heidegger’s point, the reader must remember that while Dasein can be described 
as present-at-hand entity its fundamental nature is that of being that entity whose Being lies 
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in its possibilities, in its potentiality-for-Being. As such, it is possible for Dasein to ‘be’ 
something which it may not be now yet. This is true especially of Dasein’s ownmost 
possibility of being-a-whole which is at once most proper and most ‘other’ to Dasein, as it is 
at once Dasein’s deepest possibility and its complete annihilation. 
 
The notion of being-with, understood in the extended sense suggested by Raffoul, does not 
only refer to the inescapable socialisation of every Dasein, but, more broadly, to the fact that 
Dasein, through anticipation of its own potential totality and annihilation, is constantly in a 
relation with something essentially other from itself. This rereading of the notion of being-
with also shows that Disclosedness is itself Dasein’s very way of being-with..., as it refers to 
Dasein’s constant openness to alterity. While this is certainly true of the inauthentic 
‘Disclosedness’ of das Man, in which Dasein is open to other Daseins in a way as not to 
distinguish itself from ‘them’, it is especially true for authentic Disclosedness, namely, 
anticipatory resoluteness, in which Dasein is called to confront the ultimate ‘otherness’ of its 
own fundamental nullity, and its groundedness in such a nullity. As such, the phenomenon of 
anticipatory resoluteness has a clear transcendental connotation, since what resoluteness 
really discloses is what appears to be constantly hidden in the negative language that 
Heidegger has to employ to describe it. Hence, I can legitimately ask what anticipatory 
resoluteness discloses, through Call, Guilt and Anxiety. Raffoul answers this question in the 
following way:  
 
In its very eventfulness, being withdraws, is the mystery; and such a withdrawal, as 
Heidegger stresses, calls us. The event of being thus immediately engages an 
originary responsibility, a responsibility for being. Responsibility will have to be 
taken in terms of a responsiveness to this call of being, that is, from the withdrawal of 
being (for it is the withdrawal itself that calls us, “pulls” us toward it, as Heidegger 
explains in What is Called Thinking?). Original responsibility is a corresponding to 
this call, arising out of the withdrawal of being... .
261
 
 
As partially mentioned in section ii. of this chapter, the call of conscience initiates a 
fundamental relation of Disclosedness between the caller and the one called. As I shall 
discuss in more depth in the next chapter, this relation constitutes the heart of the analysis of 
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Dasein developed in Being and Time. Raffoul is clear on this point and he attempts to analyse 
this relation by pivoting on the notion of responsibility. This will incidentally show that the 
ontology developed in Being and Time is indeed ethical, insofar as the authentic 
‘disclosedness’ of Being amounts to a relation of responsiveness towards otherness. Thus 
understood, “[r]esponsibility will then manifest the essential exposure of human beings to an 
inappropriable that always remains ‘other’ for them”.262  This is what differentiates 
Heideggerian responsibility from mere accountability. For whereas the latter is concerned, to 
a certain degree, with one’s autonomy from a conditioning ground, the former indicates “the 
very movement of a radically finite existence having to come to itself, and to itself as other, 
from an inappropriable (and thus always ‘other’) ground.”263 In this sense, Responsiveness 
and Responsibility are two different ways of defining the same phenomenon, namely, 
Dasein’s authentic answering to that call which lies at the heart of resoluteness, namely, the 
call of consciousness. 
 
The analysis I have developed in the present chapter is strongly inspired by Raffoul’s original 
analysis of the call, as is clear in the following passage from The Origin of Responsibility: 
 
The one summoned is Dasein lost in the They, called back to its ownmost being. The 
call of conscience is thus above all a call of the self, in both senses of the genitive. 
The self is not the author of the call, but is announced in and as the call, since the 
caller disappears in the calling. Therefore what is at issue in the call is nothing but the 
coming to oneself as such. This is ultimately the meaning of the ... passage in which 
Heidegger states that Dasein “calls itself.” In the call, Dasein’s being-a-self is at issue 
and in play; the call is the space or the dimension of selfhood. Yet the self is not the 
(ontical) origin of the call.
 264
 
 
Raffoul continues: 
 
The author of the call remains foreign, “absolutely distances any kind of becoming 
familiar” (SZ, 275). The ‘caller’ evades any attempt of identification simply because 
there is no ‘author’ of the call, no ‘who’ of the call—no God, no ego, no subject, no 
                                                 
262
François Raffoul, The Origin of Responsibility, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.268-269. 
263
François Raffoul, The Origin of Responsibility, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.269. 
264
François Raffoul, The Origin of Responsibility, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.251 
[emphasis mine]. 
123 
 
other person or other being whatsoever within the world. There is an origin to the call, 
but no agent. This agent is other, not as an anthropological or ontic other (for it does 
not let itself be identified as a ‘who’) but as uncanny. 
The ‘caller’ in fact merges with the calling itself, it is instead the very movement of 
the call which brings a self-to-come, it is the impersonal or pre-personal event of 
being that precedes and exceeds the one who will have to assume it as its own.
265
 
 
The relation of Disclosedness constituted by the response of Dasein to the call of 
consciousness is certainly one of fundamental openness towards the call of another. And this 
other does indeed withdraw in the event of the call itself. This is patent in that what shows 
through anticipatory resoluteness is that nullity which grounds Dasein’s finitude. 
Nonetheless, one must be careful not to interpret such an alterity as a sort of Sartrean fissure 
of nothingness within the totality of Dasein, as if Dasein could ever be a ‘for-itself’ in 
Sartre’s sense of the term. Certainly the caller which calls Dasein to responsibility is nothing-
in-the-World, i.e. it is neither an entity that Dasein can discover, nor an anthropological other 
that Dasein can ‘inauthentically be-with’. 
 
Yet, the caller is still not ‘nothing at all’. Dasein responds to the call of the ‘caller’, by 
resolving itself on its utmost potentiality-for-Being, represented by the null ground of its 
finitude. This is possible because between the caller and the called one there exists a 
relationship. The latter term must be used carefully, as it may seem to suggest the 
independence of the ‘relata’ and their possible subsistence independently from and even prior 
to the relation itself. Indeed, the later Heidegger in Contributions to Philosophy
266
 will reject 
this term entirely, since any “talk of a relation of Da-sein to be-ing is misleading, insofar as 
this suggests that be-ing holds sway ‘for itself’ and that Da-sein takes up the relating to be-
ing”.267 The reader must keep this point firmly in mind in order not to understand the term 
‘relation’ in the sense which Heidegger openly opposes. This requirement is somewhat 
reinforced by Heidegger’s definition of Dasein’s death as Dasein’s ownmost non-relational 
possibility. When facing its own death, Dasein is cut off from its relationship with other 
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Daseins, although this quite possibly refers to Dasein’s inauthentic relations rather than its 
existential being-with. 
 
Nonetheless, it must be said that, in the context of Being and Time, Heidegger takes a more 
lenient view on the topic, and often relies on the terms ‘relation’ [Beziehung] and 
‘relationship’ [Verhältnis] in order to capture the inextricable interaction of constituents 
which appears within a certain existential structure. Most importantly, the constitutive state 
for which Dasein’s Being is constantly an issue for Dasein itself, i.e. Dasein’s understanding-
of-Being,  is paraphrased, at the outset of Being and Time, with the expression: “Dasein, in its 
Being, has a relationship towards that Being -a relationship [Verhältnis] which itself is one of 
Being.”268 In much the same way, the phenomenon which takes place between the caller and 
the called one is defined by the term ‘relationship’ [»Verhältnis«], albeit this time in inverted 
commas.
269
 Finally, the term Dasein itself has a ‘relational’ character, as argued by Raffoul 
himself: 
  
The very concept of Dasein ... includes a relation to the other: to the other entity, to 
the other Daseins, and also to itself as other. This relation-to-another is not accidental: 
in so far as it is itself, Dasein is opened to otherness.
270
 
 
And in his book The Origin of Responsibility, Raffoul brilliantly explains: 
 
With the choice of this term [Dasein], it was a matter for him of seizing the human 
being no longer as subject but in terms of the openness of being as such, and only in 
this respect. This is why the term, in later writings, is often hyphenated as Da-sein in 
order to stress the sheer relatedness to being, a relatedness that is not posited or 
initiated by us. Heidegger explained in a later text that with the term Dasein, it was a 
question for him of characterizing “with a single term both the relation [Bezug] of 
Being to the essence of man and the essential relation [Wesenverhältnis] of man to the 
openness (‘there’ [Da]) of Being [Sein] as such.” To that end, “the name of ‘Dasein’ 
[there-being] was chosen for the essential realm [Wesenbereich] in which man stands 
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as man.”271 That relation is not posited by human Dasein, but belongs to being 
itself.
272
 
 
In the following chapter I will analyse in more detail the connection between the 
‘relationship’ between the caller and the called one and the relationship of understanding 
between Dasein and its being [Seinverständnis], and I will clarify further how the two 
converge in the phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness. 
 
Nonetheless, the aforementioned passage already attests Raffoul’s recognition of an implicit 
connection between the openness of the human Dasein to the call, namely, responsibility, and 
the indissoluble bond between Dasein and its Being, that is, Dasein’s disclosive 
understanding-of-Being. Raffoul also clearly sees that the phenomenon of authentic 
Disclosedness, which is central to the analysis of finite temporality in terms of the meaning of 
the Being of Dasein, is itself an ‘ethical’ phenomenon in that it is a fundamentally relational 
one. For, as I shall soon clarify, authentic Disclosedness is nothing but the relational space 
between the caller and the called one. This is what Raffoul calls the space of responsibility 
and is that which manifests itself as Dasein’s taking up the fundamental nullity of its basis by 
acknowledging its own finitude. In this context finitude must then be understood as the 
meaning-giving basis of Dasein’s Being, i.e. Care, in terms of the finite unity of the structure 
of Care, namely, temporality. However, similarly to Crowell, the above does not mean that 
the space of Disclosedness is engendered by the encounter of two relata, namely Being and 
Dasein, nor that the anticipatory resoluteness discloses Being and Dasein as two ‘in-
themselves’ which can be taken apart from each other. Rather the analysis of authentic 
Disclosedness is possible only in terms of the atomic entanglement of the terms that appear 
within it, namely Being and Dasein. Nevertheless, by insisting on Dasein’s ownership of the 
call and its essential involvement in both sides of it, as the one called and the caller, Raffoul’s 
interpretation seems at times to run the risk of reducing the fundamental otherness of Being 
to an internal movement of Dasein’s subjectivity. This risk is evident in a passage such as the 
following: 
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As conscience, Dasein calls from the bottom of its being; the one who calls is neither 
a ‘who’ nor a ‘what’, but Dasein itself in its bare ‘that’, in its sheer thrownness.273 … 
What I have to be, then, what I have to assume, is precisely my Being-thrown as such. 
What is ‘mine’ is thus what can never belong to me, what evades me, what will always 
have escaped me.
274
 
 
Resolving itself onto its own potentiality for finitude constitutes Dasein’s very own 
disclosing responsibility. Yet this entails, according to Raffoul, Dasein’s taking on its own 
inappropriable potentiality and appropriating what is inappropriable. If by this one mean that 
responsibility consists in Dasein’s relation to its Being as an issue for Dasein itself, this 
formulation is certainly quite appropriate. Indeed, it may then be possible to analyse this 
relation of responsibility in these terms and, through such an analysis, attempt a description 
of the Being of Dasein as the ‘inappropriable’ which Dasein must appropriate in order to be 
its-self. Now, according to Raffoul, the appropriation of the inappropriable in responsibility is 
possible only in terms of Dasein’s facticity. Indeed, it is possible as an appropriation of 
Dasein’s own facticity.275  
 
To be thrown (facticity) means to be called (responsibility), they are one and the same 
phenomenon; hence the “facticity of responsibility.” ... Ultimately, the motif of 
facticity indicates that I am responsible for finitude itself, that responsibility is in a 
sense identical to finitude. The call manifests the essential finitude of Dasein, thrown 
into its Being and having to “carry” it as its own.276 
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Hence, Dasein’s responsiveness to the alterity which shows itself forth through the call, does 
not imply that the ‘other which calls’ is a substantial other. Rather, according to Raffoul, 
responsibility is the existential gesture of Dasein’s acknowledgment of its own finitude. As it 
should by now be clear, the term finitude does not mean here ‘incompleteness’. Instead, it 
points, so to speak, in two directions: on the one hand, it names the fullness of Dasein’s 
potentiality-to-be-a-whole; on the other hand it indicates the lack of a worldly ground for 
Dasein’s wholeness. Hence, it is by ‘accepting’ the nullity of the origin of its own Being as a 
fundamental character of its own ‘being-a-Dasein’ that Dasein can truly come to itself as an 
entity [Seiendes] whose very Being [Sein] is constantly at issue. 
 
Nonetheless, as I have explained in the course of this dissertation, what is at issue for 
Dasein’s Being consists in nothing else but that very Being, and this fundamental fact of 
Dasein’s constitution is characterized by Heidegger in terms of Care. While, the structure of 
Care does itself include facticity, the latter is only one of the elements of a tripartite structure 
that includes existence and falling. This fact should immediately warn us against treating 
facticity in isolation from the totality of the structure of Care. The question therefore is 
whether or not Raffoul’s analysis of responsibility, despite its undeniable merits, may indeed 
run the risk of falling into a reductionist position concerning the relation between Dasein’s 
responsibility and finitude on one side, and facticity on the other. 
While I am do not agree with Raffoul’s attempt to equate responsibility and finitude - two 
quite different characters of Dasein, I have no objection to Raffoul’s connection between 
responsibility and finitude.
277
 It is clear, in fact, that what Dasein responds to in the call is the 
finitude which shows through the nullity of Dasein’s own basis. To exist finitely means to 
have responded to the call which urges Dasein to take up its very own lack of (a worldly) 
ground. Nevertheless, I believe that Raffoul’s reduction of responsibility and finitude to 
facticity is untenable. This should not suggest that there is indeed no connection between 
responsibility, finitude and facticity, but rather that the analysis needs to be broadened in 
order to embrace the totality of the structure of Care, including the phenomena of existence 
and falling. 
 
As such, I am certainly not denying the truly inspired and inspiring contribution of Raffoul’s 
analysis to current Anglo-American Heidegger Scholarship. For Raffoul is the first scholar 
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working in the Anglo-American context to take a serious look at the connection between the 
phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness and the fundamental openness of Dasein to alterity, 
especially that of Being. Nonetheless, concerning the specific problematic of Being and Time, 
I believe that a more comprehensive approach than Raffoul’s to the phenomenon of 
Disclosedness is required in order not to overlook  the unitary constitution of Disclosedness 
and its ‘mirroring’ into the tripartite structure of finite temporality. For, as I shall argue in the 
final chapter of this dissertation, finitude must be understood in relation to temporality, that 
is, the totality of the structure of temporality, which includes not only the ‘time’ of Dasein’s 
thrownness, namely, its ‘having been’, but also the ‘time’ of its projecting understanding, i.e. 
its ‘being-ahead-of-itself’, and its present falling. In other words, the totality of that relation 
of Disclosedness which is opened through the three elements of Anxiety, Call and 
Responsibility, together with the general fallenness of Dasein, must indeed be considered in 
terms of that fundamental openness to alterity which is Disclosedness itself, understood in 
terms of the relationship between Dasein and Being. Indeed, this fundamental relationship 
must be explored, so to allow the structural elements of this relationship to manifest 
themselves in the phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness, i.e. anticipatory resoluteness, 
through its finitely temporal structure. Such an exploration should allow my research to reach 
‘higher ground’, wherefrom it should be possible to develop a reading of Heidegger’s 
masterwork which may be both ethical and phenomenological. I shall call this reading 
‘relational’, not because it will focus on the ‘relata’, but rather because it will emphasise the 
‘manifestational space’ within which the elements of this ‘relation’ may show themselves as 
‘related’ in some way. And I shall devote the following chapter precisely to this task. 
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5. A RELATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF 
BEING AND TIME 
 
 
The four interpretations of Being and Time considered thus far have been presented in order 
of merit. While the historical importance of Dreyfus’ interpretation within the Anglo-
American context cannot be denied, his focus on Dasein’s inauthentic existence prevents him 
from engaging with the second and most important division of Heidegger’s masterwork. 
Similarly, Lafont takes Division Two to be a mere repetition of Heidegger’s analysis of 
Dasein in its inauthenticity; nevertheless, her study concerning the concepts of language and 
meaning begins to show the importance of the phenomenon of Disclosedness, albeit 
implicitly. The same concept of meaning is what guides Crowell to take a more 
phenomenological approach to Being and Time and through this he comes to appreciate the 
primacy of Disclosedness. The latter is defined in terms of the phenomenological space of 
meaning, within which everything, including Being, is understood/disclosed. While Crowell 
acknowledges Heidegger’s attempts to venture outside the disclosive space to reach its 
source, i.e. Being, his investigation remains confined within the limits of an implicit epoché. 
Finally, by engaging more thoroughly with Being and Time as a whole, Raffoul redefines the 
analysis of Dasein in terms of the ethical engagement between Dasein and what lies beyond 
it. In his analysis, the notions of Anxiety, Guilt, Death and Resoluteness are studied in the 
wider context of Being and Time’s ontological focus, and the question concerning what lies 
beyond the phenomenological space of Disclosedness is raised explicitly for the first time in 
terms of the alterity of Being. But while Raffoul concentrates his analysis on Dasein’s own 
alterity in relation to its potentiality for Being-its-Self, the disclosive relation between Dasein 
and its Being as an alterity is not examined in its own right, running the risk of annulling the 
ontological distinction between Being and Dasein as an entity. 
 
The present chapter will therefore engage in a study of Dasein’s Being in terms of its alterity, 
in order to demonstrate that  the emergence of a relational space between Being and Dasein 
requires neither the complete bracketing out of what is beyond the space itself nor the 
reduction of Dasein’s Being to a function of Dasein itself. 
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Achieving this will require my analysis to move, so to speak, sideways to take advantage of 
the achievements of possibly the most novel and direct analysis of the concept of ‘beyond’ in 
the history of Western philosophy, namely, Emmanuel Levinas’ study of alterity carried out 
in his book Totality and Infinity.
278
 This will constitute a powerful tool I expect will enable 
me to build on Crowell’s and Raffoul’s achievements while at the same time avoiding some 
of the inconsistencies I have highlighted in their works. In this way I hope finally to be able 
to ferry Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein from hermeneutic epistemology to relational ethics, 
from a philosophy of the understanding to a philosophy of Disclosedness. 
 
In an effort to achieve my final aim, this chapter will firstly present a snapshot of Levinas’ 
philosophy by mapping some of its key concepts against Heidegger’s own, in Section i. This 
will allow me to establish some important points of contact between the two, thus opening the 
possibility to utilise Levinas’ findings to further my interpretation of Being and Time. In 
particular the concept of alterity will be utilised in Section ii. in order to clarify Heidegger’s 
discussion of the Call of Conscience and its origin ‘beyond’ Dasein. Through this 
Levinasean-influenced analysis of the Call, Being will be found to be Dasein’s Other, as it 
calls Dasein from beyond itself to its-Self. In Section iii. I will then attempt to clarify what it 
means for Being to be Dasein’s Other, while Section iv. will demonstrate how this definition 
can provide a more expansive interpretation of Being and Time which focuses on the 
disclosive relatedness between Dasein and its Being, without necessarily undermining the 
ontological difference on which the philosophy of Being and Time is fundamentally 
grounded. 
 
 
i. Levinas: the Same and the Face of the Other 
 
In an attempt to further Raffoul’s ethical interpretation of Being and Time, let us now turn to 
Levinas, and in particular, to his book Totality and Infinity. As the title of this book partially 
suggests, in this work Levinas engages in a critical dialogue with Being and Time. Although 
Levinas is openly dismissive of Heidegger’s philosophy throughout the book, I shall explain 
how many important notions discussed in Totality and Infinity expand on some of the crucial 
ideas of Being and Time. As such, the contention of the present chapter is that, by analysing 
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closely Levinas’ critique of the concepts of Totality and Being, it may be possible to throw 
some light on that fundamental relationship between Dasein and its Being that Heidegger 
discusses in terms of both understanding-of-Being and Disclosedness, and that underpins all 
the ontological structures I have discussed thus far. This is not to say that Levinas’ 
philosophy can be reduced to Heidegger’s; even less that either philosophy should be 
‘corrected’ from the standpoint of the other. Hence, the present work will not consist in a 
systematic comparison between Levinas and Heidegger nor will it attempt a philosophical 
rapprochement between the two. Rather, I shall try to draw the reader’s attention to some 
features of Levinas’ philosophy which will help me enlighten a number of issues from Being 
and Time which come to light in the course of this dissertation. 
 
A further disclaimer is necessary here: there are certainly a number of other philosophies and 
philosophers that could be used to the same effect. For example, Karl Jasper’s concepts of 
‘Transcendence’ and ‘limit-situation’,279 or Gabriel Marcel notion of ‘Mystery of Being’280 
may prove fruitful to further the concept of authentic Disclosedness in view of Dasein’s 
finitude and its consequent Call to accept its Guilt. Similarly, Derrida’s philosophy of the 
‘Différance’ and the ‘trace’281 could be profitably exploited to explain Heidegger’s use of the 
term ‘beyond’ and the questions around sameness and difference between Dasein and its 
Being. Yet, in my view, none of these approaches provides the ethico-relational connotations 
which Raffoul has discovered in Being and Time and which, far from being my own personal 
interpretative preference, appears to be the only appropriate way to clarify some of the 
apparent contradictions present in Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s Disclosedness of Being 
as Call of Conscience. Conversely, some of Levinas’ concepts will prove to be a helpful tool 
to this end, and this section and the next intend to show precisely this. 
 
Explicitly, Levinas’ thought is founded upon one fundamental critique of Heideggerian 
philosophy, which is summarized in Levinas’ fierce attack against the notion of Ontology. In 
Totality and Infinity he writes: 
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Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the 
same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of 
being. ... That reason in the last analysis would be the manifestation of freedom, 
neutralizing the other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid 
down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing other limits it. ... The 
relation of Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in 
order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but 
the reduction of the other to the same.
282
 
 
The achievement of ‘Totality’ represents, therefore, the aim of ontology, by suppressing all 
differences in order to absorb everything into the homogeneity of what ‘is’. In this sense, a 
theory of ontology does not have actual limits, since all that may be grasped must, in a certain 
way, already belong to the horizon of Being, even if it belongs to it as a mere being-not. 
What instead does not belong to this very horizon neither ‘is’ nor ‘is not’, hence it just has no 
standing at all. 
 
Against the framework of traditional ontology, Levinas counterposes his fundamental 
intuition of a ‘radical alterity’. The latter is found in the encounter of an I with what defies 
any attempt of being grasped in terms of that very I, of being surmised into the ‘horizon of 
Being’. This ‘defiance’ is what Levinas calls the Other [Autrui]; and ‘Infinity’ is what 
characterizes the relation of the Other with the ‘I’; this is because between the I and the other, 
if it is to be a truly ‘Other’, there must be something like a distance which can never be 
completely bridged, a void which can never be wholly filled, a desire which is never totally 
fulfilled. In this sense the term Infinity means irreducibility, or, as Levinas calls it, absolute 
transcendence. The experience that the I, which I myself always am, has of this infinite, 
irreducible defiance which is the Other, a relation which Levinas calls Metaphysics,
283
 is, 
according to him, foundational in respect to ontology. This argument constitutes the heart of 
Levinas’ critique of Heidegger, as it is summarized in Totality and Infinity:  
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The relationship with a being infinitely distant, that is overflowing its idea, is such 
that its authority as an existence is already invoked in every question we could raise 
concerning the meaning of its Being. One does not question oneself concerning him; 
one questions him. Always he faces. If ontology – the comprehension, the embracing 
of Being – is impossible, it is ... because the comprehension of Being in general 
cannot dominate the relationship with the Other. The latter relationship commands the 
first. I cannot disentangle myself from society with the Other, even when I consider 
the Being of the existent he is. Already the comprehension of Being is said to the 
existent, who again arises behind the theme in which he is presented. This ‘saying to 
the Other’ – this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with an 
existent – precedes ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology 
presupposes metaphysics.
284
 
 
We therefore are ... radically opposed to Heidegger who subordinates the relation with 
the Other to ontology (which, moreover, he determines as though the relation with the 
interlocutor and the Master could be reduced to it)…285 
 
Beginning from this fundamental opposition to Heidegger, Levinas develops a particularr 
philosophy of alterity, based on the relation between what he calls the I [le moi] or the Same 
[le même] and the Other [Autrui]. In the first instance, the former names the kind of subject 
which is so central to philosophy since Descartes. The I consists essentially in a ‘knowing 
subject’, whose primary goal is to thematise everything under his gaze. Knowing something 
is, according to Levinas, having comprehended – etymologically speaking - that something 
within the totality of a common horizon. In the history of philosophy this ‘common horizon’, 
be it an omniscient God or a transcendental Subject, is what remains constant throughout the 
cognitive experience and renders it ‘objective’. Hence, the I is also called by Levinas the 
Same. The latter term does not only allude to the constancy of the knowing-I, but, most 
importantly, refers to this epistemological tendency of the knowing-I itself to reduce 
everything to that totality which it itself constitutes. 
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In opposition to this totalizing movement is what Levinas calls the Other. The otherness of 
this Other is not the same as that of other worldly objects; the latter, says Levinas, is only a 
formal alterity, insofar as for him, like for Heidegger, objects exist only within the gaze of a 
Dasein, that is, only in relation to Dasein’s existential project. Nor is the Other the negation 
of the Same; for, says Levinas “the negator and the negated are posited together” and together 
they “form a system, that is, a totality”.286 Finally, the Other cannot be constituted only in 
terms of resistance to the Same, since any resistance, as a limitation, requires a common 
ground which may be ‘limited’. Rather, for Levinas, the term ‘Other’ refers to “the absolutely 
other”.287 “He and I do not form a number”,288 states Levinas, for the radical alterity of the 
Other prevents the establishment of any totality within which the Other itself may be 
compared to the Same. Hence, in relation to the Same, the Other is said by Levinas to be 
transcendent, not because the Same lacks the power to wholly grasp the Other, but because 
the Other is essentially Infinite and therefore inherently defies any attempt of being grasped 
in its fullness. While this Infinity, as an infinite distance, is what factually prevents the 
integration of the Other into the Same, according to Levinas, this distance does not destroy 
the relation between the Other and the Same and is not itself destroyed by the relation itself, 
as would happen with relations within the same.
289
 
 
But what sort of relation can exist where the relata are so different as to deny the existence of 
any common ground between them? In order to clarify the terms of Levinas’ answer to this 
question, the reader must turn their attention to his description of the way in which the Other 
presents itself to the Same, namely as a face [visage]. The term ‘face’, Levinas states, names 
“[t]he way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me”.290 This 
is to say that, through the manifestation of its face, the Other manifests itself according to 
itself, overflowing all pre-emptive ideas the Same has concerning this very manifestation; for 
any idea the Same may have of it would reduce that very manifestation to sameness. This is 
what Levinas calls expression, where the term suggests an external pressure [ex-pressio], a 
force which exceeds the capacity of the receiver, or the unerthening of something hidden. By 
saying that the face of the Other is essentially ‘expression’, Levinas echoes Descartes’ second 
ontological argument from the Meditations, where the reality of God is proven by the 
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existence of an infinite idea of God within the res cogitans. Yet, Levinas is not trying to 
prove the existence of the Other, but only describing the way in which his
291
 transcendent, 
infinite manifestation, namely, his face, cannot be deduced from, reduced to, or contained 
within the Same, contrary to what all philosophy beginning with Socrates’ maieutics has 
traditionally believed. The manifestation of the Other through his face is not a matter of 
unearthing something from within the depth of the Same. In other words, the Other is not 
internal to the Same, or, so to speak, a fact of the Same’s interiority –an interiority which 
corresponds to an all-encompassing totality; rather the former is essentially external to the 
latter. As such, the face offers something to the Same which lies beyond the latter, exceeding 
the latter himself and coming from outside him. The face represents, therefore, the fact that 
the Other is essentially external to any all-encompassing horizon or totality, a fact which 
Levinas calls ‘exteriority’ [exteriorité]. 
 
When the Other presents itself to the Same through his face, a certain relation between the 
two is established. Yet, according to Levinas, the relation which is established in the face of 
the Other is not one which ultimately can be referred back to the totality of a system of relata. 
Instead, the face of the Other ‘faces’ the Same. This is to say, it comes from outside the 
system within which the totality of the Same rests. Hence, the only relation between the Same 
and the Other that Levinas’ philosophy can admit is “[a] relation whose terms do not form a 
totality..., [which proceeds] from the I to the Other, ... as delineating a distance in depth ... 
irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding established between the 
diverse terms, other with respect to one another, that lend themselves to its synoptic 
operation”.292  
 
This relation is what Levinas calls a face to face between the Same and the Other. This 
‘facing position’, where the Same and the Other are figuratively opposed, does not imply a 
confrontation of the Same with the Other, where the distance between the two may be 
reduced to the commonality of a genus encompassing both parties; rather, if the face of the 
Other is essentially its ‘ex-pression’, a lance thrust from the outside of its infinity, piercing 
right through the undisturbed totality of the Same, then it is easy to see why Levinas believes 
that the face to face stance is essentially conducive to what he refers to as language, 
discourse, speech or dialogue. More or less consistently, these terms all fundamentally refer 
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to the mode of a relation where the relata are neither limitrophe, nor bound within a common 
totality, but where the distance between the two –between the I and the Other- is maintained 
by virtue of the relation itself, i.e. a face to face relation. Dialogue, according to Levinas, is 
the bridge which connects without uniting, for in it the Same is called by the manifestation of 
the Other’s face.293 In other words, language, speech, discourse and dialogue are primarily 
responses to the call that the face of the Other issues to the Same. 
 
Yet, what does this ‘call’ amount to? I know that it is from the face of the Other that the call 
is issued, and that, through the manifestation of the face, the infinity of the Other infiltrates 
the totality of the Same. But what is the Same called to by the presence of the Other’s face? 
According to Levinas the face of the Other calls the Same to responsibility for the Other 
itself. But what does Levians mean by ‘responsibility’? Levinas explains: 
 
It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself. … The face I welcome 
makes me pass from phenomenon to being in another sense: in discourse I expose 
myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the response -acuteness of 
the present-engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final 
reality. This extreme attention does not actualize what was in potency, for it is not 
conceivable without the other. Being attentive signifies a surplus of consciousness, 
and presupposes the call of the other.
294
 
 
Responsibility, therefore means to ‘respond’ to the call of the Other. But what does the call of 
the face of the Other says to the Same? It enjoins not to commit murder, not to kill the 
Other.
295
 
 
To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension 
absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power. I can wish to kill only 
an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore 
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does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole 
being I can wish to kill.
296
 
 
The Same, intrinsically, wishes to kill the Other, in order to obtain the all-encompassing 
freedom in a tendency that is connatural to his very being and is suggested in his name. 
Instead, the emergence of the face breaks the utter solitude of the Same and calls him to 
acknowledge the limits of his freedom. Through this movement, the freedom of the Same is 
changed from arbitrariness to responsibility and the Same’s self-contained all-encompassing 
independence is destroyed to make room for a dialogical relation. Nevertheless, one must be 
careful not to interpret this as the dialogue between two equivalent interlocutors. Since the 
same cannot independently initiate this dialogue, something which is fundamentally 
impossible due to absolute alterity of the Other, the Same must be called so that a dialogical 
relation may be initiated. The complete independence of the Other and yet the complete 
dependence of the Same to him make the relation fundamentally asymmetrical, where only I 
am responsible to and for the other. The Other does not and cannot reciprocate, since 
reciprocation can happen only if both the Same and the Other belonged, so to speak, to a 
common plane. As I have already explained, this is not possible due to the radical difference 
that Levinas wants to maintain between the Same and the Other. 
 
However, the last consideration engenders one further question, namely, how can a radical 
distance be maintained there where a relation is in place? In order to understand how this is 
indeed possible, Levinas asks his reader to accomplish a radical shift, abandoning the 
traditional epistemological framework which denies any meaningful relations outside the 
self-sufficient plane of the subject/object, within which the truth is guaranteed by the 
ignorance of its provenance. Indeed, the I-think is self-sufficient only when judging his own 
self-sufficiency from the interiority of its totality, and only thanks to an epoché which blinds 
him to the externality of its essential source. Instead, in acknowledging the finitude of its 
freedom by responding to the call of the face of the Other, Levinas believes that a different 
kind of relation is established, indeed a foundational one. As its provenance cannot be charted 
from inside that subjective horizon afforded by the Cartesian self, the Kantian subject or the 
phenomenological Ego, this very ignorance signals the upper limit of traditional 
epistemology and the novel ethical approach on which Levinas’ philosophy relies. While the 
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Other remains epistemologically transcendent, its effects on the Same are undeniable as it 
defines the very nature of the Same in terms of responsibility and, therefore, finitude. This 
means that the relation between the Same and the Other does not exist ‘in spite of’ their 
radical distance; instead it is due to this very distance that the Same finds itself limited and 
can therefore respond to the negative manifestation of the other. The comprehensive kind of 
relation which belonged to epistemology is here abandoned and in its place and new type of 
relation is found, namely, the ethical relation. 
 
 
ii. Calling (Levinas) from Beyond 
 
The Call of Conscience discloses to Dasein the finite temporality which constitutes the nullity 
of its null basis. By being called, Dasein is summoned from the inauthenticity of das Man to 
the authenticity of its-Self. After having been called out of its fallenness through the silence 
of the Call, Dasein can face the ownmost possibility of its Death as a Being-towards-death, 
which is grounded in the finitude of its temporality; and by disclosing its very Death in 
anticipation Dasein discloses itself as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Heidegger refers to this specific kind of Disclosedness 
by the expression ‘Anticipatory Resoluteness’, where the term Resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit] refers to that specific kind of Disclosedness [Er-schlossenheit] which is 
not a more or less passive discovering of the world as it gives itself to Dasein but the 
fundamental openness of Being on the basis of Dasein’s existential choice of itself as 
potentially and finitely whole. Nevertheless, due to its existential fallennes, Dasein is unable 
to make this choice on its own ‘strength’ and, in order to choose its-Self, it needs to be called 
from beyond itself by something, in a way, ‘other’ than itself. 
 
Seemingly in contradiction with this last point, Heidegger states that the ‘caller’ is no one 
other than Dasein in its potentiality-to-be-authentically-its-Self.
 297
 However, as previously 
clarified in this dissertation, the contradiction is only apparent insofar as the discursive nature 
of the Call of Conscience affords Dasein a fundamental ‘articulation’, distinguishing between 
two existentiell constituents of it, i.e. inauthentic das Man and authentic its-Self. While this 
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should not be taken to mean that Dasein’s Being is severed, the duality afforded by the 
articulateness of the Call allows Heidegger to ‘position’ Dasein at both ends. Hence, what 
calls is at once Dasein itself as a fallen das-Man-self, and beyond itself, as an authentic its-
Self, which already is, in anticipation, the finite completeness that calls Dasein to be itself. 
While in this dissertation I have extensively dealt with Dasein as it needs to be called out of 
its fallennes and into its authenticity, I have not dealt explicitly with the nature of what lies 
beyond Dasein itself as Dasein’s own Being. As such, in the remainder of this chapter I will 
attempt to analyse the nature of this ‘other’ Dasein, as well as the nature of the relationship 
which Dasein entertains with that which lies beyond. In order to shed some light on the 
former issue let us start with analysing the latter. 
 
I have said that, by facing its own death, Dasein discloses its finite temporality as the 
meaning of its Being; by ‘meaning’ here I denote the condition of possibility for something to 
be understood as it is by Dasein. As such, finite temporality represents the horizon which 
grants to Dasein the possibility of having an understanding disclosure of its own Being, 
within which Dasein is disclosed as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.
298
 Yet, if Dasein in its 
Being has the potentiality for constituting a totality, then whatever is beyond Dasein would 
necessarily fall outside the ‘wholeness’ of its Being, that is, the totality of Dasein itself. In 
this sense, it would seem that whatever is beyond Dasein does not actually belong to Dasein, 
let alone be itself Dasein, but it would be strictly speaking ‘other’ than Dasein. If my goal, 
therefore, is clarifying the relation between Dasein and that which lies beyond it, my analysis 
must attempt to grasp the relation between Dasein and that which falls entirely outside the 
totality which is achieved by Dasein in Anticipatory Resoluteness. 
 
Yet, if my analysis is thus far correct, it may be possible, and indeed fruitful, to study the 
relation between Dasein and its beyond in terms of the relation between a totality and its 
alterity. Thus, I may be able to employ some of the concepts of Levinas’ ethical philosophy 
as tools, in order to, firstly, elucidate the kind of relation which Dasein entertains with its 
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beyond, and, secondly, spell out the nature of the beyond itself. While in section i. of the 
present chapter, some of the fundamental concepts of Levinas’ philosophy have been 
discussed, if I am to explain how these notions can help me understand the provenance of 
Dasein’s call of conscience and the nature of the caller, I must, first of all, map some of these 
concepts onto Heidegger’s philosophy to find how this tool may be more effectively applied. 
Let us start from the notion of the Call. Similarly to Heidegger, in fact, Levinas uses the term 
‘call’ and ‘calling’. This call is for Levinas a ‘calling into question’. What is called into 
question is the totality of the same in relation to the infinity of the Other which is manifested 
in the face. In this sense the call is not a critical attitude in which the I recognizes its 
limitedness in relation to another totality; this calling is rather “[a] calling into question of the 
same –which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same- [and] is brought about 
by the other.”299 It is the Other, therefore, that calls into question the spontaneous totality of 
the Same, that is, it calls into question the I’s freedom. Does this imply that for Levinas the I 
is not free? Certainly not; for in the face to face in which the Other asks to be welcomed, the I 
is called to take responsibility for the Other. Freedom is not the lack of responsibility and is 
not arbritrariness, since the totality of the I is not self-constituted but has an origin in the 
relation with the Other that calls me to responsibility, hence to freedom. In this sense the 
totality of the I is limited by the infinity of the Other insofar as that the totality of the I is no 
longer admissible following the I’s encounter with the Other. The relation between the finite I 
and the infinite Other, says Levinas, “does not consist in the finite being absorbed in what 
faces him, but in remaining in his own being”.300 Yet the infinity of the other does not simply 
call into question the totality of the I but grounds it, insofar as it allows the I to discover its 
totality in terms of the essential finitude which makes any totality possible. 
Similarly, in Being and Time the Call of Consciousness is directed to Dasein’s ownmost 
Being-guilty. Being guilty consists in ‘being the null basis of a nullity’. Therefore, 
Heidegger’s Call of Consciousness is itself also a call for Dasein to take responsibility for the 
essential finitude of its being-a-whole by being-towards the nullity which grounds it. In this 
sense, just as for Levinas, what grounds the finitude of Dasein’s totality is essentially 
something which can never be included within that totality itself, not even as a mere negation 
of the totality. The nullity of Dasein’s Being is not in fact a ‘not-being-a-whole’, but 
something which transcends the totality of Dasein by remaining foundational to it. By being 
                                                 
299
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.43. 
300
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 
p.292. 
141 
 
called to face the fundamental nullity of its Being, Dasein is urged to choose its-Self in 
anticipation. In choosing its-Self, Dasein answers the Call by taking responsibility for its 
finite totality, i.e. anticipatory resoluteness, so as to be free for its authentic Self. Does this 
mean that Dasein is self-grounding? Or that it can chose itself from the ground up? Not at all. 
As for Levinas, the freedom that comes from the Call does not consist in arbitrariness, but in 
responsibility, that is, in the consciousness of one’s own limitedness in the face of what 
grounds one. In this sense, facing nullity, or to be the null basis of the nullity, does not mean 
to renounce oneself. Just as the infinity of the Other does not make the Same anything but 
himself, nullity does not negate Dasein’s Being but makes Dasein itself; that is to say, an 
entity for which its Being(-in-the-world) is an issue; or, which is the same, an entity whose 
possibilities, due to the finitude of its Being (temporality), are fundamentally finite and, 
therefore, significant. 
 
Therefore, in order to be its-Self, Dasein must in a certain way face the nullity which grounds 
its fundamental finitude by being-towards that nullity itself. In this way Dasein is called to 
take responsibility [Being guilty] for its indebtness [Guilt=debt] with the nullity of its ground.  
“The calling into question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other in the 
face”, says Levinas “we call language”.301 As I have already mentioned in section i. of this 
chapter, by ‘language’ Levinas refers to a dialogical relation which originates in the face to 
face encounter between the I and the Other. Indeed, Language essentially comes from the 
Other,
302
 insofar as it is in an epiphany of the face that the ‘face to face’ is first established. 
Yet the face-to-face relation is itself language insofar as it is a relation where the distance 
between the Other and the I is not destroyed by the relatedness. Analogously, for Heidegger a 
dialogue is established through the Call of Consciousness where the caller calls by keeping 
silent and Dasein must listen by hearkening and respond in anticipatory resoluteness. And 
similarly to the dialogical relation established between an I and the Other, the Call of 
Consciousness maintains a fundamental distance between the caller and the called one, so 
that the caller is not reduced to the called one but remains essentially beyond its totality.
303
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In the language of the Other, says Levinas, “the world is offered...; it is borne by 
propositions. The other is the principle of phenomena”.304 And a few pages later Levinas 
remarks: “The Other, the signifier, manifests himself in speech by speaking of the world and 
not of himself; he manifests himself by proposing the world, by thematizing it”.305 This does 
not mean that the world, ontologically speaking, is ‘a consequence’ of the relation established 
between the I and the Other. Rather, the world signifies merely the space of this relationship, 
a space in which phenomena are disclosed. This is confirmed by what Levinas says in 
Chapter D. of Totality and Infinity: “The relationship with the Other is not produced outside 
of the world, but puts into question the world possessed”,306 that is to say, it calls the I to 
question the ground of Disclosedness. Indeed, following the encounter with the Other, the I, 
as is the case with Dasein, can no longer pretend the world is his own creation, or depends 
entirely on his beliefs and knowledge of it. In the same way, the I, or Dasein, does not ‘own’ 
the manifestation of his own self as he fundamentally relies on something other than or 
beyond himself to discover the ultimate finitude which characterises its Being. In this sense 
Levinas argues that “[t]he relationship with the Other is not produced outside of the world but 
puts in question the world possessed. The relationship with the Other, transcendence, consists 
in speaking the world to the Other”,307 while the Other at the same time speaks the world to 
the I.  Similarly in §43 Being and Time Heidegger argues: 
 
To be sure, the pre-ontological understanding of Being embraces all entities which are 
essentially disclosed in Dasein; but the understanding of Being has not yet Articulated 
itself in a way which corresponds to the various modes of Being. 
At the same time our interpretation of understanding has shown that, in accordance 
with its falling kind of Being it has, proximally and for the most part, diverted itself 
into an understanding of the 'world'. Even where the issue is not only one of ontical 
experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes 
its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world.
308
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While Being needs to be somehow ‘understood’ prior to the world showing itself forth, it is 
only insofar as Dasein stands into a disclosing relation with its Being that the ‘world’ of 
phenomena can be discovered. This very relation of understanding Disclosedness is what 
strictly speaking is called the world, as that relational space in which phenomena can be 
discovered; this is explicitly confirmed by Heidegger in his 1927 Marburg lectures reprinted 
under the title of Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where he states “…Being-in-the-world 
is already, as such, understanding of Being.”309 
 
Now, the Disclosing relationship between Dasein and its Being in which the ‘world’ of 
phenomena is constituted and that Levinas has called ‘language’, is said by Levinas to be a 
relation which puts into question the possession of the world by the I. In more Heideggerian 
terms, any Disclosedness of Being, even the less authentic which can inferred from the 
discovering of intraworldly entities, in some way puts into question Dasein’s epistemological 
independence and its existence as a self-constituted ground of the phenomenal world. 
Furthermore, authentic Disclosedness openly questions its very origin, as it calls Dasein to 
take up that ground that Dasein itself is not (i.e. the null basis of a nullity) by facing its own 
Being in its fundamental finitude as a being-towards-death. Indeed, it is the relational nature 
of Disclosedness which points to a term which is external to Dasein itself. Indeed, 
Disclosedness always consists in a relation between Dasein and the Being that is disclosed by 
Dasein, be it even a mere pre-ontological understanding, making of Being the ‘other term’ of 
any disclosing relationship. Within such a relationship, it must be Dasein’s Being itself, as 
both other to Dasein and yet its authentic its-Self, that calls into question Dasein as a self-
constituted basis. This same relationship is the premise on which the Call of Conscience deals 
a final blow to the post-Cartesian self by putting into question Dasein’s self-constitution in 
the most radical way. However, it must be clear by now who is the only one that can call 
Dasein to take up the nullity which grounds its finitude, to renounce to its illusion of being an 
all-encompassing whole and accept its finite totality as the proof of what calls it from beyond 
itself.  That is, nothing other than Being itself. And indeed, if my use of Levinas terminology 
still holds, that which calls Dasein into question from an unreachable beyond as the very 
Other to Dasein, is indeed Being. That is to say: Being is Dasein’s Other.310 
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iii. The Alterity of Being 
 
Yet, what does it mean exactly for Being to be Dasein’s Other? Certainly, it does not mean 
that Being and Dasein belong to two planes which are irremediably irreconcilable. Indeed, 
strictly speaking, “…the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me 
in the world. The call comes from me… .”311 Hence, if Being in its otherness is the caller, 
then the previous quote would imply that Being, strictly speaking, belongs to Dasein. In other 
words, if Being is the caller and if the call comes from Dasein itself, then Being and Dasein 
must be somehow the same. But how can Being be at once Dasein’s Other and Dasein itself? 
Is Heidegger falling into a sort of Hegelian subjectivism? Is Dasein’s Being just so totalizing 
to include in itself even its Other? If this were the case, the analytic of Dasein developed in 
Being and Time would be entirely sufficient to manifest the totality of Being itself. On the 
other hand, if this is not the case, then, in spite of a certain fundamental connection between 
Dasein and its Being, the latter cannot be identical to the former. Indeed, this must be the 
case, not only in view of Heidegger’s insistence on the difference between the analytic of 
Dasein’s Being developed in Being and Time and the analytic of Being proper, which 
Heidegger was unable to develop within the framework of this book; but also in order to 
avoid a fatal contradiction with Heidegger’s main tenet of the ontological difference. And 
indeed, since Dasein is ultimately still an entity, albeit a special one, no identification 
between Being and Dasein is possible if the ontological difference is to be maintained. 
 
I am presented therefore with a striking issue as I must clarify in what way Dasein can, 
without being the same as its Being, be at once the called one, and the Other which calls itself 
from beyond itself. In order to come out of this impasse, let us take a cue from Raffoul who, 
in his article Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger,
312
 devises a compelling 
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Levinas’ Philosophy.  
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interpretation concerning the source of the call and the status of Being in relation to Dasein. 
Raffoul states: 
 
Heidegger does not say simply that the call comes “from me.” Rather, the call is said 
to come from the being “which I am each time.” Now, as we know, I am this being 
only in the mode of a zu-sein, a having-to-be, that is, in the manner of a possibility to 
be.
 313
 
 
Dasein in its Being, i.e. Care, is constantly unsettled into a possibility-to-be, so much so that 
this Being-possible is indeed the fundamental character of its Being. This very Being is 
constantly more than what Dasein is at any moment. In this sense Being is to Dasein that 
which at all times is not Dasein, is other than Dasein, and is constantly transcendent in 
respect with Dasein. And yet, insofar as Dasein’s Being-possible is what Dasein is in its 
Being, i.e. Care, as it is constantly thrown and projected transcendentally, then this Being 
itself is, strictly speaking, ‘of Dasein’. Indeed, as Raffoul says:  
 
I have to assume this being, whether authentically or inauthentically. [Yet] It does not 
... “belong to me,” if what is meant by this is projected by me. When Heidegger writes 
that Dasein “calls itself,” it does not mean that the “I,” as author, is the origin of the 
call (…he on the contrary insists that there is no author of the call), or even that there 
is a strict identity between the caller and the called one.
314
 
 
Nevertheless, Dasein must entertain an original relationship with its Being, insofar as it is 
through that relationship that Dasein is constituted as its-self. Since, as I have discussed in the 
previous sections, Dasein is its-self authentically by responding to the call of its Being, that is 
to say, by taking responsibility for its being-fundamentally-unsettled, i.e. Being-guilty, then 
any possible relationship between Dasein and its Being has a ‘transcendental posture’, so to 
speak; this is because Dasein can never ‘actually’ (that is to say, ‘presently-at-hand’) be its-
self in its Being, for that Being is constantly beyond Dasein’s reach. This is the reason for 
which Dasein ‘exists’, where by ‘existence’ Heidegger means the constancy of Dasein’s 
relationship with the transcendence of its Being. In this sense, one can refer to Being as 
                                                 
313
 Francois Raffoul, “The Question of Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger”, in Between Levinas and 
Heidegger, ed. E. S. Nelson, J. Drabinski, (Albany: SUNY Press, Forthcoming), p.37. 
314
 Francois Raffoul, “The Question of Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger”, in Between Levinas and 
Heidegger, ed. E. S. Nelson, J. Drabinski, (Albany: SUNY Press, Forthcoming), p.37. 
146 
 
Dasein’s Other, insofar as Dasein consists, existentially, in a relationship with what it itself 
‘is-not’; and yet, that which Dasein constantly is-not is also what Dasein ‘potentially is’ at 
any time. This may seem contradictory. For, in what sense is Being other to Dasein if, 
potentially, Dasein ‘has’, in itself, that very Being as its own? In answering this question I 
need to point out, with Raffoul, that this identity cannot be conceived as that of two different 
entities, nor can the phenomenon of the Call of Conscience be conceived in terms of the 
relation between two individual relata: 
 
The call of conscience is … above all a call of the self, in both senses of the genitive. 
The self is not the author of the call, but is announced in and as the call, since the 
caller disappears in the calling. Therefore what is at issue in the call is nothing but the 
coming to oneself as such. … In the call, Dasein’s being-a-self is at issue and in play; 
the call is the space or the dimension of selfhood.
315
 
 
Yet the Call is only possible if Dasein is in some way always, already open to the otherness 
of the caller. While Dasein’s self is defined within the call, its otherness precedes it and must 
be defined independently from selfhood. Indeed, Dasein is not a self in any post-Cartesian 
sense of the word, but an entity whose primary Being is Care. This definition is crucial as it 
constitutes the basis for Heidegger’s anthropologico-philosophical shift away from the 
autonomous self, towards a relational entity whose fundamental trait is openness to alterity. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of Care signals Dasein’s inescapable relation of Disclosedness with 
other entities, other Daseins and, ultimately, with its own Being as another.
316
 The latter is the 
most basic type of Care, which shows itself as Dasein’s primary character of Being as being 
at issue and which I have previously referred to as a disclosing relation of Being to Dasein. 
As such, just as Dasein is defined by nullity through and through, its Being is defined by 
alterity through and through; so much so that the meaning of its very Being is nothing other 
than the manifestation of its intrinsic heteronomy, namely, finitude. Hence, while maintaining 
a certain identity between Dasein and its Other, i.e. its Being, this is far from constituting the 
wholeness of an autonomous, self-enclosed I. It is instead a commonness which is 
engendered within the Disclosedness of Being to Dasein, understood as the 
phenomenological space which defines both the caller and the called one, alterity and 
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openness to it. In this sense, the otherness of Dasein’s Being seems vaguely to echo Saint 
Augustine when he declares: 
 
Late have I loved you, O Beauty so ancient and new; late have I loved you! For 
Behold you were within me. And I outside; and I thought you outside and in my 
ugliness fell upon those lovely things that you have made. You were with me and I 
was not with you. I was kept from you by those things, yet had they not been in you, 
they would not have been at all. You called and cried to me and broke open my 
deafness.
317
 
 
But where Augustine can address this alterity personally by the ‘Thou’, within the present 
dissertation I have only been able to discuss Dasein’s alterity, namely, its Being, in terms of 
Dasein itself. While this is all that was traditionally believed to be possible within the 
unfinished framework of Being and Time, Levinas has shown a glimpse of what can be 
achieved when one dares to stare transcendence in the eye or, better, face-to-face. Certainly, 
one cannot deny that Raffoul’s interpretation of Being and Time has achieved much of what 
is achievable within the traditionally accepted framework of the book, which only allows for 
an explicit treatment of Being from Dasein. However, following Levinas’ example, I may 
venture to ask whether or not is possible to describe Being in terms of alterity, not only 
negatively but also positively. The answer to such a question does not only affect my ability 
to provide a positive description of Dasein’s Being in terms of its own alterity, but it has 
important ramifications for Heidegger’s scholarship, as it would prove that Being and Time 
contains the means to answer the question which Heidegger fully tackles only following the 
Kere. The importance of this point cannot be overstated: it is undeniable that at no point in 
Being and Time Heidegger ventures to describe Being positively; indeed, he explicitly rejects 
this possibility as outside the scope of the book. Nonetheless, if my analysis is correct, the 
theoretical gap which separates the philosophy of Being and Time from that of the 
Contributions to Philosophy
318
 is in fact quite narrow and the turn [Kere] much less sharp 
that what Heidegger himself may have believed. And while it is true that the avenue I am 
proposing has not been pursued directly by Heidegger, what this dissertation aims at 
demonstrating is that a positive answer to the question of Being is possible within the context 
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of Being and Time and indeed it is entirely achievable within a strict Heideggerian 
framework. 
 
Let us start by saying that, within Being and Time, I am aware of a few reasons why Being is 
not Dasein. Firstly, Being is not an entity, unlike Dasein which is so, albeit an ontological 
entity. Secondly, in the Call of Conscience, Being -at least the Being of Dasein- is disclosed 
to Dasein as null through and through.
319
 This obviously does not mean that Dasein is itself 
nothing but that its Being is nothing, i.e. not-a-thing; indeed, strictly speaking, it is incorrect 
to say that ‘Being is...’. This does not imply that Being has simply vanished into non-being -a 
contradiction in terms. Rather, Being is nothing because is not-a-thing-in-the-World, unlike 
Dasein who is and cannot not be-in-the-World. 
 
Thirdly, I have mentioned already that, for Heidegger, the meaning of Dasein’s Being, i.e. 
temporality, constitutes the condition of possibility for Dasein to be the entity it is. As a 
consequence, in the course of this dissertation I have established that Dasein is, existentially, 
a finite entity, a fact which is disclosed in the Call in terms of Dasein’s ‘Being-guilty’. Being-
guilty means that, in spite of Dasein’s obligation to take up its own basis, that very basis lies 
fundamentally outside Dasein’s power, for it has not been authored by Dasein itself. But now, 
if the condition of possibility of Dasein’s Being itself, i.e. its ‘Basis’, is the meaning of its 
own Being, i.e. temporality, and given that the meaning of something is that very something 
as it enters the intelligibility of Dasein, then we infer that the null basis of Dasein is Dasein’s 
very Being, insofar as it is disclosed understandingly by Dasein. From this I gather that Being 
itself must, in some sense, fall outside Dasein’s power, or, which is to say the same, is 
external, transcendental, or beyond Dasein. 
 
Having now provided an exhaustive summary of the negative characterisation of Being 
contained within the pages of Being and Time, let us turn to the more arduous task of 
providing a positive characterization of the alterity of Dasein’s Being. While the unfinished 
nature of the book seems to warn against attempting such a feat, we learn from Being and 
Time that “‘Nullity’ does not signify anything like not-Being-present-at-hand or not-
subsisting; what one has in view here is rather a "not" which is constitutive for this Being of 
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Dasein…”320 A few years later, Heidegger will expand on this point when, in What is 
Metaphysics?, he will argue that the topic of metaphysics is this very nothing, i.e. Being.
321
 
Hence, there has to be a positive way in which Heidegger may be able to hint to the alterity of 
Being. Certainly, this cannot mean that Being and Time can provide a positive 
characterization of Being in general. This is indeed not the task of the published divisions of 
Being and Time -even though as von Herrmann points out in his book Heideggers 
“Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie”,322 it may be possible to partially reconstruct 
Heidegger’s general position concerning the missing divisions. However, within the 
framework of Being and Time, I may still be able to provide a positive characterization of 
Dasein’s Being in its alterity. 
 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I have characterised the Being of Dasein as Care. As 
reaffirmed in the present section, this term names nothing other than Dasein’s fundamental 
Being, which consists in that this very Being is constantly an issue for Dasein itself. As Care, 
Dasein is constantly projected transcendentally, that is, beyond itself and towards its Being, 
as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. I have explained how this implies the fact that Dasein’s 
Being consists in entraining a fundamental relation to that Being which Dasein itself is, and 
towards-which is projected beyond itself. This fundamental relation is initially named by 
Heidegger ‘understanding-of-Being’. The relation between Dasein’s projectedness and 
understanding-of-Being is confirmed by the fact that an act of understanding [Verstehen], of 
which understanding [Verständnis] is the potentiality, is defined by Heidegger as a projection 
of possibility upon the meaning of that which is projected. Hence, understanding-of-Being is 
initially characterised by Heidegger as the ground of possibility of all projections and, more 
in general, a fundamental constituent of all Disclosdeness. Yet, understanding-of-Being is 
not, so to speak, anything in-itself; rather it is an ontological structure that needs necessarily 
to be actualized every time in a particular Dasein through an act of (understanding) 
Disclosedness.
323
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The point is that, Dasein, in order to be a Dasein, has to entertain a relation to its Being, and 
to Being in general, not only ‘potentially’, but through a concrete projectedness beyond... and 
towards..., which is carried out in a concrete disclosedness, which is constituted by concrete 
moods and concrete acts of understanding, as well as a concrete falling and a concrete call-
out-from this fallenness. If such a concrete Disclosedness has to be carried out, there has to 
be a meaning which any of Dasein’s acts of understanding may be ‘upon’. As previously 
argued, temporality is the meaning of Care, and as such is both the ground of Dasein’s taking 
issue with its Being and the way in which that very Being enters into an understanding 
relation with Dasein. In other words, Dasein, in order to be what it is, has to constantly 
project itself beyond itself and towards its Being; that is, it has to entertain an understanding 
relation with its Being through a concrete act of understanding of Being. By means of this 
projection, Dasein’s Being is disclosed as that temporality which constitutes the ground of all 
understandingly disclosive projections. Dasein’s Being resides, therefore, in a relation with 
its (finite) temporality, which Dasein discovers by responding to the Call of Conscience and 
anticipating its end, i.e. its death. Indeed, Dasein’s Being is disclosed in terms of Dasein’s 
temporality, and as Dasein’s temporality. 
 
Now, if my discussion thus far is correct, there should be no contradiction in affirming that 
Dasein’s Being, which Heidegger defines as Care, consists fundamentally in that Being 
which is constantly at stake for Dasein. This very phenomenon has been explained in terms of 
Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-a whole; and of this potentiality I have said that it can never 
be attained until Dasein’s end, that is until Dasein ‘is’ no longer. This however poses another 
problem, namely, whether one can affirm without contradiction that Dasein, in resolute 
anticipation, may be a whole. For how can the alterity of what lies beyond Dasein be, in some 
way, attained by Dasein? As we have seen with both Levinas and Heidegger, this is possible 
only if one maintains that the way in which Dasein’s Time unfolds is different from the 
simple flow of ‘nows’ that is traditionally used to characterise the phenomenon of time. 
Indeed, the fact that Dasein is existentially in an understanding relation to its Being, i.e. 
understating-of-Being, whether ontologically or pre-ontologically, implies that it is possible 
for Dasein to positively disclose that very Being. Through this Disclosedness, Dasein projects 
itself towards its being-a-whole, even though this consists in that the totality of Dasein’s 
being is, in its Being, constantly unsettled and never whole. Yet, Dasein gains a hint of its 
wholeness by means of the relationship which it entertains with its being. For wholeness here 
does not mean ‘completeness’, as if Dasein may be an all-encompassing, self-enclosed 
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system, but ‘finitude’, which is disclosed when Dasein resolutely stares into its nothing and 
takes up that ultimate event which is its death. 
 
Nonetheless, if it is possible for Dasein to disclose its finitude, there must also be a way in 
which Dasein may entertain a relationship with that which Dasein itself is constantly ‘not’. 
This way is what Heidegger calls authentic Disclosedness or anticipatory resoluteness, which 
is possible only because in disclosing its Being, Dasein finds the meaning of that very Being, 
namely, its temporality; the latter is Being itself as it is disclosed by Dasein to itself in 
intelligibility. Is temporality therefore a positive way in which Dasein’s Being can 
characterized by Dasein to itself? While this is certainly true, it implies that the phenomenon 
of temporality, like Being, can also be characterised in terms of alterity. This implies that 
temporality is also a positive way in which the alterity of Dasein’s Being may be understood 
or, more generally, disclosed to Dasein. 
 
As I have previously argued in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, temporality is not an ever-
changing flow which requires a substantial self to travel through it; rather, it itself constitutes 
that unity which is proper of Dasein in its Being. This unity is what allows Dasein to grasp 
itself as a whole, that is, what allows anticipatory resoluteness. This in turn is what makes 
Dasein able to entertain a relation with something that Dasein, ontically, is not, at any point 
in time. Hence, temporality constitutes the way in which the alterity of Dasein’s Being enters 
into Dasein’s intelligibility. More than that, Dasein’s temporality is what grounds the 
possibility of the Call of Conscience, insofar as its unitary structure makes it possible for 
Dasein to: first, to be kairotically opened to the beyond from which the Call comes, in the 
present of its fallen state; second, to take responsibility for its Being as having-been (null 
through and through, i.e. guilty) by responding to the call itself; and third, be able to futurally 
anticipate its own death by ‘resolving’ itself unto it. This does not mean, as Heidegger 
remarks, that Dasein wants to bring about its own demise. Indeed, it should be clear by now 
that by death Heidegger does not refer to a moment of Dasein’s life, or even an event outside 
of it. Rather, Death consists in nothing else but the revelation of the fundamental finitude 
which characterizes Dasein’s Being and which is disclosed in the unity of Dasein’s finite 
temporality. For this, Death is not ‘something’ that Dasein will be ‘sometime’, but the 
fundamental and unitary character of Dasein’s Being which I have called finitude.  Hence by 
anticipating its own death, that is, by taking responsibility for its own finitude, Dasein 
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discloses its Being ontologically and ‘is’ its-Self, in spite of the fact that, ontically, as it is 
always still outstanding, Dasein is never wholly its-Self. 
 
Finally, it is by understanding temporality as the unitary structure of Dasein’s Being, that 
Heidegger can argue that Dasein may effectively relate to the something which, at all times, 
is beyond itself and yet determines its-Self in that existential potentiality-for-Being which 
characterizes the Being of Dasein as an issue for it, i.e. Care. In other words, it is through the 
unity of temporality that Dasein can paradoxically relate to its Being in its fundamental 
alterity. 
Yet any careful reader of Levinas would remark that if temporality is interpreted as that 
common unitary ground which allows Being to be anticipatingly included within the horizon 
of Dasein’s Disclosedness, then the relation between Dasein and its Other, i.e. its Being, 
would not be what Levians calls a relation with a primordially absolute, etymologically 
understood, alterity. If temporality constitutes nothing but the common plane between Dasein 
and Being, then Levinas can rightly complain that: 
 
Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the 
same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of 
being.
324
 
 
Certainly, it is possible to read Heidegger in this way. Yet, if one wants to argue that Being, 
at least in the sense of the Being of Dasein, can be characterized in terms of that radical 
alterity that Levinas names ‘the Other’, one cannot maintain that temporality is merely the 
ground of understanding-of-Being. Nevertheless one cannot simply reject Levinas’ most 
important characteristics of the notion of alterity, insofar as these are supposed to help in 
clarifying: 1) why for anything to be discovered or disclosed, Dasein must always already 
entertain a relation of Disclosedness with its Being; and 2) why this relation of Disclosedness 
is essentially the response of Dasein to the Call of its own Death through which its Being is 
manifest in terms of finite temporality. In order to do this, I must explain in what sense 
temporality grounds the relationship between Dasein and its Other without being external to 
this relationship itself. The answer however is relatively straightforward if one pays attention 
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to Heidegger’s definition of the term ‘meaning’. In §32, a section that in this dissertation we 
have returned to again and again, Heidegger says: 
 
When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein -that is, 
when they have come to be understood- we say that they have meaning [Sinn]. But 
that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or 
alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verstandlichkeit] of 
something maintains itself. …Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property 
attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate 
domain'. Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world 
can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. … And if we are 
inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation does not then become a 
"deep" one, nor does it puzzle out what stands behind Being. It asks about Being itself 
in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. The meaning of Being can 
never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 'ground' which gives entities 
support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the 
abyss of meaninglessness.
325
 
 
By extension I may say that, temporality is not a property of Dasein, something ‘in between’ 
Dasein and its Being or, with Levinas, a middle and neutral term that ensures the 
comprehension of being. When Dasein authentically discloses its Being in anticipatory 
resoluteness, and can therefore ‘be its-Self’, what is disclosed is in fact Dasein’s Being; yet 
the way in which this Being is disclosed is ‘as’ temporality. This is to say that, when Dasein, 
by facing its finitude, discloses its-Self in its Being as the unity of its possibility, that is, as a 
potentiality-for-being-a-whole, what is disclosed amounts to its Being, i.e. Care, in that which 
renders it possible, i.e. the unitary structure of temporality. 
 
Nonetheless,  “[t]he meaning of Being can never be contrasted… with Being as the 'ground' 
which gives entities support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning…”326 For the 
meaning of something, according to Heidegger, is not another entity, separate from the 
something itself, but the entity itself as it is apprehended ontologically, namely, in its Being, 
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by Dasein. Similarly, temporality is not substantially distinct from Care but Care itself in its 
apprehension, or better, in its relation of Disclosedness to Dasein. Heidegger confirms this 
when he states: 
 
The meaning of Dasein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and 
'outside of' itself, but is the self-understanding of Dasein itself.
327
 
 
Indeed what is specific about the meaning of Dasein’s Being is not that it is ‘any meaning’ 
but the meaning of the Being of that entity which asks the question about Being -about its 
own Being. And the peculiarity lies in that the meaning of the entity which asks about that 
meaning cannot be apprehended or known as entities are known or apprehended; indeed, to 
disclose the meaning of the entity whose Being is that of inquiring about its own meaning 
consists in letting that entity ‘be its own Being’. This meaning is therefore not something that 
can be disclosed once and for all; rather it manifests itself in the existence of the entity whose 
being is to enquire about that meaning. 
 
If one applies this reasoning explicitly to the concept of temporality, this means that 
temporality itself is fully disclosed only in the totality of Dasein’s existence. This is to say: 
temporality is disclosed through Dasein’s very existence as the unity of that existence; and 
that unity is that anticipating-projecting potentiality-to-be-a-whole that I have called Care, 
and that is nothing else but the Being of Dasein. As Temporality ‘is’ Dasein’s Being in the 
way that it enters the intelligibility of Dasein, it temporalizes itself as Dasein. Hence, 
ontically, there is no difference between Dasein’s Care and its temporality, insofar as Care is 
possible only as Dasein’s Being is finite, and can be positively disclosed to Dasein only in 
terms of finitude. And since the finite temporality in which Care is disclosed to Dasein is 
nothing but that nullity which Care is through and through, one can finally begin to see that 
temporality itself is an alterity, just as much as Care is alterity. 
 
Indeed, temporality is not something within which Dasein is, but something Dasein ‘is’ in its 
Being. Yet it is something that is constantly beyond Dasein: this is clear if one considers the 
way temporality temporalizes itself in the different ecstasies, that is, in the concreteness of 
Dasein’s existence. That is, in the past Dasein is thrown from beyond itself towards itself, 
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that is towards its existential potentiality-for-Being which is always outstanding, since in the 
present Dasein is either fallen away from itself or thrust in an anticipatory resoluteness of 
itself as an entity which is constantly unsettled. However, since it is the totality of the 
ecstasies which constitute the unity of temporality, then Dasein can be its-Self, not as a static 
or substantial identity which remains constant through continuous change, but as ‘being a 
constant unsettledness’ and being thus wholly at any moment. In that, Dasein is its-Self, that 
is, it entertains a primordial relation with the alterity of what it is, i.e. its Being. 
I may argue, therefore, that temporality is the ‘way of being’ of that relation between Being 
and Dasein which I have called Disclosedness, for it is as temporality that Dasein’s Being is 
understandingly disclosed to Dasein, i.e. in the possibility to respond/’take respons-ability’ 
for its constant unsettledness.  Hence, temporality is what calls Dasein beyond itself to itself, 
by allowing Dasein to transcend itself towards its-Self. But what is transcendent is 
temporality and not Dasein. Hence, temporality is constantly transcendent, external, beyond, 
other than... Dasein. This is because temporality can never temporalize itself wholly in 
Dasein’s existence, except through the impossibility of that existence. Similarly, Dasein’s 
Being is transcendent, external, beyond, other than… Dasein, insofar as Dasein is never its 
totality-of-Being except in its potentiality for Being-its-self, a potentiality which is never 
resolved within Dasein’s existence, but whose resolution constitutes the fundamental 
meaning of Dasein’s existence, a meaning which can be taken up at any moment by Dasein 
through responding to the call of Being that projects Dasein towards its own Self, that is, 
towards the unsettled finitude which gives meaning to the finite totality of Dasein’s existence. 
But now, if I define temporality as the relation of alterity that Dasein has with its Being, am I 
not equating temporality with understanding Disclosedness? Certainly not. Rather, 
temporality is the way in which Dasein relates to the fundamental relation that is the 
Disclosdendess of its Being. In other words, the way the ground of the relationship of 
Disclosedness that Dasein entertains with its Being is itself disclosed to Dasein in terms of 
the meaning of its Being, the meaning of Care, that is to say, in terms of temporality. 
 
 
iv. The Relation between Dasein and its Being: Disclosedness 
 
As I have explained earlier in this dissertation, in her book Heidegger, Language and World 
Disclosure Cristina Lafont writes that Heidegger substitutes a philosophy of perception for a 
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philosophy of understanding.
328
 Hence, the way in which entities are manifested to Dasein 
does not depend, as with Kant, on the way in which they are given to perception, but 
according to the way these are understood in their Being. Through this shift, Lafont argues, 
Heidegger reformulates epistemology in terms of hermeneutics, where entities are understood 
[verstehen] rather than known [erkennen].
329
 Lafont’s considerations are consistent with the 
term Heidegger uses in the early sections of Division One of Being and Time to indicate the 
foundational relation of Dasein with its Being, i.e. understanding-of-Being [Seins-
Verständnis]. 
 
At the outset of this dissertation I have indicated understanding-of-Being to be the ground of 
Disclosedness, where by this I meant that no Disclosedness, either of Dasein’s world or of its 
Being, is possible without a certain pre-ontological openness of Dasein to its Being. This 
point is well summarized by Levinas in his essay God, Death and Time when he states: 
 
...the verb ‘to be’ is comprehended by men before any explicit ontology. It is 
comprehended preontologically, and thus without a full understanding but, on the 
contrary, with the subsistence of a question. In the preontological comprehension of 
being, there is the question itself of being, which is therefore a question possessing a 
pre-response.
330
 
 
Nevertheless, after having studied more thoroughly the analysis of Disclosedness developed 
by Heidegger in §§28-38, the reader has become aware of the equiprimordiality of an act of 
understanding with the other three constituents of Disclosedness, namely, Disposition, 
Discourse and Falling. In other words, when something is understood by Dasein, this 
understanding gives itself always together with the other three constituents of Disclosedness. 
This means that, whenever something is understood it is also, and at the same time, disclosed 
in its Being. This point needs to be stressed: understanding is possible only as Disclosedness. 
Hence, Dasein’s understanding of Being, even if only pre-ontological, must be accompanied 
by Disposition, Discourse and Falling. In other words, an understanding-of-Being cannot be 
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an isolated phenomenon, but it is possible only within that constituted whole that I have 
named Disclosedness of Being [Seinserschlossenheit]. 
 
This last point may appear to undermine the central tenet of this dissertation, namely that 
understanding-of-Being grounds Disclosedness. However, so long as one correctly interprets 
Heidegger’s use of the term understanding-of-Beings, this contradiction is only apparent. 
Indeed, I have mentioned more than once that by understanding-of-Beings I take Heidegger 
to refer to that fundamental relation between Dasein and its Being, a relation that must be in 
place if Dasein is able to disclose its Being and its World, as well as discovering entities 
within that world. Most notably, Heidegger analyses the anatomy of this relationship in his 
discussion concerning the authentic Disclosedness of Dasein’s Being. This disclosing 
relationship takes place in the silent discourse that is the Call of conscience, which calls 
Dasein out of its fallenness to the anticipating authenticity of its finitude and is heard by 
Dasein insofar as it finds itself in the disclosing mood of Anxiety. As such, the composite 
interdependency of the constituting elements of authentic Disclosedness should be a clear 
indication of the complexity of the relation between Dasein and its Being; this strongly 
suggests that ‘understanding-of-Being’ is for Heidegger only a temporary term to indicate 
this fundamental relation, as this is clearly more than a simple understanding of Being. 
Indeed, if the Call of Conscience and the response which follows, i.e. Dasein’s Anticipatory 
Resoluteness, represent the fundamental way in which the relationship between Dasein and 
its Being is enacted, then I may have some ground to disagree with Lafont’s hermeneutic 
interpretation of Being and Time. This is not to say that the philosophy of Being and Time is 
not concerned with Dasein’s understanding-of-Being. For the ultimate goal of Being and 
Time is that of developing a fundamental ontology, which is to say, a philosophy of the way 
in which Being is understood. Indeed, there are numerous places in the text where Heidegger 
stresses the importance of the notion of understanding, the analysis of which is vital to the 
development of the concept of hermeneutical projection seen in §32 and is thus 
fundamentally connected with Dasein’s possibilities and its temporality. In addition, the 
centrality of understanding within the Heideggerian project is also consistent with a more 
phenomenological interpretation of Being and Time, such as the one developed by Crowell 
and discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
In spite of this, I wish to argue that the full development of the analysis of Dasein in its 
authenticity, which I have considered in the preceding sections, brings about a fundamental 
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advancement of Heidegger’s understanding concerning the nature of the relation between 
Dasein and its Being. This is because, if one takes seriously Heidegger’s discussion on 
Dasein’s authentic Disclosedness of its Being, it becomes clear that Dasein cannot merely 
‘understands’ its Being. For  whenever Dasein ‘understands’ its Being, whether pre-
ontologically or authentically, it has to have been already called by it through the silent 
discourse that allows Dasein’s Being to affect Dasein itself in terms of Anxiety -a call that 
Dasein can either respond to or ignore. In other words, I am suggesting here that Heidegger’s 
notion of understanding-of-Being should be revised in the light of Heidegger’s study of 
Dasein’s authenticity.331 Such an exegesis is based on two assumptions: first, that Dasein’s 
authentic being its-Self is fundamentally a phenomenon of Disclosedness, specifically, a 
Disclosedness of Dasein’s own Being. This supposition is easily confirmed by tracing down 
the phenomena of Anxiety, Call and Anticipatory Resoluteness to the general constitution of 
Disclosedness. Second, that, for the purpose of an accurate description of Dasein’s relation to 
Being, i.e. ontology, it is legitimate to consider the analysis of Dasein’s authentic 
Disclosedness as an advancement over the everyday average Disclosedness afforded by das 
Man. This latter point is in direct opposition to a certain stream in the Anglo-American 
interpretation of Heidegger often, but not always, connected with Dreyfus’ interpretation of 
Being and Time. This is because in championing a non-representational model of 
consciousness, Dreyfus over-emphasizes the importance of das Man, so much so that he ends 
up interpreting das Man itself as the horizon of all possible Disclosedness, including that of 
Being itself. I must say, in Dreyfus’ defence, that Heidegger himself is not entirely clear on 
this matter; hence, a further explanation is needed at this point. In support of his reading of 
the concept of das Man, Dreyfus quotes §27 of Being and Time in which Heidegger states: 
 
Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, 
a condition that has been detached from the ‘they’; it is rather an existentiell 
modification of the ‘they’- of the ‘they’ as an essential existential.332 
 
The reader must remember that by ‘existentiell’ Heidegger means a character of Dasein 
which may or may not be fulfilled by a concrete Dasein, that is in its meineness 
                                                 
331This is what Levinas wishes to do, while ignoring Heidegger’s attempts to do so as well. This is because, 
Levinas, like Lafont, interprets Heidegger’s text as mostly concerned with Dasein understanding-of-Being rather 
than its Disclosedness. 
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
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[jemeinigkeit]. But Dreyfus also notes a contradiction within the text when in §64 Heidegger 
affirms: 
 
It has been shown that proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself but is lost 
in the they-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self.
333
 
 
The apparent contradiction of these two passages has been partially unravelled by Charles de 
Guignon in his paper Heidegger’s Authenticity Revisited.334 Guignon’s strategy consists in 
distinguishing between das Man and the one-self, as well as between the authentic self (i.e. 
its-Self) and authentic Being-one-self.
335
 According to Guignon, while authentic Being-
one’s-self [eigentlichen Selbstein] is an existentiell modification of das Man, the one-self 
[Man-Selbst] is, on the other hand, an existentiell modification of the authentic self 
[eigentlichen Selbst]. Despite the fact that Guignon’s argument may strike the reader as a 
clever piece of scholastic trickery, the position which can be inferred from this distinction is 
one that Heidegger’s argument fundamentally requires. Let us proceed cautiously. 
 
Heidegger explicitly rejects a hierarchy between existentiell and existential phenomena, as 
well as between authenticity and inauthenticity. Authentic and inauthentic phenomena are, 
according to Heidegger, existentiell modifications of the Disclosedness of a particular 
Dasein, rather than existential characters of the structure of Dasein in general. The former are 
not less important than the latter but they are of a different order; that is, the latter are the 
ontic enactment of ontological phenomena within the concrete existence of a particular 
Dasein, while the former constitutes the general ontological structure which makes Dasein 
what it is. Now, Heidegger explicitly names das Man among the existentials of Dasein, for 
reasons which I have considered in the previous chapters of this dissertation. This implies 
that it is not possible for Dasein not to be within the general Disclosedness of das Man. 
Hence, das Man can be, strictly speaking, neither inauthentic nor authentic. 
 
On the other hand, if Guignon’s distinction can really save Heidegger from a patent 
contradiction, the same argument must apply to the concept of authentic self, of which the 
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one-self is said to be an existentiell modification. Nevertheless, is it correct to argue that the 
authentic self is an existential of Dasein, hence, neither authentic nor inauthentic? 
Heidegger’s choice of words does not really help, since, by definition, what is either 
authentic or inauthentic is existentiell and not existential. However, if this exegesis is not a 
mere exercise of logic, I may attempt to run a looser argument which will hopefully help to 
go beyond the superficially contradictory nature of Heidegger’s statements, in order to 
understand his deep intentions. 
 
In this sense, Dreyfus is certainly right in pointing out that, in and through das Man, Dasein 
entertains a certain relation of Disclosedness with its Being. This is constituted by Dasein’s 
falling away from its own Self and its Being, which becomes hidden, and towards the world 
of intraworldly entities with which Dasein is fascinated. While Being itself, and therefore 
Dasein’s own Being, remains hidden, in Falling Dasein still maintains a fundamental ‘insight 
of Being’, through the Being of intraworldly entities. This ‘insight of Being’, which indicates 
a fundamental relation between Dasein and its Being, is what Heidegger calls, using perhaps 
a misleading term, pre-ontological understanding-of-Being. However, if my discussion thus 
far is correct, this pre-ontological understanding-of-Being is nothing other than an instance, 
albeit a negative instance, of that phenomenon which I have called Disclosedness of Being. 
Does this mean, therefore, that through das Man a certain Disclosedness of being is achieved? 
Certainly. Although I must be clear that this is essentially negative, i.e. hiddenness. Yet this 
hiddenness is a fundamental step of any authentic Disclosedness, as it is only from das Man 
that Dasein can be called. The fact that das Man is a way in which Being is disclosed to 
Dasein may be confirmed by and explain the inclusion of Falling among the constituents of 
Disclosedness. For how can Dasein ‘flee’ from its Being and ‘hide’ from it if it has not been 
already called? By the same token, however, how can the Call take effect if it does not call 
Dasein from das Man? The analysis of the phenomenon of the Call which I have carried out 
in the previous chapter has confirmed that the phenomenon of das Man is connatural to the 
Call of Consciousness; for the Call always calls Dasein from its falleness within das Man. In 
other words, for a Call to be possible, Dasein must be lost there where the Call may call it 
from. On the other hand, the hiddenness of Being and the fallenness away from itself, which 
Heidegger uses to characterize the fallen state of Dasein within das Man, appear to 
intrinsically require Dasein to have been already called to what it hides and falls away from.  
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Let us remind the reader that my concern here is not so much with the status of das Man per 
se, but with its standing within the context of my discussion about the grounding nature of the 
Disclosedness of Being, as well as with the justification of the ontological primacy of 
authentic Disclosedness over inauthentic Disclosedness. Therefore, in order not to reduce 
Heidegger’s argument to one of circularity, the reader must recall at this point the role that 
Falling plays in the general constitution of Disclosedness. 
 
I have mentioned already that all the constituents of Disclosedness are equiprimordial. This 
means that, while it may be possible to analyse each of these singularly, it is actually 
impossible to prioritize any of them in respect to their unitary constitution. This fact also 
implies that Disclosedness is given always and solely as constituted by the totality of its 
constituents; hence it is not possible to eliminate one of them without also getting rid of 
Disclosedness tout court. As a consequence, given the existential status of Disclosedness, one 
must take Heidegger not to be saying that Falling, and for that matter das Man, are 
inauthentic phenomena; for, as a constituent of Disclosedness, Falling does itself enjoy 
existential status, which means it can be neither authentic nor inauthentic. Rather, what is 
authentic or inauthentic is the Self that a concrete Dasein becomes once it chooses either to 
follow or to reject the Call. In this sense, any concrete Dasein must be both fallen and called 
at once, if it may entertain that fundamental relation of Disclosedness with its Being which 
makes of it what it is. For there simply cannot be any Disclosedness except as a call from the 
fallenness of Das Man. Nonetheless, it is also true that there cannot be any fallenness unless 
as a turning away from a call of Dasein to the authentic Disclosedness of its Being. These 
two facts are, so to speak, equiprimordially intertwined. Hence it is neither authentic nor 
inauthentic Disclosedness which grounds Dasein’s possibility of Disclosedness in general, 
but rather Disclosedness in the totality of its constituents. This is why, if what I have argued 
so far is correct, it is possible to redefine the relation between Dasein and its Being no longer 
as a mere understanding-of-Being but, rather, in terms of a phenomenon of Disclosedness, 
specifically, Disclosedness of Being. 
 
Yet why should one take the analysis of authentic Disclosedness as the model of the relation 
between Dasein and its Being? Why should it hold any ontological priority over the 
Disclosedness which, as I have shown, belongs to Dasein in its fallenness within das Man? 
The answer is simple: through an analysis of authentic Disclosedness one can understand 
more openly the structure of the relation between Dasein and its Being than it is possible in 
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the hiddenness of Das Man, where this very relation is constantly covered over and forgotten 
in favour of Dasein’s fascination with intraworldly entities. Nevertheless, the last point is 
correct only insofar as it is not taken to mean that Falling and das Man are irrelevant to the 
relation of Disclosedness that Dasein entertains with its Being; indeed I have demonstrated 
that both are fundamental elements of the Disclosedness of Dasein, for it is only as a call 
from its fallenness within das Man that Being can be disclosed to a concrete Dasein. Hence 
neither Falling nor the Call are in themselves authentic or inauthentic: what is either authentic 
or inauthentic is Dasein’s concrete response/lack-of-response to the Call from its fallenness. 
This response, which Raffoul calls ‘responsibility’, or the lack of this response that consists 
in ‘fleeing in the face of...’, is what distinguishes the authentic self (its-Self)336 from the one-
self, which are respectively authentic and inauthentic. 
 
Keeping this in mind, we can turn to §§ 54-60, in which Heidegger tracks back the structure 
of Anticipatory Resoluteness (in terms of Anxiety, Being-Guilty and Call, together with the 
fallenness of the ‘failing to hear’)337 to the constituents of Disclosedness in general. If I am 
correct, this should provide a description of the fundamental relation between Dasein and its 
Being which I have defined as a relation of radical alterity. Let us begin with a passage from 
§60 in which Heidegger summarises these points clearly: 
 
The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by 
anxiety as a state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one’s 
ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic 
disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by conscience –this reticent self-
projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety- we 
call ‘resoluteness’.338 
 
In Resoluteness Dasein discloses its Being to itself, as it is called to resolve itself over its 
ownmost possibility which is, paradoxically, the end of its Being, and which is marked by the 
impossibility of Dasein’s existence. Through resoluteness Dasein takes up its own Being by 
taking up its own finitude. This finitude is understood as Being Guilty, as the latter is nothing 
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but authentic understanding in which Dasein’s Being is projected understandingly by Dasein 
itself as the null basis of the totality of Dasein’s finite temporality, by which the ‘jetting’ of 
the pro-ject is determined. In other words, Dasein’s Being Guilty is nothing else but authentic 
understanding-of-Being, in which Dasein’s Being is understood as the null limit of Dasein’s 
wholeness. In it the Being of Dasein is disclosed to Dasein authentically, from which both the 
world is disclosed and intraworldly entities are discovered. 
Nonetheless, it has already been established that understanding is not something which is 
ever actually disconnected from the other constituents of Disclosedness. Hence, if Being 
Guilty constitutes an authentic understanding of Being, it must also always be accompanied 
by Disposition, Discourse and Falling. From the passage cited above, we can determine that 
Anxiety is the authentic mood which accompanies the understanding of Being Guilty, and 
that that reticence, which is nothing other than the silence of the Call, is the discourse through 
which authentic Disclosedness is articulated. In addition, I have demonstrated that the call 
itself requires Falling from which Dasein may be called from, and towards which Dasein may 
flee, so that Falling has to also be included in the structure of authentic Disclosedness. From 
this, it becomes evident that insofar as Dasein’s authentic relation to its Being is constituted 
authentically -not only in terms of the understanding of Being Guilty but also by Anxiety, a 
kind of Disposition, the Call, a kind of Discourse, as well as the fallenness required by the 
Call- then this relation cannot be a mere understanding of Being but must be taken in a wider 
sense as authentic Disclosedness of Being. As I have previously hinted, this is what 
Heidegger refers to as Authentic Resoluteness. 
 
We are now faced with a final problem: how can Disclosedness be interpreted in terms of a 
relation to a radical alterity? In other words, can Levinas help us to confirm the legitimacy of 
the shift I am proposing from understanding-of-Being to Disclosedness of Being?  
Yet there seems to be nothing more contradictory than to call Disclosedness that relation 
between Dasein and its Being which I have interpreted as a relation with a radical alterity. 
This would seem the case especially if one takes the relation between Dasein and Being as a 
full manifestation of Being to Dasein. The Other, for Levinas, can never be fully manifest, 
fully transparent, lest not to maintain the fundamental distance which grants the irreducibility 
of the Other to the totality of the Same. 
 
This objection provides me an opportunity to clarify a few points concerning Disclosedness. 
First, Disclosedness does not mean transparency. Indeed this is often discussed together with 
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A-letheia,
339
 a word which, according to Heidegger, underlines the constant presence of 
hiddenness in any phenomenon of manifestation. Disclosedness is, in this sense, a 
fundamental relation of response, or a failing-to-hear of what is transcendent; that is to say, 
ultimately, Being. Yet, Being itself, even in authentic Disclosedness, remains inevitably 
beyond that Disclosedness itself by grounding it. While Dasein may take up the ground of 
this Disclosedness, i.e. Being, this is not to say that Dasein can make Being transparent. 
Rather, in responding to the call issued by its Being, what comes to be manifested is nothing 
but the fundamental finitude of temporality which is the meaning of Dasein’s Being, and in 
terms of which Dasein’s explicit relation with this Being is carried out. 
 
In addition, this helps me to clarify why I should consider the phenomenon of Disclosedness 
as essentially a relational phenomenon. Indeed, as it is made especially clear in the analysis 
of authentic Disclosedness, Disclosedness in general is not the result of an effort made by 
Dasein, nor the effect of a supernatural cause. Rather, it consists in a spontaneous engagement 
which engenders that freedom to be its-Self which Heidegger calls ‘responsibility’. The latter 
is, like for Levinas, asymmetrical, for only he who is called can respond. The caller and the 
called never coincide, and respons-ability is only a response of he who is called, i.e. Dasein, 
so that the one is not collapsed into the other. Rather, through its response –which may also 
consist in ‘avoiding to respond’-, Dasein establishes a relation with its Being. Such a relation, 
once again, is possible only thanks to the unitary nature of finite temporality, which 
guarantees Dasein both the nearness of its resoluteness for ‘possibility’, as well as the 
distance of its transcendent null basis, i.e. its Guilt.
340
 
 
In this sense, one cannot simply interpret the phenomenon of Disclosedness of Being as the 
momentary ‘enlightenment’ of Dasein in a vision of truth about its Being, as perhaps the 
analysis of Anticipatory Resoluteness may seem at times to suggest. The ‘Augenblick’ which 
refers to the crucial ‘moment’ in which the event of Disclosedness is carried out authentically 
through the resoluteness of a concrete Dasein, is not a ‘point in time’, but a kairological 
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instant in which the totality of temporality is present. Yet Disclosedness is there all along in 
the totality of temporality, albeit often hidden in the fallenness of das Man. By the same 
token, Disclosedness must not be reduced to the authentic manifestation which happens 
through the Call of Consciousness; the latter is only one aspect of Dasein’s disclosive relation 
with its Being. Rather, since Dasein is what it is only insofar as its Being is constantly at 
stake, then the Disclosedness of Being must be interpreted as an ongoing process in which 
Dasein is itself by existing finitely. This point is crucial and needs to be stressed further: the 
fact that Dasein ‘is’ only in terms of a constant relation to its Being as possibility, that is, as 
constantly transcending/beyond Dasein itself, implies that the relation that I have called 
Disclosedness of Being is the constant Disclosedness of Dasein’s finitude. This is engendered 
either authentically, by responding to the beyond in which this finitude has its external limit, 
or inauthentically, by denying this finitude and fleeing within the all-encompassing 
totalitarian language of das Man. In this sense, the Disclosedness of Dasein’s finitude is the 
Disclosedness –or the hiddenness- of that Being which is ‘on the other side of its finitude’, 
the relation with whose nullity grounds Dasein’s finitude itself. This fact clarifies why 
temporality is the meaning of Dasein’s Being, i.e. what is manifested to Dasein when its 
Being is disclosed. For temporality, which is the unitary structure that allows Dasein to relate 
to Being, is in turn Dasein’s finitude itself, that is, the unitary wholeness that can only be 
appropriated in anticipatory resoluteness, and that, on the other hand, grounds the way in 
which Dasein is its-Self or one-self. This way is nothing other than Dasein’s relation to its 
Being, that is to say, its Disclosedness of Being. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation I have attempted to provide an in-depth study of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time with the aim, first and foremost, of compiling a dependable interpretation of that text. 
This effort has been primarily guided by Heidegger’s questioning of Being, with the view of 
providing an insight regarding the disclosing character of Dasein and the disclosive relation 
between the latter and its Being. Indeed, if there is one point Heidegger is not shy to stress in 
Being and Time it is that the ability to ask the question ‘What is Being?’ requires a basic level 
of relatedness between the one who is asking the question and the object of the question 
itself. In view of this, my work has demonstrated that, for Heidegger, the fundamental 
relatedness between Dasein and Being is intrinsically disclosive, insofar as it is not possible 
for Dasein to ‘be’ without in some way manifesting its Being by taking issue with it. While it 
is likely that many scholars would not disagree with this structural point, the more 
philosophically challenging and controversial quest is what constitutes the ground of this 
Disclosedness of Being. 
 
This problem has informed my analysis of those readings of Being and Time which I have 
identified as some of the most influential within the Anglo-American tradition, and has 
proved to be a fruitful ground to assess both their merits and their shortcomings. Whereas 
Dreyfus, Lafont, and, to some degree Crowell, argue that the basis of any Disclosedness of 
Being is a certain pre-ontological understanding of Being, be it pragmatic (in terms of 
entities), hermeneutical (in terms of language) or phenomenological (in terms of meaning and 
its space), Raffoul paves the way to interpret Disclosedness in a novel way, namely, as an 
ethical relation with alterity. 
 
The detailed study of these interpretations of Heidegger’s masterwork has further afforded 
me with the opportunity to address a number of minor but interrelated issues, the solution of 
which has ultimately proved vital in responding to the question concerning the nature of the 
disclosive relation between Being and Dasein, and has additionally assisted in marking the 
path for a positive response regarding the question of Being. The constitutive structure of 
Disclosedness with its four key elements of Disposition, Understanding, Discourse and 
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Falling is recognised to be the fundamental structure which is mirrored in the articulation of 
das Man, Care, Temporality and, ultimately, Anticipatory Resoluteness. These findings, 
combined with Raffoul’s innovative approach, constitute something like a launching pad to 
broaden the discussion concerning the manifestation of Being to Dasein in terms of alterity, 
and demonstrate the intrinsic connection between the Disclosedness of Being and Dasein’s 
ontological meaning of it’s Being, i.e. Care, as finite temporality. 
 
My contention has been that a more careful study of the phenomenon of Dasein’s authentic 
Disclosedness, i.e. Anticipatory Resoluteness, is the basis from where a positive response to 
the question concerning the ground of Being’s Disclosedness to Dasein may be provided. 
Such a response engenders what I have called a relational interpretation of Being and Time, 
according to which Disclosedness consists in a relation between the entity whose Being 
depends on its Disclosedness and that ‘beyond’ which grounds Disclosedness itself. 
 
In concluding this dissertation, I will dedicate the first section of these final remarks to 
providing a summary of the shortcomings of the four interpretations previously discussed, 
stressing the necessity to address some of these issues in order to provide a firmer grounding 
for any future Heideggerian scholarship. Following this, in section ii. I will summarise my 
own interpretation and clarify the way in which it address all the shortcomings of the other 
four interpretations. Finally, in the third section of this concluding chapter, I will address any 
gaps in the interpretation I have proposed, as well as outlining some scope for future research 
which may stem from or enrich the latter. 
 
 
i. Shortcomings of the current Anglo-American interpretation of Being 
and Time and the relevance of Levinas 
 
I have argued that the unfinished nature of Heidegger’s Being and Time, coupled with 
Heidegger’s convoluted reasoning and awkward terminology, has proven to be fertile ground 
for innovative ideas as well as a number of serious misinterpretations. In this dissertation, I 
have considered four readings of Being and Time which I believe to be most representative of 
the different interpretative tendencies currently existing in the United States. In so doing, I 
have uncovered a number of inconsistencies and issues, dependent in most cases on the 
propensity to overlook the ontological primacy of Disclosedness due to the propaedeutic 
168 
 
priority of the analysis of discoveredness. This interpretational error is manifest in a general 
tendency for interpreting Heidegger’s theory in epistemological terms.  
 
This tendency is prominent in Dreyfus’ interpretation of Being and Time, and indeed I 
contend that it constitutes the foundation of his reading. While Dreyfus seems to appreciate 
the hierarchy of discoveredness and Disclosedness, his interpretation is unable to adequately 
position the phenomenon of understanding, and especially pre-ontological understanding, in 
relation to Disclosedness. In this way, Dreyfus ends up steering Heidegger’s philosophy back 
towards that epistemological framework from which it is so strenuously trying to escape. In 
so doing, Heidegger’s ontological efforts to address the question of Being are reduced to 
what Being and Time has rejected at the outset, namely, the study of Being in terms of 
entities. Dreyfus excuses himself from engaging with Division Two of Heidegger’s 
masterwork due to what he identifies as the less polished nature of the division, and because 
Heidegger’s account of originary temporality leads him too far from the phenomenon of 
everyday temporality to fit comfortably with his own approach.
341
 What I argue is that 
Dreyfus’ pragmatic/epistemological agenda prevents him from appropriately engaging with 
the analysis of authentic Disclosedness. Because of this, in an attempt to make his 
interpretation more complete, he resorts to the patch-work solution of having a former student 
sweep the issue under the rug by treating Division Two as irrelevant existentialist nonsense, 
and additionally, to piggyback off someone else’s, i.e. William Blattner’s, original research 
on temporality.
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Indeed, while the historical importance of Dreyfus’ interpretation of Being and Time is 
undeniable, the lack of appropriate engagement with the analysis of authentic Disclosedness 
blinds his reading to the significance of Disclosedness over the simple understanding of 
Being as a function of an average discoveredness of entities. This results in Dreyfus 
attempting to ground all Disclosedness in the average understanding that characterises 
Dasein’s discoveredness of entities, namely, das Man. As the latter is characterised in terms 
of a paradigmatic hiddenness and closedness, it is clear that Dreyfus’ proposition effectively 
runs counter to Heidegger’s intention of developing an explicit ontology. For the reasons 
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outlined above I have come to consider Dreyfus’ reading of Being and Time as untenable and, 
due to its widespread influence, in urgent need of response. 
 
Lafont’s hermeneutic interpretation is similarly entangled in the same tendency, albeit in a 
more subtle and nuanced way. As I have demonstrated, the flaw of Lafont’s reading is, as it is 
for Dreyfus’, primarily dependent on a lack of engagement with the second Division of Being 
and Time, and this fatally skews her interpretative focus towards Heidegger’s analysis of 
Dasein’s understanding of intraworldly entities. In turn, this has the unwelcome effect of 
interpreting Heidegger’s philosophy in open contradiction with one of its central tenets (i.e. it 
is not possible to achieve an adequate ontology by merely considering the Being of 
intraworldly entities), and against its primary aim of achieving an explicit understanding, or 
better Disclosedness, of Being, rather than merely the discoveredness of entities. Set off-
course in this way, Lafont incorrectly connects the notion of meaning with the hermeneutical 
truth concerning intraworldly entities, rather than interpreting it as the intelligible 
manifestation of Dasein’s Being to Dasein, upon which the discoveredness of entities ‘as they 
are’ ultimately depends. As a result, the concept of meaning is absolved from its role within 
the phenomenon of Disclosedness in general and is subsumed under one of Disclosedness’ 
constituents, i.e. Discourse. Through the warped lens of Lafont’s interpretation, the latter 
becomes the bearer of all possible truth concerning entities, as it pre-determines the possible 
ways in which Dasein can understand entities themselves. Certainly, I have not denied the 
merits of Lafont’s reading in recognising that this truth does not amount to the mere 
correspondence between a perception and its object, according to a pre-given schema, but is 
achieved only as entities are found always, already alongside their Dasein, pre-interpreted in 
some way. However, Lafont overlooks Heidegger’s attempts to reassess the question of truth 
in terms of that Alétheia which ultimately coincides with the Disclosedness of Being.
343
 In 
this sense, the phenomenon of Discourse, instead of being assessed within the constitutive 
structure of Disclosedness, is erroneously equated with that pre-ontological understanding-of-
Being which is nothing other than a proto-form of Disclosedness itself. Hence, I have 
demonstrated that Lafont’s hermeneutical interpretation is also victim of the same 
epistemological tendency which invalidates, or makes problematic, Dreyfus’ reading. As I 
have argued in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, in spite of some remarkable intuitions 
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concerning the hermeneutical nature of truth, understanding and discourse, this error prevents 
Lafont from engaging with the phenomenon of Disclosedness in its entirety, so that she fails 
to deliver a dependable interpretation of Heidegger’s masterwork. 
 
Despite continuing the negative trend of engaging only with Division One of Being and Time, 
Crowell’s approach presents what I believe to be a far more sophisticated reading than either 
of Dreyfus’ or Lafont’s. As I have demonstrated, by means of a careful comparison between 
Heidegger’s and Husserl’s philosophy Crowell begins to rephrase the analytic of Dasein in 
more relational terms. In this sense, Crowell’s phenomenological reading finally shows that 
the central aim of Being and Time is not merely that of achieving a firmer ground for 
objective truth, be it a pragmatic or a hermeneutical one, but that of reassessing the question 
of truth altogether. Thus the focus becomes one of overcoming the epistemological 
distinction between the subjective and the objective sphere in favour of a sphere of 
significance which underlies the relational nature of Being and of Dasein. According to 
Crowell, Heidegger achieves this aim by adopting a radicalised version of Husserl’s 
transcendental reduction, abandoning the study of entities or Being ‘in-themselves’ in order 
to pursue the primary question of Being in terms of Dasein’s intentional relation with it. 
Indeed, Heidegger’s reduction is so radical that it no longer requires being treated as a 
provisional step which may ultimately be overturned, but one that must instead be conceived 
as connatural to the way in which the human Dasein understandingly engages with its Being. 
Insofar as meaning is the way in which something is when is intelligible for Dasein,
344
 
Crowell comes to equate Being with meaning in general, as the space within which things 
become intelligible for Dasein. For the same reason, the possibility of any ontology, that is, 
the explicit Disclosedness of Being to Dasein, rests on the possibility of Being entering 
within the intelligibility of Dasein as its meaning, disclosed within the ‘space of meaning’ as 
the ground of its Disclosedness. 
 
Unlike Dreyfus’ and Lafont’s reading, Crowell’s radical interpretation of Being in terms of 
its disclosing interaction with Dasein has the merit of demonstrating that there is no conflict 
between the ontological difference and the possibility of ontology. Unfortunately, just as with 
Dreyfus and Lafont, Crowell’s unwillingness to engage with Heidegger’s more ‘mystical’ 
sections from Division Two causes him to risk reducing Being to a mere epistemological 
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grounding space. While this is certainly not the simple epistemological error of interpreting 
Heidegger’s ontology as a function of the discoveredness of entities, by equating Being and 
meaning, the phenomenological interpretation nonetheless effectively limits ontology to the 
field of intelligibility. Even admitting that Crowell is willing to expand the reference of the 
space of meaning from mere intelligibility to the entire phenomenon of Disclosedness, I have 
demonstrated the inadequacy of this approach in accounting for the terminological difference 
between the concept of ‘Being’ and that of ‘meaning’. Collapsing the two entirely risks 
irremediably confining ontology to the realm of Dasein’s own Disclosedness of Being, 
forever forfeiting the possibility of addressing the question of Being as the outside source of 
Disclosedness itself. This does not mean that Crowell’s theory is unsound: indeed the reading 
of Being and Time I have proposed in this dissertation relies heavily on the phenomenological 
relatedness between Being and Dasein championed by Crowell himself. Nevertheless, the 
risk is that, by focussing exclusively on the Disclosedness that is achievable in terms of 
meaning, the question concerning the Being of Dasein still remains partially unanswered. 
 
While the tendency to interpret the philosophy of Being and Time in epistemological terms 
has some unwelcomed consequences, and must in general be avoided, it should be noticed 
that Heidegger himself somewhat contributes to this confusion by not appropriately 
distinguishing between the concept of understanding-of-Being, especially in its pre-
ontological form, and that of Disclosedness. As I have argued in the present dissertation, 
discussing Dasein’s engagement with Being in terms of ‘understanding’ is merely 
propaedeutic and, following the discussion on the constitutive structure of Disclosedness, is 
effectively replaced with the more faceted concepts of Disclosedness of Being. However, the 
presence of a certain terminological ambiguity concerning the way in which Being and 
Dasein are related suggests Heidegger himself may not have been able to reach an entirely 
satisfying solution prior to the publication of Being and Time. Although this may partially 
excuse the epistemological tendency identified in all the interpretations I have listed above, I 
believe this does not entirely justify these readings, so that I have been forced to press 
forward in search of a more comprehensive approach to the question of Being and the source 
of its relatedness to Dasein. 
 
Raffoul’s ethical reading has proved in a certain way to be exactly such a step forward. By 
focusing his attention to the second Division of Being and Time, Raffoul draws some 
important connections between Dasein’s finitude, the Call of Conscience and the fundamental 
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nullity that Dasein discovers in the Call. From this, the concept of Dasein is reassessed in 
terms of its essential openness towards the ‘beyond’ which calls it to take up its finitude by 
manifesting its lack of a (worldly) ground. What is beyond is fundamentally ‘other’, so that 
Raffoul partially exploits the concept of alterity to overcome the notion of the autonomous 
subject in favour of a responsive Dasein whose Being lies beyond autonomy and heteronomy. 
Yet, the fact that Being lies ‘beyond’ Dasein does not entail an actual separation between the 
two outside the articulateness available as part of an event of Disclosedness. As in the case of 
Crowell, I have demonstrated that for Raffoul there are no ‘in-themselves’, but both Being 
and Dasein are bound in the relation that at once is manifest in their Disclosedness and 
renders their very Disclosedness possible. While this approach provides an elegant 
explanation as to why the Call of Conscience can be said to come “from me and yet from 
beyond me,”345 I have argued that it is practically impossible for Raffoul to avoid reducing 
Being’s alterity to a sort of dialectical effort, entirely internal to Dasein. 
 
Nevertheless, from the stand-point of the inextricable relationship between Dasein and its 
Being, Raffoul reinterprets the problem of ontology as a question concerning Dasein’s 
responsiveness to the Call of Being, rather than as the attainment of a mere ‘understanding’ 
of Being. In responding to the alterity from where the Call originates, Dasein enters into an 
explicit relation with its Being and becomes ‘responsible’ for its Disclosedness. As I have 
argued in the present dissertation, this is not to say that Dasein actively ‘determines’ its 
Being; rather, Raffoul believes that in choosing to accept its grounding finitude, Dasein 
chooses to become its-Self as it factically is. Nevertheless, facticity is only one of the 
elements of the structure of Dasein’s Being which also includes ‘existence’ and ‘falling’. 
Therefore, in this dissertation I have challenged the correctness of Raffoul’s attempt to reduce 
Dasein’s responsibility to the mere acceptance of facticity. This is not because responding to 
the call of Being does not engender such an acceptance, but because reducing the Call of 
Conscience to a call to facticity runs the risk of concealing the disclosive nature of the call 
and the anticipatory resoluteness which Dasein embraces in responding. This has provided 
me with the opportunity to go beyond Raffoul’s innovative reading and approach the question 
of Being from the standpoint of a Disclosedness of alterity. 
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In order to facilitate this task, it seemed appropriate to me to employ Levinas’ ethical 
philosophy and, especially, his discussion of ‘otherness’. In spite of it being explicitly 
opposed to Heidegger’s analysis, Levinas’ philosophy has proven to be a useful starting point 
as I have attempted to understand how Being can be at once contained within Dasein’s 
Disclosedness of it and yet fundamentally beyond Dasein. Through the comparison between 
the notion of Being and that of otherness, I have not only demonstrated the fruitfulness of the 
interpretational shift from an epistemological to a relational reading of Being and Time, but I 
have also shown that the within the confines of the text it is possible to provide a positive 
answer to the question of Being. This response has been pursued as part of what I have called 
the ‘relational reading’ of Being and Time, where I have reassessed the concept of 
understanding-of-Being in view of Heidegger’s discussion of authentic Disclosedness and the 
notions of ‘beyond’ and ‘nullity’. 
 
 
ii. Main Findings: the Relational Interpretation of Being and Time 
 
The main theoretical aim of the present dissertation has been that of establishing the nature of 
the ground of Being’s Disclosedness to Dasein. My contention is that a relational 
interpretation of Being and Time provides the best account of what this ground consist in. 
Incidentally, along this journey, a number of additional findings have emerged and proven to 
be instrumental in achieving my goal. 
 
I began by studying the general constitution of Disclosedness. Initially, I found that this 
phenomenon could be characterised in terms of the ‘there’ [Da] of Dasein, signalling the 
inalienable openness of Dasein to its own Being. This fact was referred to as Dasein’s Being-
in, namely the way in which Dasein is unable to ‘be’ except in terms of its being-within the 
openness of the World. I then proceeded to review Heidegger’s analysis of Disclosedness in 
terms of its constituents. Firstly, I considered the concept of Disposition in view of 
Heidegger’s discussion on moods. I concluded that Disposition consists in the way in which 
Dasein is affected as part of a disclosure or discovering of something. As such, I argued that 
this constituent signals Dasein’s existential thrownness, that is to say, the inevitability of its 
being-in-the-world as an ontological, i.e. disclosing, entity. Secondly, I defined the 
constituent of Understanding in terms of Dasein’s taking up its Being in its possibilities. I 
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found that the role of Understanding as a constituent of Disclosedness is that of revealing 
Dasein’s Being in terms of its potentiality-for-Being, that is to say, in terms of a projection of 
possibilities according to the meaning of Dasein’s Being. As such, I agreed that, while 
Disposition disclosed Dasein’s actuality, Understanding disclosed its possibility.346 However, 
I pointed out that it is Dasein’s being possible that is truly actual for it. 
 
Further to this, I reviewed the notion of Discourse as that which grants an event of disclosure 
with the possibility of being expressed. I argued that the possibility of expression, not to be 
confused with expression itself, does not merely signify the condition of possibility for 
linguistic utterance but, rather, consists in ‘the character of articulation’. This explained why, 
according to Heidegger, Discourse characterises [bestimmt] Disposition and Understanding, 
since in articulation Disclosedness is broken up into its different ‘voices’ [Stimmen] and can 
be analysed in terms of its equiprimordial ‘ways of Being-in’, i.e. its constituents. From this, I 
drew a distinction between the terms Discourse and Language, where the latter was defined 
as the existentiell-ontic embodiment of the way of Being-in, which is ‘Discourse’. While 
Language was said to be merely expressive, Discourse was defined as the ontological ground 
for expression which can also manifest itself in keeping silence. Finally, I turned my attention 
to the phenomenon of Falling, which I argued names: 1) Dasein’s inclination to lose itself in 
the ‘world’ of intraworldly entities; and 2) its tendency to flee unsettledness and hide in the 
publicness of das Man. Importantly, I noticed that, in spite of Heidegger’s negative 
characterisation of Falling, this constituent is an existential of Dasein, which provides the 
only possible launching pad from which the dis-closedness of anticipatory resoluteness may 
be achieved. 
 
After having analysed the concept of Disclosedness in its constituents, my research moved to 
engage with what Heidegger considers the most primary way, albeit not the most originary, in 
which Dasein is engaged in Disclosedness, that is, through the discoveredness of equipment. 
I defined the latter in terms of its reference to other equipment and ultimately to the totality of 
equipment which is in view of its Bewandtnis. I argued that there is for Heidegger a vertical 
structure which underlies the significance of a piece of equipment for Dasein, where the latter 
constitutes the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which of all Bewandtnis. The fact that the 
discoveredness of entities, especially as ready-to-hand equipment, depended on their 
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significance 1) clearly shows their relatedness to Dasein’s Being, and 2) demonstrates that the 
discoveredness of all entities ‘depends’, strictly speaking, on Dasein. While this does not 
mandate that each entity be dependent of Dasein’s discoveredness of them, their being 
independent is possible only on the ground of the possibility of this discoveredness. 
 
Through the discussion of equipment, I found that Dasein is always, already alongside other 
entities, in such a way that the being of these entities has always, already been somewhat 
understood. This is what at the outset of Being and Time Heidegger defines by the phrase 
‘pre-ontological understanding-of-Being’. While the latter names the primary way in which 
Dasein is always, already related to its Being, this does not mean that Dasein’s Being is 
always, already understood explicitly. On the contrary, I have shown that the outcome of 
Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-of-Being is a basic discoveredness of entities in the 
world which effectively conceals the Disclosedness of Being on which it is grounded. This 
tendency to understand Being in terms of intraworldly entities is explained by Heidegger 
through the notion of das Man. I defined this as a way of Being according to which Dasein 
comports itself as ‘any Dasein’, in the sense of what ‘anyone does’. While it is fair to define 
das Man as essentially inauthentic, I have clarified that das Man is not for this a negative 
phenomenon, since it affords Dasein a primary discoveredness of entities according to the 
way in which ‘anyone discovers’ them, in their ready-to-hand everydayness. As such, I 
argued that, insofar as the primary way in which Dasein understands its Being is pre-
ontological, das Man is also to be defined as a pre-ontological phenomenon. Similarly, since 
das Man is classified by Heidegger as the inauthentic way in which Dasein at once reveals 
and conceals its own Being, I claimed that Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-of-Being 
is itself inauthentic. Since all understanding-of-Being is at bottom a Disclosedness of the 
latter, I concluded that Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding-of-Being can be defined as an 
inauthentic Disclosedness. 
 
Further, I moved on to analyse the way in which Dasein’s Being is authentically disclosed. In 
order to do this, I began by considering the notion of meaning. I explained that according to 
Heidegger entities or Being come to be understood as ‘meaning’; the latter is nothing other 
than the entity itself, or Being as it becomes intelligible to Dasein. This means that the entity 
or Being comes to be projected in terms of their ownmost possibilities and according to a 
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formal existential framework which makes what is projected possible.
347
 This framework is 
nothing other than ‘meaning’ and was described as “the ‘upon-which’ of a primary projection 
in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something”. 348 As such, meaning was 
defined as the condition of possibility of articulation, i.e. of analysis.  
Following on from this, I considered the concept of Care. I found that Care names the totality 
of what I argued is a ‘disclosing structure’, as it mirrors the fundamental constituents of 
Disclosedness. I indicated that while the structure of Disclosedness describes the way in 
which anything, in general, is manifested in its Being, Care consists in a ‘Dasein-specific’ 
Disclosedness which signals the unitary structure of Dasein’s Being in its fundamental 
disclosing attitude. I argued this to be nothing other than Dasein’s constant ‘taking issue’ as 
‘that entity for which, in its being, that very being is an issue’.349 In spite of the high 
philosophical relevance of the notion of Care, I concluded that Care is only a half-way step, 
albeit a fundamental one, between Heidegger’s analysis of Disclosedness and his discussion 
of temporality. 
 
Further to this, Temporality was found to constitute the condition of possibility of the 
structure of Care as a unity. This is because, in defining Dasein’s finitude, temporality makes 
Dasein’s Being fundamentally possible, as it makes its concrete possibilities significant. This 
fact was clarified in terms of the articulation of these possibilities according to Dasein’s 
potentiality-to-be a finite whole, which constitutes the ‘upon-which’ of all of possibilities of 
Dasein. I concluded that temporality itself is the condition of possibility according to which 
Dasein’s Being can be disclosed. This is clearly expressed in Heidegger’s formulation: 
‘temporality temporalizes [zeitigt] itself’, which I understood in the sense that temporality 
makes itself ‘early’ [zeitig], that is, foundational in relation to the unitary structures of 
Disclosedness and Care. From this I determined that temporality is to be defined as the 
meaning of Care, that is, as the meaning of Dasein’s Being. 
 
Having established this point, I attempted to clarify the nature of the Disclosedness which 
provides the concrete Dasein with a vision of its Being as temporality. Firstly, I studied 
Heidegger’s discussion of Anxiety, where he argues it to be the disposition of an authentic 
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Disclosedness which is independent from anything in the world and directed towards nothing 
in particular –a threat that comes from nowhere. From this I established that what anxiety is 
anxious about is the way in which Dasein is-in-the-world, which is characterized by the 
unsettledness of its constant ‘being at issue’.350 I explained that the role of Anxiety is that of 
bringing Dasein face to face with the unsettledness of its articulated projective thrownness 
and in this way it manifests for the first time Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being itself in its 
totality. What is manifest, however, is ‘nothing’, namely, the fundamental nullity of Dasein’s 
Being, a nullity which I found was structural, given that Dasein is that entity whose essence is 
its existence and is therefore constantly ahead of itself in its possibilities. From this I deduced 
that Anxiety forces Dasein face to face with the nullity of its very own Being in terms of its 
meaning, that is, as the finitude of Dasein’s temporality; and I interpreted the latter as the 
abyss of Dasein’s ultimate impossibility of existence, namely, its death. This phenomenon 
was described as Dasein’s Being-towards-its end in terms of its potentiality to be-a-whole. 
This dissertation found that Dasein dies because the condition under which its Being, i.e. 
Care, can be a unitary phenomenon is the finitude of temporality. It is because Dasein’s 
temporality is finite that its Being is ‘possible’ and its possibilities are significant, insofar as 
they have been articulated according the meaningful, temporal horizon upon which Dasein’s 
Being can be disclosed. 
 
Secondly, I investigated Heidegger’s notions of Guilt and the Call of Conscience. I learnt that 
as Anxiety provides an initial clue for Dasein’s authentic Disclosedness of its Being in terms 
of temporality, Dasein finds itself called to take up the grounding nullity revealed by Anxiety. 
Dasein’s movement of taking up its own null Being-a-basis is what has been termed ‘Guilt’. 
This phenomenon is brought to light through a call which directs Dasein to face the temporal 
finitude which underpins its Being, i.e. Care, as Being-towards-death. I concluded therefore 
that the Call of Conscience amounts to a call for Dasein to embrace it ownmost potentiality-
for-Being-its-Self,
351
 as being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, in Being-
towards-death. I can say, therefore, that the call of conscience, through an appeal to Dasein’ 
Guilt, calls Dasein to authenticity by enjoining it to face its own death. 
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Finally, I established that the nullity of Dasein’s Being can be thought in terms of 
Disclosedness, albeit a distinctive case of it, on the basis that the phenomena of anxiety, 
being-guilty, the call and Dasein’s constant fleeing can be mapped against the constitutive 
structure of Disclosedness in general. I explained that this peculiar case is called by 
Heidegger ‘Resoluteness’ [Entschlossenheit] and is defined as ‘reticent’, insofar as it projects 
its Disclosedness upon the nullity of its finitude, ‘ready-for-anxiety’. In its reticence, 
Resoluteness brings Dasein to face its nullity, and ‘self-projecting’, as it discloses Dasein in 
its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole in terms of Dasein’s being-Guilty.352 Resoluteness was also 
said to be necessarily ‘anticipatory’ since it projects Dasein towards the finite completeness 
underpinned by it potentiality-for-annihilation, something which can never be attained within 
Dasein’s existence. 
 
During the structural analysis of anticipatory resoluteness, I came across Heidegger’s 
discussion concerning the provenance of the Call of Conscience. According to Heidegger, the 
Call comes at once from Dasein and from beyond it, so that the problem for my dissertation 
was to ascertain whether Dasein could in fact be at once the caller and the called one. The 
matter was further complicated by Heidegger’s insistence on the external nature of the caller 
in respect with the called one, defined as ‘beyond’. Resolving the issue concerning the nature 
of the beyond proved important not just in order to rescue Heidegger from a logical 
contradiction, but since it turned out to be connected with the more positive question 
concerning what is disclosed in anticipatory resoluteness. 
 
In order to explain Heidegger’s intention and avoid a patent contradiction, I considered the 
fundamental openness of Being afforded to Dasein by its choice to take itself up as 
potentially and finitely ‘whole’ in anticipatory resoluteness. I explained that, in order to 
choose its-Self, Dasein needs to be called out of its fallenness by something which is itself 
not fallen, something ‘other’ than itself. I found that the contradiction is only apparent insofar 
as the discursive nature of the Call of Conscience affords Dasein a fundamental ‘articulation’, 
distinguishing between two existentiell constituents of it, i.e. inauthentic das Man and 
authentic its-Self. Hence, Dasein is called out of its fallenness to attain its authentic its-Self. 
Hence, in a certain way, it can be said that Dasein calls itself from itself to its-Self. Indeed, I 
argued that in order to be constituted as its-Self, Dasein must entertain an original 
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relationship with its Being, by responding to the call of its Being, that is to say, by taking 
responsibility for its being-fundamentally-unsettled, or ‘Guilty!’. 
Since Dasein can never ‘actually’ be itself in its Being, its relation to its Being is said to be 
‘transcendental’, a fact which reinforces Dasein’s existential nature, where by ‘existence’ 
Heidegger means the constancy of Dasein’s relationship with the transcendence of its Being.  
the one who calls is said to be itself a nullity, insofar as it is essentially beyond Dasein and 
therefore fundamentally nothing (in-the-world). I then leveraged on Heidegger’s tenet of the 
ontological difference between Being and entities to argue that this nothing in the world is in 
fact Being itself. By establishing this identity, I was able to clarify that who calls Dasein out 
of its fallenness and towards its-Self is nothing other than Dasein’s very Being. In this way, I 
demonstrated that the call belongs to Dasein as one of its fundamental existentiale of its 
Being. However, due to its structural nullity, Dasein’s existential totality is effectively 
grounded by what is not within that very totality, while still constituting this very totality 
through and through. Hence, I showed that the ‘nothing’ which calls Dasein to its null 
finitude is the very Being of Dasein, a nullity which grounds the finitude of Dasein’s 
temporality. 
 
In this sense, Dasein consists, existentially, in a relationship with what it itself ‘is-not’; and 
yet, that which Dasein constantly is-not is also what Dasein ‘potentially is’ at any time. As 
such, I took a step further and defined Being as Dasein’s Other. This move was justified in 
terms of Dasein’s Care, as this signals Dasein’s essential relation with other entities, other 
Daseins and, ultimately, with its own Being as another.
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 I identified the latter to be the most 
basic type of Care, underpinning Dasein’s ontological character. Indeed, I found the nullity of 
Dasein to depend on the fundamental alterity of its Being, a heteronomy signalled by the very 
meaning of Dasein’s Being, i.e. finite temporality. 
 
Having established the alterity of Being in relation to Dasein, I first attempted to spell out the 
nature of this Being in terms of what it is ‘not’. I argued that, according to Heidegger, Being, 
unlike Dasein, is not an entity and is disclosed as ‘nothing’, so much so that it cannot be said 
that ‘Being is…’. This is because, unlike Dasein who is and cannot not be-in-the-World, 
Being is not-a-thing-in-the-World. For these reasons I believed that the definition of Being in 
terms of its otherness to Dasein was justifiable and indeed had already been attempted by 
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Raffoul before me. However, in discussing Raffoul’s interpretation of Being and Time, it 
became clear to me that, while his reading had achieved a dependable reading of Heidegger’s 
explicit treatment of Dasein’s Being from within Dasein’s understanding Disclosedness, a 
positive description of Being had remained unattempted. However, my contention was that, 
by applying Levinas’ notion of ‘Other’ to Heidegger’s Being, it was possible to achieve just 
such a thing. 
 
In order to do this, I turned once more to the notion of Care, in terms of which Dasein is 
constantly projected beyond itself and towards its Being, and noted that this notion implies an 
inalienable relation to that which Dasein itself is constantly ‘not’. I demonstrated that, while 
this relation underpins the entirety of Dasein’s existence, it shows itself openly only in 
authenticity, in terms of the disclosive relation which Heidegger calls ‘anticipatory 
resoluteness’. Through this phenomenon, Being is disclosed by Dasein in the only way 
Dasein can disclose anything, i.e. in terms of its meaning; hence, what Dasein discovers in 
anticipatory resoluteness is its own finite temporality. I argued that the latter provides the 
unitary framework (having-been, making present and future) within which Dasein is capable 
of grasping itself in terms of its possibilities and as a whole. This in turn is what makes 
Dasein able to entertain a relation with something that, ontically, surpasses Dasein at any 
point in time, while ontologically being Dasein. Hence, I argued that temporality constitutes 
the way in which the alterity of Being enters into Dasein’s intelligibility, as well as the 
grounding condition of Dasein’s Call as open (in the present of its fallen state), responsible 
(in taking responsibility for its having-been by responding to the call itself), and resolute (by 
futurally anticipating its own death and itself unto it). 
 
In this way I demonstrated that, by understanding temporality as the unitary structure of 
Dasein’s Being, Heidegger’s position is justified, in that Dasein can effectively relate to that 
which is beyond itself and yet is its-Self anticipatorily, as well as , paradoxically, to its Being 
in its fundamental alterity. Nevertheless, temporality is neither a property of Dasein nor an 
external term which allows for objective comprehension, but rather Being itself as it enters 
the intelligibility of Dasein. As such, I inferred that when Dasein, by facing its finitude, 
discloses its-Self in its Being as the unity of its possibility, what is disclosed amounts to 
Dasein’s very Being (Care) in that which renders it possible, namely, temporality. 
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I also remarked that, while this demonstration was carried out in terms of the intelligibility of 
temporality, understanding-of-Being cannot be an isolated phenomenon, but is possible only 
within the constituted totality of Disclosedness. I took this to suggest that the notion of 
‘understanding-of-Being’ is for Heidegger only a temporary way to define the fundamental 
relation which is later expanded in terms of Disclosedness. Indeed, unlike traditional 
understanding, Disclosedness in general is not the result of an effort made by Dasein, nor the 
effect of a supernatural cause, but the spontaneous and asymmetrical engagement between the 
caller and the called one. By responding, or not responding, to the call of its Being, Dasein 
establishes a relation with its other. In it, Dasein is both near to its Being in resoluteness and 
far from it due to its transcendent nullity. 
 
In this way, I demonstrated that the basis of Dasein’s Being is not mere understanding, but a 
complex relation of openness to something ‘other’. While, within such a relation, Being and 
Dasein are not relata, they are distinguished in terms of the discursive nature of the Call of 
Conscience, which separates Dasein from the null ground which lies beyond it. This 
separation, however, is not that of a subject from its object, so that it is only within the 
limitedness of a purely ontological perspective that a relational interpretation of Being and 
Time runs the risk of objectifying Being. This is where Crowell’s phenomenological 
interpretation shows its importance, as Dasein and its Being ‘are not’ separate, but can ‘be’ 
only as part of that common relation of Disclosedness within which the alterity of the one and 
the sameness of the other are articulated. Indeed, the two are themselves this relation, where 
the separation/analysis exists because of the unity, and the unity is disclosed through the 
analysis. 
 
Raffoul calls this disclosive relation ‘responsibility’, stressing the mechanism of the call 
which engenders a response. And indeed, I demonstrated that it is within this vocational 
dialogue that the totality of the possibilities of Dasein come to maturity [zeitigen] in 
anticipation. Nevertheless, it is only as part of this responsive relatedness that Being and 
Dasein ‘are’ and can be disclosed ontologically. Indeed, their disclosure is itself 
Disclosedness, that is, the fundamental relation in which the two terms show themselves as 
finite temporality. On the basis of this, I can finally argue that the ground of Disclosedness is 
nothing other than Disclosedness itself, as a relation of alterity between Dasein and its Being, 
in which the relation is not engendered by its relata but where the terms of the relation are the 
result of a discursive analysis of the relation itself. For this reason I have chosen to call my 
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interpretation of Being and Time ‘relational’, as it maintains the primacy of the 
phenomenological space of Disclosedness without sacrificing the analytical separateness 
between Dasein and its Being. 
 
 
iii. Final Remarks: issues, limitations and recommendation for future 
research 
 
I think that the exegesis of Being and Time proposed in this dissertation provides greater 
dependability and breadth than those currently widespread within US Heideggerian 
scholarship. Indeed, I have demonstrated that a shift from an epistemological to a relational 
interpretation allows for a comprehensive engagement with both published Divisions of 
Heidegger’s masterwork, and this seems more consistent with Heidegger’s intentions. 
However, this same approach carries with it a number of inevitable risks and shortcomings 
for which a solution is ultimately impossible within the scope of this dissertation. I hope that 
my open acknowledgment of what I understand to be these shortcomings will suffice in the 
context of the present work, while opening the possibility for future thought on these matters. 
In what follows, despite conceding a partial defeat, I hope the reader will nevertheless be 
satisfied that, until such time that a better approach is devised, the benefits of a relational 
reading of Being and Time greatly outweigh its risks and shortcomings. 
 
Certainly, the major theoretical risk that a relational interpretation of Being and Time runs is 
that, by relying too heavily on relational metaphors, the fragile balance of sameness and 
otherness is broken in favour of a more simplistic connectedness of relata. While in the 
present dissertation I have attempted to tread as carefully as possible along this fine line, I 
acknowledge that in many places this delicate equilibrium may have not been achieved, and a 
more simplistic and ultimately incorrect picture may have been painted. This is especially 
true in those final sections where the discussion of the relation between Dasein and its Being 
in terms of alterity is at its most complex. Unfortunately, this risk is so deeply enshrined 
within the overall approach, that any attempt to avoid it entirely would necessarily require the 
abandonment of my interpretative line tout court. 
 
Further to this, I must also acknowledge that, while the influence of US Heideggerian 
scholarship in Australia is undeniable, European and especially French Heideggerian 
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scholarship has also had an impact, albeit arguably a more subtle one. As such, the fact that in 
this dissertation I do not directly deal with Heidegger’s continental reception is certainly an 
important shortcoming. In spite of the benefits which a more comprehensive discussion of 
Heidegger’s interpretation may have engendered, the decision not to openly engage with the 
European tradition has been deliberate and has been motivated by two factors. Firstly, any 
attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the interpretation of Being and Time within 
European scholarship would have forced me to engage with nothing less than the entire 
history of continental philosophy from Sartre to Vattimo, an enterprise which would have 
quickly outgrown a single doctoral thesis and, possibly, the lifetime of a single scholar. 
Secondly, I firmly believe that, even in the Australian context where European interpretations 
have been acknowledged, US Heidegger scholarship still dominates the larger percentage of 
our local reading of Heidegger’s major text. 
 
In addition, I believe that while this dissertation aims to provide as comprehensive as possible 
a discussion of all topics which have been considered, an exhaustive treatment of each of 
these would have required a dedicated monograph. For example, a discussion of the notion of 
‘meaning’ and its connections with other notions such as Care, temporality, understanding 
and significance is one that I feel has not been completely developed within the present work. 
A study of this notion in its own right would definitely clarify the exact role of meaning 
within the economy of Being and Time and would better show the mechanics of its 
connection with Dasein’s Being. In my dissertation I have only been able to hint at these 
mechanisms. Additionally, the topic of Dasein’s finite temporality could be discussed in 
relation to one of the notions my dissertation has not been able to address, namely, History. 
Such a discussion would help to show that Heidegger’s analysis, while extremely theoretical, 
is ultimately motivated by an understanding of human Dasein as a concrete, specific 
individual. Furthermore, the connection between Dasein’s temporality and spatiality may 
provide fertile ground to review Heidegger’s position in the light of other influential 
philosophers, such as Descartes, Kant and Bergson. On the basis of this, it may be possible to 
expand on Heidegger’s anthropological analysis in order to tackle a number of questions 
Heidegger purposefully avoids, especially those concerning Dasein’s body. 
 
Finally, when in the present dissertation I introduced Levinas’ philosophy, I did so noting that 
I would attempt a very limited engagement of his work with Heidegger’s, focussing on those 
aspects of Levinas’ work which were relevant to my discussion concerning the disclosive 
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relation between Dasein and its Being. Nevertheless, in the course of my research, it has 
become apparent to me that the relation between Levinas and Heidegger represents an 
extremely rich topic for future research, insofar as there seem to be a number of opportunities 
where comparing one with the other may prove beneficial to our understanding of both. 
There are certainly a number philosophical and theoretical limits to such an enterprise and I 
am in no way suggesting that the thought of either of these philosophers be entirely reduced 
to the other. However, I believe that the boundaries of such an exploration cannot be 
appropriately set until this is actually attempted. In this sense, while outside the scope of the 
present dissertation, further research into this relation is not only recommended but indeed 
strongly encouraged. 
 
In spite of the shortcomings I have briefly outlined, the present dissertation has engaged with 
a number of topics from Being and Time which have been discussed in light of the four major 
interpretative streams currently available within Anglo-American Heideggerian scholarship. 
In this work, I have concluded that a further interpretative stream is needed to ensure future 
scholarship will focus on the relation between Dasein and its Being and the Disclosedness 
that this relation grounds. If I have been able to demonstrate one thing through this 
dissertation I hope it to be that it is only by seriously and methodically engaging with 
Heidegger’s Being and Time in its entirety that Heideggerian scholarship and, more in 
general, phenomenology can flourish within the context of today’s philosophical research. 
Such engagement is all the more important in Australia, where I have argued that the 
relatively small number of Heideggerian scholars of an international calibre has meant we 
tend to rely disproportionately on those dominant readings coming from the North-American 
context. My hope is that, by clarifying the shortcoming of the most widespread interpretation 
of Being and Time, as well as proposing a viable alternative which focuses on the disclosive 
relation between Dasein and its Being, I have succeeded in providing a ‘grounding clearing’ 
on which newer and better attempts to understand the nature of human Dasein and its Being 
may stand tall on the shoulders of this giant.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Glossary 
 
Resoluteness: Entscholssenheit 
Anxiety: Angst 
fear: furcht 
intraworldly: Innerweltlich 
Disposition*: Befindlichkeit
354
 
Disclosedness: Erschlossenheit 
Discoveredness *: Endecktheit
355
 
thrownness: Geworfenheit 
Intelligibility: Verständnlichkeit 
understanding-of-Being: Seinsverständnis 
understanding [an]: Verstandnis 
Understanding [existential phenomenon of]: Verstehen 
Understanding [common]: Verstand 
Significance: Bedeutsmakeit 
fallenness: Verfallenheit 
falling: Verfallen 
Existentiale: Existenzial 
Existentiell: Existenziell 
Totality-of-Involvement: Bewandtnisganzheit 
Bewandtnis *: Bewandtnis
356
 
For-the-sake-of-which: 
voice of conscience: Stimme des Gewissens 
temporal: zeitlich 
temporality: Zeitlichkeit 
Temporality: Temporalität 
authenticity: Eigentlichkeit 
Discourse: Rede 
Language: Sprache 
assertion: Aussage 
interpretation: Auslegung 
Interpretation: Interpretation 
ntelligibility: verständlichkeit 
characterise: bestimmen 
character: Bestimmung 
das Man: das Man 
one-self: Manselbst 
Being-one’s-self: Selbstsein 
  
                                                 
354
 Macquarrie & Robinson: ‘State-of-Mind’; Stambaugh: ‘Attunement’  
355
 Macquarrie & Robinson: also ‘Uncoveredness’; Stambaugh: ‘Discoveredness’; Kisiel: also ‘Uncoveredness’. 
356
 Macquarrie & Robinson: ‘Involvement’; Stambaugh: ‘Relevance’ 
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A Comparative Table of Being and Time Analytical Structures 
 
Disclosedness 
Dasein’s way of 
Being 
Care Temporality 
Anticipatory 
Resoluteness 
Disposition Being-already-in Facticity Having-Been Anxiety 
Understanding 
Being-ahead-of-
itself 
Existence Future Being Guilty 
Falling Being-alongside Fallenness Making Present Failing to hear 
Discourse Expressibility Articulatedness 
Ecstatic 
Articulation 
Call of 
Conscience 
 
 
 
